Leopold Schwarzschild, *Das Neue Tagebuch*, and Anti-Totalitarianism in Interwar Europe, 1933-1941

by

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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.
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Paris, July 1, 1933: The Historiography of Antifascism and Das Neue Tagebuch

It was a cool Saturday afternoon in Paris and the fog had finally thinned out. Carriages, buses “crammed with sightseers of five continents,” and taxis piloted by Russian immigrants crowded the wood-paved, fir-lined Boulevard de la Madeleine and Boulevard des Capucines, while on the asphalt sidewalks shoppers walked among the “blaze of azaleas, carnations, lilies, lilac, hortensias [and] chrysanthemums” – not to mention the newspaper kiosks and advertising pillars – that marked the Madeleine flower market. A few blocks away, M. Dupont’s 84-member Garde Républicaine orchestra gathered in the open-air theater at the Tuileries Gardens along the Seine to prepare for their weekly 4 o’clock afternoon concert, usually marked by Chausson’s Symphony, Ravel’s Pavane pour une infante defunte, and Debussy’s Martyrdom of Saint Sebastian; tourists from the hotels along the Rue de Rivoli crossed the boulevard to pay for a seat to listen to the ensemble, and the workers on break in the gardens either found a park bench within earshot or remained standing some distance away from the pay seats. From the “blowzy, full-bosomed women” who carried string bags that bulged with vegetables, to the “thin girls from the studios” to the “collarless men in cloth caps and slippers” out this Saturday, this was Paris on July 1, 1933.

Among the Parisians jostling for space among the sidewalks and the construction crews removing the odd dead fir tree from the sidewalk planters this afternoon, a new magazine had appeared in the kiosks of the boulevards this morning: Das Neue  

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4 Ibid., 26, 34.
Paris, July 1, 1933: The Historiography of Antifascism and Das Neue Tagebuch

Tagebuch, a weekly German-language magazine of about thirty pages. At three francs, the journal was more expensive than any of the daily publications, but the first issue featured exclusive articles by both the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss and the Austrian journalist and writer Joseph Roth. And yet it was the magazine’s editor, Leopold Schwarzschild, whose article, “After Hugenberg’s Last,” claimed topped billing. Schwarzschild, too, penned the “foreword” to Das Neue Tagebuch:

To open this magazine with a “foreword” seems superfluous to us. Neither our publisher, nor our editors, nor our coworkers meet the public as unknown. And even those who have never heard of our authors’ past work, or of the banned and destroyed Tagebuch will gain better disclosure from just a few of the following pages than from any foreword. […] The exceptional circumstances under which this German periodical appears in a foreign environment justify its publication.

“Exceptional circumstances” indeed had forced Schwarzschild and many other German authors to flee Germany. Jewish and leftist intellectuals had begun to flee Germany not long after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, but economic restrictions made the departure difficult. While those with a valid German passport could reach France, Austria, the Netherlands, or Czechoslovakia, it had been forbidden since 1932 for German citizens to take more than 200 marks out of the country with them, and a 25 percent tax was levied on those who wished to transfer their assets. It was only following the Reichstag Fire and subsequent Reichstag Fire Decree, which suspended most civil liberties in Germany, that the first real waves of emigration – and terror – really began. One intellectual wrote in his diary of how SA men broke into the apartment of his friend, the author, anarchist, and Soviet sympathizer Theodore Plievier,

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5 For example, Le Temps cost 40 centimes in 1933.
at six o’clock on the morning of February 28, only nine hours after the Reichstag Fire. As Plievier had stayed out that evening, the storm troopers mistakenly beat up his roommate, and, upon learning of their mistake, “smashed the apartment amid yells that they will yet avenge themselves on that swine Plievier.”

Gustav Regler, a Communist writer, watched the Reichstag burn and knew that he would be wanted by the police, but still, he wandered the streets of Berlin for several hours that evening. Only after a friend told him that his apartment had been searched, and after a sympathetic prostitute offered him the key to her squat, did he realize his predicament: “Berlin contained hundreds of thousands of workers who only yesterday had been my comrades. Now the time had come that there were only [Michael] Korth and [Erich] Franzen, two equally threatened writers, and a street-girl, to offer me help against being struck down.”

For fear of similar attacks or being sent to a concentration camp, an unprecedented number of intellectuals emigrated from Germany following the Reichstag Fire. And this was in spite of greater emigration controls. Train officers questioned passengers carrying much luggage on trains within Germany, and one émigré recalled a friend who had both his French visa and German passport confiscated as he tried to cross the border at Aachen.

Every individual story had its own wrinkles, but for all who left, the National Socialist dictatorship meant more than just geographical relocation. Alfred Döblin realized as early as April 28 that his poor command of French and English meant that his professional medical career was finished in exile. When Alfred Kerr, one of the leading

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12 Palmier, Weimar in Exile, 93, 688.
critics of the Weimar Republic, tried to attend shows in Prague and Paris, depression overcome even his egoism:

At the back of a box I was plunged into melancholy, for I brusquely recalled that I was no longer a drama critic in Berlin. I would not be able to utter my opinion there frankly. [...] How will German theater manage without me? Never again to write in German! It will be hard for me to take leave of this language to which I have given so much.\textsuperscript{14}

And yet two months after Kerr’s complaint appeared in the pages of \textit{Les Nouvelles Littéraires}, Leopold Schwarzschild (himself recently emigrated from Munich) closed the introduction to his magazine with a bolder reflection on the émigré’s position in exile.

Emigration, separation from one’s topsoil, can have two effects. It can set a splinter in one’s eye; also can it focus one’s vision. It can spark hate and bitterness to such a degree that it makes one mad. And yet emigration, like any kind of distance from things and events, can bestow greater prescience, more thoughtful objectivity, and a penetrating insight. The history of emigration furnishes examples of both cases. We hope to be counted among the second group. And so we turn to our work.\textsuperscript{15}

Granted: many likely continued the walk down the \textit{Boulevard de la Madeleine} and other streets in the 1\textsuperscript{st} arrondissement more concerned with the female shoppers whose ubiquitous string-handle bags threatened to swing into one’s knees than this journal in a foreign language, but \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} is a unique case in the history of 20\textsuperscript{th} century journalism and antifascism.\textsuperscript{16} What to make of this weekly periodical with a weekly circulation of 20,000 copies that appeared from this morning of July 1, 1933, until French regulations and Gestapo raids shut down the publication following its May 5, 1940 issue?\textsuperscript{17} What to make of a magazine that, while consistently anti-Nazi, featured more than 3,500 articles with contributors from Winston Churchill to Engelbert Dolfuss to Ilya Ehrenberg? Read by German exiles the world over; subscribed to by “the

\textsuperscript{14} Alfred Kerr, “Voyage sentimental,” \textit{Les Nouvelles Littéraires}, July 1, 1933.
\textsuperscript{15} Leopold Schwarzschild, “Die Woche,” \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} 1, No. 1 (July 1, 1933): 3.
\textsuperscript{16} Morand and Spiegel, \textit{Paris to the Life}, 34.
\textsuperscript{17} Leopold Schwarzschild, “Ein Abschnitt,” \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch}, September 23, 1933, 300.
chancelleries and general staffs of Europe;” debated in the House of Commons, the Parliament of the Third Republic, and in the Dutch States General: if one wishes to get an idea of what those Europeans and Americans classified as “antifascists” actually thought, and how their attitudes towards Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, a post-Hitler Europe, and other issues changed throughout the decade, then Das Neue Tagebuch is a good place to start.18

Yet any historian who attempts to write a new history of antifascism has a considerable legacy to be mindful of. The way historians have assessed antifascism has changed throughout the past century in light of events like the construction of the so-called “antifascist wall” in Berlin, or the fall of the Eastern European Communist dictatorships that relied on antifascism as their justification for existence. Therefore, in order to get a good idea of how scholarship on the subject has changed since the 1930s, and in order to make clear later how this thesis differs from previous works on the period, it is prudent to compare the approaches and theses of several major past works on the anti-Nazi movement. There is no defining work on antifascism, but taken together, several books and articles combine to yield a good general perspective.

It might be fitting to add “memoir” to the categories of books that focus on antifascism, since some of the first historians to attempt to write a coherent narrative of antifascism had been members of the struggle against the common enemy of fascism themselves. By the time Eric Hobsbawm’s general history of the twentieth century Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 appeared in 1994, this British historian was no stranger to the ideological balancing act required of twentieth century

leftists. Born to English-Jewish parents in Alexandria, Hobsbawm grew up in the political uncertainty of Berlin in the early 1930s. As Hobsbawm put it, “we were on the Titanic, and everyone knew it was hitting the iceberg. The only certainty was about what would happen when it did. Who would provide a new ship?”¹⁹ Hobsbawm became a fifteen-year-old Communist by 1932, and when he and his adoptive aunt and uncle fled to England the following year, he continued to study Marxism, among other things, and won a scholarship to Cambridge to study history. “What made Marxism so irresistible,” wrote Hobsbawm, “was its comprehensiveness. ‘Dialectical materialism’ provided, if not a ‘theory of everything,’ then at least a ‘framework of everything.’”²⁰ At King’s College, Hobsbawm joined the Cambridge University Socialist Club (CUSC) by 1936, an antifascist society to which between one-tenth and one-fifth of Cambridge’s student population claimed membership by 1939. Not that this amounted to much action: few of the CSUC’s members actually went to fight in Spain or elsewhere against fascist forces. “We enjoyed it,” wrote Hobsbawm, “even when, as for most of radical Cambridge, it did not occupy the bulk of our time, and we did a certain amount of world-saving as a matter of course, because it was the thing to do.”²¹ Following service in World War II in the British Royal Engineers, Hobsbawm became a lecturer at Birkbeck College at the University of London and a member of the Communist Party Historians Group (CPHG).

Hobsbawm, however, became most known for his socialism in 1956. Following Nikita Khrushchëv’s speech “On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences” at the 20⁰ Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, Hobsbawm, unlike most of the members of the CPHG, remained in the Party, and in October of that

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²⁰ Ibid., 97
²¹ Ibid., 119.
year he wrote an article in the *Daily Worker* supporting the Soviet invasion of Hungary. But even as Hobsbawm later identified more with Italian Eurocommunist parties, “he always talked himself out of disillusionment.”\(^{22}\) In a 1994 interview, for example, Hobsbawm responded to the question of whether 20 million deaths would have been justified to create a communist utopia with “yes.” As he reflected at age 92 on the “interesting times” in which he had lived, Hobsbawm concluded that Communism meant something different for him than for most of his colleagues. He became a convert earlier, when “being a communist meant not simply fighting fascism but the world revolution.”\(^{23}\) Hobsbawm admired the attitude of Communist leaders like Georgi Dimitrov and Ephraim Feuerlicht (an Austrian Communist and organizer of the French Resistance who was executed in Paris in 1944), “men of strong, lucid intelligence and remarkable learning” who “had chosen not to interpret the world but to change it.”\(^{24}\) For Hobsbawm there was something attractive about this kind of intellectual who “resisted the temptations of a post-political refuge in literature or [a] graduate seminar.” Hobsbawm apparently felt that leaving the Party would amount to an abdication of his political responsibility as an intellectual. Finally, though, Hobsbawm refused to give up his Party membership out of pride: “I could,” he wrote, “prove myself to myself by succeeding as a known communist – whatever ‘success’ meant – in spite of that handicap, and in the middle of the Cold War.”\(^{25}\)

What kind of history did Hobsbawm write? A co-founder of *Past and Present* and the author of works on 19th-century Europe like *The Age of Capital* and *The Age of...*
Empire, Hobsbawm was a prolific writer, but the work of his most relevant to this thesis is *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*. For someone known as a socialist historian, Hobsbawm minimized the importance of the Cold War to his narrative of the century. Indeed, Hobsbawm regarded the entire Soviet project that had given him and others so much hope as a historical accident:

> The strength of the global socialist challenge to capitalism was that of the weakness of its opponent. Without the breakdown of nineteenth-century bourgeois society in the Age of Catastrophe, there would have been no October Revolution and no USSR. The economic system improvised in the ruined rural Eurasian hulk of the former Tsarist Empire would not have considered itself, nor been considered elsewhere, as a realistic global alternative to the capitalist economy.\(^{26}\)

While Hobsbawm was careful to emphasize the astonishing number of humans killed or allowed to die by human decision in the 20th century – 187 million, or one-tenth of the global population in 1900 – a careful reading of *Age of Extremes* suggests that this most political of historians regarded the military and ideological conflict between communist and capitalist countries as a minor story of the 20th century. Hobsbawm the communist saw food and agriculture as the major development of the century:

> the third quarter of the century marked the end of the seven or eight millennia of human history that began with the invention of agriculture in the stone age, if only because it ended the long era when the overwhelming majority of the human race lived by growing food and herding animals.\(^{27}\)

In the end, Hobsbawm seemed to minimize the importance of the antifascist struggle to which he had devoted the prime of his life; the history of conflicts involving 20th century socialism, he predicted, “will probably seem of more limited historical interest – comparable, in the long run, to the sixteenth and seventeenth-century wars of religion or the Crusades.” Hobsbawm’s *Age of Extremes* turned out to be an *Age of Agriculture* in which backward agrarian countries in both the capitalist and socialist world modernized.


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Yet Hobsbawm’s scholarship did not overlook the antifascist movement to which he and other Cambridge students had been party. In the chapter of *Age of Extremes* devoted to antifascism and the Second World War, “Against the Common Enemy,” Hobsbawm argued, “the politics of the West can be best understood, not through the contest of states, but as an international ideological civil war.”28 But the European Civil War (1933-1945, roughly) that Hobsbawm posited was not between capitalism and communism *per se*, but rather “between ideological families: on the one hand the descendents of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the great revolutions including, obviously, the Russian revolution; on the other, its opponents.”

Hobsbawm’s European Civil War thesis seems like an interesting way to think about the period, but its major weakness is that it elides the existence of intellectuals who were both anti-Nazi and anti-Stalinist during the period – Leopold Schwarzschild among them. Hobsbawm does mention that class of Western journalists, to which Schwarzschild belonged, that “played a crucial role in alerting even more conservative readers and decision-makers to the nature of National Socialism,” but neither does he mention these influential antifascists were anti-Communists, nor the fractiousness that existed between Communist and non-Communist antifascists.29

Hobsbawm, in other words, presents to his reader a world in which Communists did little harm in the struggle against antifascism. Granted, Hobsbawm did not have the luxury of hindsight in 1932 when he became a Communist, but it still seems not to have occurred to him as late as 1994, when *Age of Extremes* was published, that it was manifest to many in the 1930s that Communism was not the force of “progress” and the

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28 Ibid., 144.  
29 Ibid., 150.
Enlightenment that he still saw it as. The Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939 was for him more a sign of “the divisions between states which made possible the rise of Nazi Germany” than of the hollowness of Communist antifascism. And so on. “If you ask me,” wrote Hobsbawm, defending his admiration for the Soviet Union, “to entertain the proposition that the defeat of National Socialism was not worth the 50 million dead and the uncounted horrors of the Second World War, I simply could not.” What Hobsbawm never seems to have realized is that one could agree with this statement without also decrying the poverty of Soviet Communism.

Hobsbawm’s commitment to socialism did not pass, but other historians were soon to try their hand at writing a history of antifascism. François Furet, whose 1995 The Passing of an Illusion marked an about-face from Hobsbawm’s interpretation, was one. Furet, born to a wealthy Parisian banker in 1927, was too young for antifascism to have mattered to him in the same way it did to Hobsbawm, but Furet still began his career as a Marxist historian like Hobsbawm. Yet after Furet’s early work on the French Revolution threw doubt on whether a bourgeois class had even existed, Furet began to remake himself more and more as an anti-Marxist historian. Furet had left the Communist Party in 1956 after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, unlike Hobsbawm, and after he composed a conventional account of the French Revolution in La Révolution Française (1965), he began to attack French Marxist historiography of the Revolution and the leading representative of that historiographical school, Albert Marius Soboul. While at Princeton as a visiting professor in 1969, Furet composed the article “Le catéchisme

30 Hobsbawm, Interesting Times, 418.
révolutionnaire,” which he described as a “declaration of war” against Marxist historians, and he later incorporated the article into an anti-Marxist book, *Penser la révolution française*.33 Some part of the war against Soboul may have had older roots: in the late 1940s, Furet, at the time a Stalinist, had criticized Soboul for “Trotskyite” deviation. At any rate, the war between Furet and Soboul reached its climax at a colloquium on the Revolution at Göttingen in 1975, where Soboul was giving a presentation on class struggle in France in 1789 and quoting Tocqueville on “the fury of the peasants.” Robert Darnton, who attended the colloquium, recalls what followed:

Furet interrupted him, using the intimate “tu”: “Listen, Marius. All of us here have read Tocqueville.” He then proceeded to summarize Tocqueville’s argument in a few perfectly formed sentences aimed squarely at the Marxist view of class warfare. Soboul flew into a rage, banged the table, screamed in fury: “It’s in the Vulgate! It’s in the Vulgate!” I had never seen a grown-up behave like that in public. Furet did not blink an eye, did not tense a muscle. The plebian fury washed over him, like water off a duck.34

When Furet tried his hand at 20th-century history with *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, the result was a book unlikely to make many Communist friends. As Furet described in the preface of the book, he was most interested in Communism’s “inseparability from a basic illusion,” namely the idea that Communism “conformed to the necessary development of historical Reason and that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ thus appeared to have a scientific function.”35 The point of *The Passing of an Illusion*, was, therefore, to track “the constant adjustment” that was the work of Communism; how it managed to integrate unexpected historical developments into its system of beliefs.36

33 Ibid., 314.
34 Ibid., 315-316.
36 Ibid., x.
Antifascism, Furet argued, marked one of these cynical shifts in Communism that allowed Soviet leaders to downplay the Moscow Trials and the Great Terror. According to Furet, after a period of about a year and a half from 1933-1934 that ended with the Night of the Long Knives, Stalin began to realize that Nazism was no passing phenomenon. “He understood what no one in the West wanted to admit: that Mein Kampf was a government program. The USSR was consequently in danger and needed to ensure it was not alone in opposition to Hitler.”

The “class against class” Communism of 1929-1934 had to be replaced by a Popular Front approach that united Communists, Social Democrats, and other non-Communist liberals. The strategy, wrote Furet, could satisfy both hardcore Communists and plain leftists. For the former, National Socialism was “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, the most imperialist elements of financial capital” and hence a more pressing target than the simple bourgeois states of Western Europe; for the latter, Communists had changed from categorical anti-capitalists to flexible partners in a general struggle against Nazi Germany.

The USSR had, through the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935, gained a useful partner to protect itself from the Third Reich, and the entry of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations on September 18, 1934 strengthened that organization, too. Antifascism may have been a real point of idealism for Western liberals, conceded Furet, but that did not change the fact that it was essentially the result of a cynical shift in Stalin’s grand strategy.

At the same time, however, antifascism also demanded blindness on the part of Western intellectuals to the atrocities in the Soviet Union, which far outstripped those of

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37 Ibid., 224.
38 Georgi Dimitrov, quoted in Furet, The Passing of an Illusion, 221.
Nazi Germany, at least in the 1930s. Furet would have nothing of Hobsbawm’s claim that the antifascist side of the “European Civil War” represented Enlightenment liberalism. Was it not in the Soviet Union that only five months after the Night of the Long Knives that the assassination of Sergei Kirov was used to justify the Great Purges? “At the time,” noted Furet, “Hitler was a mere sorcerer’s apprentice on the scale of mass terror. Compared to the liquidation of the Bolshevik Party between 1935 and 1938, the Night of the Long Knives appears a minor incident.”

Hobsbawm, in arguing that Stalin was a leader in the tradition of Robespierre, had taken the bait of the antifascist narrative:

Hitler was decrying the principles of 1789, while Stalin was promulgating the new Soviet constitution of 1936 with great pomp. Through antifascism, the Communists had recovered the trophy of democracy without renouncing any of their basic convictions. During the Great Terror, Bolshevism reinvented itself as a freedom by default.

Furet’s ‘anti-antifascist’ narrative is a solid corrective to Hobsbawm’s account of the period, but it, too, has many holes. While *The Passing of an Illusion* is a book devoted to Communism in the 20th century, Furet’s criticism of the antifascist movement fails to take into account those opponents of Hitler who were not played by the Comintern: the Austrian Social Democrats, Schwarzschild and conservative Germans in Paris, and American anti-Nazis. While Furet’s account of antifascism as a Stalinist illusion may dispel Hobsbawm’s enthusiasm for the period, in other words, it also suppresses the story of those activist intellectuals whose antifascism was a “necessary and heroic moment in the history of the West’s resistance to totalitarianism in the first place,” and ignores the antifascism of German exiles that constituted “one of the few

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40 Ibid., 224.
authentic traces of the humanist and democratic face of the ‘other Germany’ to be salvaged from the collapse of communism.”

By the 1990s a new generation of historians had begun to reassess antifascism. No longer former members of antifascist movements, these historians, born in the decade following World War II, wrote in the wake of the fall of Europe’s premier antifascist state, the German Democratic Republic. The obvious question to ask, then, was whether antifascism (the justification for the existence of the GDR) had any philosophical legitimacy, or whether it was, as Furet had argued, just a front for a new form of Communist terror. Antonia Grunenberg, a German political scientist who had lived in West Germany, described the motivations for her attack on antifascism in the introduction to her 1993 essay *Antifascism – A German Myth*.

The occasion for my interest in the myth of antifascism was the attempt of East German intellectuals following the opening of the Wall to propagate the story that the early years of the GDR, the 40s, had been some “Golden Age” of morality in politics, that this was practically the dowry the GDR had brought to its marriage with the Federal Republic.

What was more, Grunenberg felt that the question of German reunification had exposed the hypocrisy of the antifascist myth:

I was moved, too, by how hesitantly, how cautiously, indeed, how negatively West German intellectuals reacted to reunification. Many of them who in the years before had been interested little in the GDR had been nevertheless (or perhaps I should say *therefore*) of the opinion that the GDR had best embodied the “Other Germany,” better preserved in spite of all suppression of free thinkers, in spite of a political elite that had been so rigid, so complacent, and so cynical, that it could not perceive the clear signs of its own defeat.

Grunenberg’s book went on to argue for the illegitimacy of the German antifascist tradition, but it derived its meaning from the historical moment in which it appears, at a time when historians had begun to assess the meaning of the 20th century, in particular

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41 Ibid., 4.
the meaning of National Socialism and East German Communism to any German identity. In Grunenberg’s opinion, antifascism was a myth used to promote a liberal narrative of German history whose defining moments were the Revolutions of 1848 and 1918, antifascism in the GDR, and the student revolts of 1968. Antifascism could provide Germans with an alternative, prouder, historical narrative than one that presented Nazism as the logical outcome to 19th-century German history. As Grunenberg argued, however, German antifascism was so marked by state terror and oppression that to use it as a part of a post-1990 German history was laughable. The way to a healthy German democratic state was civil society movements and reforms, not an antifascist narrative of history. In the end, Grunenberg’s analysis accurately grasped the 20th century narrative that was at stake in historians’ debates about antifascism, but like Hobsbawm and Furet, Grunenberg focused too much on antifascism as the GDR practiced it without paying attention to antifascist groups of the 1930s.

By the mid 1990s, several American, German, and Israeli historians had begun a second wave of research on antifascism that was both more thoughtful towards grand narrative than Furet or Hobsbawm had been, and more open to non-Communist antifascist groups than Grunenberg. On April 12-13, 1995, international scholars met at Columbia University to “debate the usefulness and liabilities of the concept of antifascism,”43 and the Winter 1996 issue of New German Critique was exclusively devoted to the “legacies of antifascism.”44 The contents of the issue show that the debates over antifascism were less about factual quibbles than how to impose a narrative on the

43 Anson Rabinbach, “Legacies of Antifascism,” New German Critique, No. 67 (1996), 6. The scholars who attended the conference were: David Bathrick (Cornell); Dan Diner (Tel Aviv); Geoff Eley (Univ. of Michigan); Antonia Grunenberg (Univ. of Pennsylvania); Denis Hollier (Yale); Mary Nolan (NYU); Leonardo Poggi (Università di Modena), and Frank Stern (Tel Aviv).
44 New German Critique, No. 67 (Winter 1996).
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20th century. “Debates about antifascism,” wrote NYU historian Mary Nolan in her contribution to the issue, “represent efforts to impose a political coherence and narrative – be it fascism versus antifascism, socialism versus capitalism, or the torturous but ultimately triumphant progress of liberal democracy.”45 Just as Hobsbawm sought to turn the 1930s into a European Civil War over Enlightenment values, Furet turned the period into a tale of Stalinist political manipulation. More than just focus on grand narrative, however, Nolan argued for more attention to the “positions ignored in the narrative of antifascism that focuses on the German Communist Party from the 1920s through the 1940s and then on the GDR’s construction and deployment of antifascism.”46 To that end, Nolan focused more in her article on New Beginning, a socialist antifascist group founded in 1929 and led by Walter Löwenheim (known better through his pseudonym Miles). Nolan’s essay successfully pointed out the poverty of an approach that focused only on communist antifascists (Hobsbawm, Furet, and Grunenberg), but her modest essay could not grapple with the larger narratives put forward by Hobsbawm or Furet.

Neither did the other articles in New German Critique address the question of anti-Communist antifascism. Dan Diner’s article, “On the Ideology of Antifascism,” was a conspicuous example of the old approach. In it, Diner gave a scathing assessment of antifascism as a lie that denied the Holocaust, but he focused far too much on antifascism as state-sponsored ideology in the GDR and failed to assess the positive legacy of either New Beginning, Das Neue Tagebuch, or other non-communist antifascist groups. Little of Diner’s analysis as concerned the GDR was off the mark: antifascism, at least as practiced in the GDR, according to Diner, “assumed a quasi-organic link between capital,

46 Ibid., 35.
capitalist crisis, and fascist rule, which, in order to initiate a social transformation into socialism, needs to be fought in the form of either open fascism or the potential fascism implicit in bourgeois society. More than bad history, this part of the antifascist “lifelong lie” (Lebenslüge) justified the repressive socialist rule of the GDR. Even worse, however, this antifascist narrative demanded the silencing of alternative explanations of German fascism, most conspicuously anti-Semitism. This, according to Diner, “resulted in a striking paradox:”

any comment on national socialist mass extermination as a core event of German fascism that transcended economic relevance not only meant a deviation from the dogmatic understanding of history, but was ultimately also felt to be an attack on the basic historical assumptions of the GDR’s collective project.

This argument may be true as concerns the GDR, but the problem with it is that it attempts to create an identity between state-sponsored antifascism in East Germany and all antifascist movements. Diner appears to have partly recognized this problem when he wrote the following in the article:

Left-wing identity, no matter what its provenance, simply cannot help being afflicted by the GDR’s crime. The decaying collective body of the GDR and its historical justification – antifascism – appear to exude a venom which infests all those who feel – however idiosyncratically – to be part of this system of legitimation. Such an incisive effect of historical denial sheds light on the fundamental significance of that which grounds all antifascism, no matter how much those who profess it define themselves in opposition to the GDR.

Diner’s argument seems to be that the antifascism of the GDR was so particularly noxious that all antifascist movements are tarnished by its legacy. It may be historically understandable that Diner would make this argument; after all, he, like Grunenberg, wrote in the milieu of post-Wende Germany where left wing intellectuals spoke sympathetically of the GDR. But that does not mean that his argument is correct. To go

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48 Ibid., 130.
49 Ibid., 124.
from denouncing those post-1990 reconstructions of the GDR’s history to claiming that antifascism was an tradition without any legitimacy does not make sense. In Grunenberg and Diner’s writings, time seems to flow backwards: the antifascism of *Das Neue Tagebuch* and other Western intellectuals is damned by the later policies of the GDR ten to twenty years after the fact. Groups that opposed Nazism before the Holocaust ever took place are slandered under the label of Holocaust denial. This is not a tenable argument. However one reads Diner’s argument, though, his article shows how much “antifascism” has been taken to mean Communist intellectuals who interpreted the Third Reich as a capitalist phenomenon, or the GDR, rather than just groups and individuals who simply opposed Nazism.

Fortunately, new sources and fresh eyes (the present writer was five years old at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall) give the historian of antifascism today the chance for a renewed look at the movement. *Das Neue Tagebuch* is a rich source for understanding how antifascists thought. A study of the paper can show how much these German exiles saw the war in the same way as Hobsbawm as well as the degree to which they really were afflicted by Furet’s “illusion.” *Das Neue Tagebuch* itself and its history presents the historian with a wide array of primary sources with their own unique history. Beyond the complete run of the paper that Princeton University’s Firestone Library owns, I was able to see the remaining archives of the paper at the Federal Archives in Berlin, Germany in August 2007. The archives consist of a collection of manuscripts, correspondence, and office notebooks that the paper’s enemies managed to preserve; the Gestapo confiscated the Paris offices of the paper in spring 1940 and took the papers to Berlin, where they remained until 1945. Soviet occupation forces subsequently moved
the files to the Soviet Union and Poland. They remained there until 1957 (Soviet-owned files) and 1961 (Polish-owned files), when they were repatriated to the Institute for Marxism-Leninism (later the Central Party Archive of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and, later and only partly, to the German Central Archive in Potsdam. Following German reunification, the files, split between the IML and the Central Archive, were reunited at the Federal Archives in the Lichterfelde suburb of Berlin. Moreover, the Leo Baeck Institute in New York City contains Schwarzschild’s correspondence and manuscripts from his time in America after 1940. Between the thousands of Das Neue Tagebuch articles and the paper’s correspondence, there is much material here for a reassessment of interwar antifascism.

Now that we have gone through the historiography of the subject, we can make clear how Das Neue Tagebuch challenges the conventional interpretations of antifascism. One of the few sites of antifascism that remained anti-Stalinist and anti-Nazi throughout the 1930s, and a paper that sought desperately to warn Western readers who would not pay attention of the danger of both regimes, Das Neue Tagebuch was the center of European anti-totalitarian culture in the 1930s. It was part of an international constellation of anti-totalitarianism, one marked by thinkers like the theologian Paul Tillich, the economist Calvin Hoover, the journalist William Henry Chamberlin, and many writers for the journal Partisan Review. Like many of these other points in the anti-totalitarian world, it regarded the Soviet Union and Communism as a threat to

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50 See in particular Paul Tillich, “The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church,” Social Research, November 1934, 405-433.
53 Gleason, Totalitarianism, 44-45.
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humanity second only to National Socialism. It was an example of that “humanist and democratic face of the ‘other Germany,’” and of how antifascism was more than Stalinist cynicism or a “German myth.” While Schwarzschild had an intense hatred of Communism, the paper was one of the few anti-Nazi voices of the 1930s that both fully grasped the nature of the German threat and the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union.\(^{54}\) If anything, the existence of *Das Neue Tagebuch* and the analytic articles it published during the 1930s shows the poverty of both Communist antifascism and the liberal democratic governments of the period: the former because *Das Neue Tagebuch* made clear the nature and scale of the atrocities in the Soviet Union at the same time that Western European antifascists held Stalin as a champion of liberty; the latter because the paper made clear through prose and technical articles the re-armament and expansionist aims of Hitler’s Germany – claims that were only eventually fully appreciated by the conservative readers of the paper, like Winston Churchill.

Further, a study of *Das Neue Tagebuch* shows that it is misguided to speak of interwar antifascism *per se*. Many of the German émigré thinkers who grouped around *Das Neue Tagebuch* recognized the Soviet Union as the terror state it was, and Schwarzschild was often referred to in retrospect as the German Joseph McCarthy. There was hardly an antifascist “front” between European conservatives and Communists “against the common enemy,” as Eric Hobsbawm claimed.\(^{55}\) Conservatives like Schwarzschild despised National Socialism long before Communist antifascists attempted to form any National Fronts, and any support *Das Neue Tagebuch* or other conservative émigrés had for the Soviet Union is best expressed by Churchill’s statement


\(^{55}\) Ibid., 6.
justifying his support of the Soviet Union after the German invasion: “If Hitler were to
invade Hell, I should find occasion to make a favorable reference to the Devil.” The only
period of catholicism between socialists and German Communists was short (from early
1934 to August 1936) and involved mutual suspicion on both sides. Schwarzschild’s
engagement with the Communists was even more limited. And after the Moscow Trials,
it was not uncommon for Schwarzschild to directly compare the Soviet Union with Nazi
Germany – hardly a sign of unity with Communists.

The best way, then, to look at the 1930s in light of Das Neue Tagebuch and the
renewed emphasis it puts on anti-totalitarian opponents of Hitler and Stalin, is to add to
the narratives of the Popular Front and Communist opponents of Hitler the story of
“Cold War Zero.” Cold War Zero, a war of ideas, not weapons, presaged the rhetoric of
the “First Cold War” of the 1940s and the “Second Cold War” of the 1980s. It was a war
waged between anti-totalitarians and European Communists whose rhetoric
foreshadowed the antagonisms of post-war Europe. Das Neue Tagebuch was the center of
this liberal anti-totalitarian culture in Europe that opposed both National Socialism and
Stalinism, until the logic of Hitler’s war and the necessary Western alliance with the
Soviet Union forced Schwarzschild’s press out of print and his opinions out of vogue
until the First Cold War made such anti-Soviet ideas fashionable again.

The story of the seven-year career of Das Neue Tagebuch is divided into four
chapters, organized chronologically.

The first chapter, “German Paris, 1933: The World of the Émigrés,” details the
beginning of Das Neue Tagebuch in Paris and attempts to give an idea of the intellectual
life and assumptions of the German émigrés in Paris. In contrast to past narratives of
antifascist groups, like those of Mary Nolan or Furet, this chapter goes beyond analyzing just the political positions of the antifascist émigrés and seeks to ask how those in Paris did things: where they lived, what they ate, where they worked, and what they read. The chapter also investigates how émigré intellectuals read by “reviewing the review” that Siegfried Kracauer wrote of André Malraux’s *The Fate of Man* in an early issue of *Das Neue Tagebuch*. Finally, more conventionally, the chapter turns to Leopold Schwarzschild’s self-defense after allowing Engelbert Dolfuss to publish an article in the inaugural issue of *Das Neue Tagebuch*; Schwarzschild’s defense of his decision to publish Dolfuss reveals much about the way he saw the world in 1933 as a war between civilization (non-Nazi Europe) and non-civilization (Nazi Germany).

In the second chapter, “Berlin, 1933-1935: Happiness in a Tin Can and the Nazi ‘Black Budget,’” the narrative moves to *Das Neue Tagebuch’s* exposure of Germany’s secret rearmament, an episode that both shows how the journalists of *Das Neue Tagebuch* did their work and emphasizes their increasingly pragmatic, realist stance towards Nazi Germany as opposed to other antifascists. The main thrust of this chapter is to show how Schwarzschild and the other reporters at *Das Neue Tagebuch* grasped that the Third Reich was not just a dictatorship run by exploitative and violent imperialistic capitalists. The Nazi economy was not just another form of capitalist exploitation, but a strange variety of socialism that went to extreme measures to reduce unemployment (statistically if not in reality) and employed creative modes of public financing both to build public works projects and to fund German rearmament. The aim throughout the chapter is to show how the German public works projects were financed, how rearmament was clandestinely funded, and how reporters from *Das Neue Tagebuch* uncovered the secret
German rearmament. By taking a more technical approach than the other chapters, we can get an idea of how the journalists at *Das Neue Tagebuch* did their work in addition to the assumptions about the German economy that separated them from Communists. More than that, however, the chapter shows how Schwarzschild argued that the proper response of Western democracies to German re-armament was an arms race; not only Schwarzschild’s rhetoric but also his arguments and strategic vision presaged the later Cold Wars.

In the third chapter, “Moscow/Paris, 1935-1937: Communism Turns Ugly,” the focus turns to *Das Neue Tagebuch*’s reportage of the Moscow Trials and the intense break of the paper from the German Communists in Paris and Prague. At the same time when Mosse’s Cambridge cohort and other European antifascists prickled with excitement at the prospect of fighting in the Spanish Civil War, Schwarzschild gave up his belief in the Soviet Union as a force for human progress and excoriated other antifascists’ attitudes towards Communism. The two years from 1934-1936 were marked by a short period of limited catholicism between Schwarzschild and German Communists in exile, but that period was followed by Schwarzschild’s increasingly aggressive attitude towards German Communists and the Soviet project in general. Schwarzschild would soon openly compare Soviet Communism to National Socialism, and any hopes of an “antifascist” alliance were dashed because of the Communists’ support of the Moscow Show Trials and Schwarzschild’s uncompromising stance against tyranny. Indeed, Schwarzschild and *Das Neue Tagebuch* grew throughout this period from an anti-Nazi publication into one of the major points in the international constellation of anti-totalitarianism, a publication that featured all of the tropes of the Cold War.
This thesis’ conclusion, “New York, 1940-1941: Gog and Magog and the Historiography of Antifascism,” focuses on Schwarzschild’s escape from France in the fall of 1940, his arrival in America and contact with other anti-Nazi liberals, and his 1941 work *Gog and Magog: The Nazi Bolshevik Twins*. The aim throughout is to see how Schwarzschild identified himself as an anti-totalitarian (anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet) during this period, and to see how great the split from pro-Soviet antifascists had become since the Moscow Trials. The chapter concludes with several reflections on the novel findings of this thesis with regards to the historiography of antifascism.

Let us turn from the structure and argument of this thesis back to the streets of Paris. The forty-two year old Schwarzschild could rest content that Saturday, June 1, with his wife, Valerie, at the couple’s apartment (rue Weber 6) following the publication of *Das Neue Tagebuch*’s first issue. Weeks of making the trip along Line One of the Paris Metro from the rue Obligado station to Champs-Élysées – Clemenceau station, then the walk to the Société Néerlandaise d’Editions, the home of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, had paid off. Schwarzschild had years of journalism experience behind him as the editor of *Das Tagebuch*, the Munich-based predecessor of his new Paris magazine, but this was a different journalistic situation entirely. Whether it was simply finding the new address of frequent contributor Vladimir d’Ormesson (rue Vaneau 55, down several buildings from André Gide) in this new milieu of Paris, or coaxing articles from journalist, writer, and frequent alcoholic Joseph Roth (last heard of in Halle [Salle] that Friday afternoon), editing an anti-Nazi paper in a foreign country in these times was no small feat. Schwarzschild would soon have to edit fellow Paris transplant Siegfried Kracauer’s

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56 Bundesarchiv (Berlin-Lichterfelde), File R8046-11
57 Bundesarchiv (Berlin-Lichterfelde), Files R8046-16; R8046-4.
contribution to the periodical, the essay “Seen With European Eyes,” not to mention his own essay on the new American president, Franklin Roosevelt, and a host of other articles.\(^{58}\)

Schwarzschild’s route from Berlin to Paris was not an easy one. Between secondary texts and Schwarzschild’s personal files from his time in America, we know the following about him. Born in 1891 in Frankfurt, Schwarzschild was forced by his family to study business at the University of Frankfurt, but the young man had a taste for journalism, and he began to publish articles about German politics in addition to his university studies.\(^{59}\) Schwarzschild fought for the German Army for four years in World War I, and by the time the war ended – at least according to Schwarzschild’s own account – “jobs and commissions were offered to him,” and from 1919-1921 he made a living both as a freelance journalist for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and Berlin *Börsen-Courier*, in addition to being entrusted by “the German Treasury with the organization of the campaign for the first international loan of the new-born republic in the Frankfurt district.” Schwarzschild had also written a play about the 1918 German Revolution, *Sumpf*, but this was his last literary attempt; “although the play was successfully produced in many cities,” he later wrote, “I soon discovered the insufficiency of my bellettristic talents.”

This proved to be a wise move, for Schwarzschild developed a reputation throughout the 1920s as one of the preeminent journalists of the Weimar Republic. In 1921, Schwarzschild was invited to become the co-editor and co-publisher of *Das Tage-

\(^{58}\) Siegfried Kracauer, “Mit europäischen Augen gesehen,” *Das Neue Tagebuch* 1, No. 2 (July 8, 1933), 39; Leopold Schwarzschild, “Roosevelts Evangelium,” *Das Neue Tagebuch* 1, No. 2 (July 8, 1933), 36.

\(^{59}\) Leopold Schwarzschild, “Auto-Biographical Notes,” Leo Baeck Institute (New York), Collection # AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
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*Buch*, a “high-brow weekly” in Berlin that was one of the most well-respected weekly papers in Weimar Germany. As Schwarzschild put it, “[*Das Tage-Buch*] was the first German publication that really understood the nature of the Mark debacle of the early 20’s, and the one and only remedy for it: shutting down the printing press. The magazine was equally alone in its desperate campaign against the super-deflation policy of 1930-32 which, indeed, broke the neck of the republic.” In addition to *Das Tage-Buch*, which he edited alone after Carl von Ossietzsky’s 1927 departure from the paper, Schwarzschild also edited *Montag Morgen*, a “’low-brow’ and popular” weekly, as well as *Magazin der Wirtschaft*, which he described as “a German counterpart of the London *Economist*, but rigorously excluding any non-economic issues.” For Schwarzschild, journalism was a means to protect and offer positive criticism of liberalism in Europe; in one instance, he successfully defended *Magazin der Wirtschaft* in a libel suit after having accused the Chief Prosecutor of the German Supreme Court of not sufficiently prosecuting nationalist assassins. The Prosecutor, a Dr. Jorns, later became “Hitler’s Chief Prosecutor.”

Following Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor and the Reichstag Fire in early 1933, Schwarzschild fled Germany. He and his wife left Berlin for Munich on the suspicion that the Bavarian government might rebel against the national Nazi government, but this wish proved to be in vain. Reports came out that Schwarzschild’s apartment and property in Berlin had been confiscated, and that there was a price on his head. On March 10, the two fled to Paris. And on August 25, 1933, Schwarzschild was declared in an official German announcement, along with Willi Münzenberg, Lion

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60 "Leopold Schwarzschild. Biographical Data,” Leo Baeck Institute (New York), File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
61 H.R. Knickerbocker, Letter, July 28, 1941, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
62 "Leopold Schwarzschild,” Leo Baeck Institute (New York), File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
63 Palmier, 94.
Feuchtwanger, and dozens others “to have lost German citizenship, since he has done harm to the German interests through his behavior that is in breach of the responsibility of loyalty for the Reich and the Volk.” But with the help of philanthropists in Amsterdam and his journalistic contacts in Paris, it was only a few months before Schwarzschild had gotten his bearings in Paris and was ready to continue his opposition to Hitler the only way he knew how – through journalism.

This, then, was the setting as Das Neue Tagebuch released the first of many issues of its seven-year existence. By reading between the lines of this remarkable newspaper, we will see a different story of the 1930s than the one usually told about appeasement and popular fronts, but before then, let us turn to the streets of Schwarzschild’s milieu itself. How had Schwarzschild and other émigrés settled into their new life? What were the ideas being disseminated between German intellectuals during the first year of their new existence in Paris? As the flower ladies and newsstands of the Madeleine ended business for the day, as the bag-toting housewives returned home carrying loads of vegetables, as the Garde Républicaine finished their set for the day, what was this place, German Paris?

German Paris, 1933: Reading The World of the Émigrés

Schwarzschild had escaped Germany by March and could resume his journalistic work. But for whom? And with whom? And what would he write about? This chapter, divided into three parts, uses the first issues of Das Neue Tagebuch to capture the mentalité of German intellectuals living in exile in Paris in 1933. First, by looking at the advertisements in Das Neue Tagebuch and other sources, this chapter attempts to reconstruct German Paris: how exiles did things, what they read, where they ate, and what they thought. We are, however, most interested in the last of these categories, and so this first part focuses on the typical “antifascist library” in order to get a sense of the ideas to which German intellectuals in exile were exposed. Second, this chapter turns to the articles of Das Neue Tagebuch to explain the backgrounds and interests of some of the early contributors to the magazine. It is hard to make generalizations about large groups from just one article, but by analyzing Siegfried Kracauer’s “Seen With European Eyes,” a review of the 1933 André Malraux novel Man’s Fate (La Condition humaine) and seeing how Kracauer read the book, we can make some judgments on how German intellectuals in exile thought without the analysis becoming too speculative. Finally, this chapter examines the “Dollfuss Affair”: Schwarzschild invited the controversial Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss to write an article, “Austria At This Moment,” for the first issue of Das Neue Tagebuch, and by studying Ludwig Bauer’s and Leopold Schwarzschild’s ensuing defense of the decision to include an article by Dollfuss, we can get a more precise idea of how Schwarzschild and Bauer saw the world and National Socialism.
Let us turn our focus, then, to the world of the émigrés. Schwarzschild was not alone as he settled into Paris, for moral opposition, fear for one’s personal safety, or material reasons could motivate German citizens to leave the Third Reich for Paris. Barely settled in the city, Schwarzschild learned of the fate of Alfred Strauss, an unpolitical Jewish lawyer in Munich accused of having had sex with an “Aryan” teenage girl. According to his contacts in Munich, Strauss had been forced at the Dachau concentration camp to respond to calls to attention with, “I am the Jew Strauss and have defiled Aryan girls.” Four days later, Strauss was beaten up and gunned down, his corpse returned to his family without explanation.\(^{65}\) Emigration also made sense for business owners at a time when local officials in Thuringia were shutting down mechanized glass bloweries and banning cigarette-rolling machines on the grounds that mechanization would rob workers of their right to “bread and Lebensraum.”\(^{66}\) Not finding a way around Jewish boycotts – whether through emigration or some other means – was deadly. In Düsseldorf, a Jewish dentist, Maier, was forced into poverty through a ban on Jewish practitioners. In mid-July, with his wife (also a dentist) on a quick vacation, Maier clandestinely worked in her office, but was later kidnapped by four S.A. men during lunch at his own apartment. According to the report Schwarzschild received, the men had stabbed Maier twenty-one times, broken his feet by crushing them with a copying press, and shot him in the head, causing his skull to explode.\(^{67}\) It was perhaps no surprise that when the 85-year-old Nathan Marcus Oppenheimer, owner of the largest diamond company in Europe, took his life upon learning that new Nazi regulations had

\(^{65}\) “Ermordung eines Münchener Anwalts,” *Das Neue Tagebuch*, July 1, 1933, 22.

\(^{66}\) “Maschinensturm,” *Das Neue Tagebuch*, July 22, 1933, 82

\(^{67}\) “Ermordung eines Zahnarztes in Düsseldorf,” *Das Neue Tagebuch*, July 1, 1933, 22.
appropriated his philanthropic organizations, the note he left his son remarked that he had begun to feel that his life was “superfluous.”

In light of the violence and economic instability in Germany, those who had both the means and the language abilities to do so made their way from Germany to France. A mid-July issue of Das Neue Tagebuch featured an advertisement by a German businessman looking to invest 100,000-120,000 francs into a French, Belgian, or Dutch firm that, he hoped, would eventually produce the (unnamed) products he once imported into those countries from Germany. A German journalist who spoke English, German, and French could still find himself in search of work, as one job-seeker looking for a journalism post “regardless of subject matter, in France or foreign-based” and offering language lesson and translations could attest.

A small industry based around the émigrés soon arose. Emigration by August had grown such that German citizens interested in emigrating could contact the Star Express, a Paris-based company that offered to transport their belongings and home furniture by rail to Paris and other smaller French cities, with tri-weekly service and offices in “all German cities.” And in October, two German academic couples in exile in southern France posted an advertisement offering to take children off of new immigrants’ hands for a while: their pension “near the sea and the mountains” accepted immigrant children of all ages and educational backgrounds. The title of one new company that offered

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68 “Selbstmord eines Frankfurter Grosskaufmanns,” Das Neue Tagebuch, July 1, 1933, 23.
69 Das Neue Tagebuch, July 22, 1933, 78.
70 Das Neue Tagebuch, October 7, 1933, 342.
71 Das Neue Tagebuch, August 19, 1933, 198.
72 Das Neue Tagebuch, October 7, 1933, 342.
displaced young Jews courses in landscaping, basic agriculture, and baby- and dog-sitting skills, summed up the situation for many: “New Existence.”[^73]

But there were also more mundane matters to take care of. Within a few months, the *Deutsche Poliklinik* had opened doors at 62 rue de la Rochefoucauld; the German-speaking clinic employed at least nine general specialists, three pregnancy experts, and three midwives, and offered all medical services from dentistry (gold and porcelain tooth crowns) to electro-shock therapy.[^74] Fanny Lövenstein, a former Berlin corset-maker, began to sell her goods from her new Paris location. And new restaurants began to cater towards German customers. If the advertisements in *Das Neue Tagebuch* are any indicator, vegetarian restaurants like *Le restaurant Végétarien des Boulevards* thought it worth their while to pitch to the readership of the magazine, and by November, *Das Neue Tagebuch* often featured an advertising section, “Recommended Parisian Cuisine,” whose listings comprised mostly French and Alsatian restaurants.[^75] Some restaurants that otherwise catered to a French clientele began touting their German food and drink and German-speaking staff, although mistakes were often made in attracting the new clientele. The Obernai Tavern, for example, made a point of its *Müucher Spatenbräu* and advertised: “*Man spricht deutch.*” The ad-writers of *La Maison végétarienne*, one of the vegetarian restaurants, made a more serious typo when they initially pitched their restaurant as *La Maison végé arienne*, or “The Vege-Aryan House.”[^76] Living in translation in a foreign city was not without its moments of confusion or embarrassment, but “German Paris” was beginning to exist.

[^73]: *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 2, 1933, 223.
[^74]: *Das Neue Tagebuch*, October 14, 1933, 366.
[^75]: *Das Neue Tagebuch*, November 4, 1933, 459.
[^76]: *Das Neue Tagebuch*, October 14, 1933, 366.
German Paris, 1933: Reading the World of the Émigrés

Intellectual life came to Paris, too. At 9:00 PM on September 21, 1933, the *Université du Parthenon* hosted a meeting of the German Club headlined by a lecture by Magnus Hirschfeld, “The Race Problem: From Gobineau To Today,” followed by an open debate; the advertisement for the event welcomed guests, but noted that “proof of membership to a left-wing party or a labor union is required [for admission].”77 (A later lecture, “Art In Contemporary Germany,” required no such proof).78 Several newspapers beyond *Das Neue Tagebuch* came into circulation. “Rampart serves no party,” bleated the advertisement for one short-lived paper that “fought for a Germany free from the Nazi terror” and billed itself as the “protective barrier for Germany’s free citizens.”79 *Jewish Notebooks*, a French-Jewish publication, offered a special feature in September, “The Contribution of the Jews of Germany to German Civilization in All Branches of Humane Activity,” headlined by Albert Einstein.80 German bookstores became more prominent throughout Paris. Several blocks southeast of the offices of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, near the French Theater, one could find the German-speaking bookstore *Stock*. “Please come and see for yourself our comprehensive collection without feeling pressured to purchase anything,” read one advertisement for *Stock*, which offered its patrons German-speaking service, home delivery, and a selection of the most recent German books, brochures, and magazines.81 Soon after this advertisement, another bookstore, the *Librarie “Au Pont de l’Europe”* opened up near the Madeleine, promising the “largest selection of German books” in the city, lending books, and a monthly book catalog.82 And it is both a sign of

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77 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 9, 1933, 266.
78 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 30, 1933, 339.
79 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, October 28, 1933, 414.
80 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 9, 1933, 246.
81 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 30, 1933, 339.
82 *Das Neue Tagebuch*, September 30, 1933, 318.
Das Neue Tagebuch’s reach and readership that the November 11, 1933 issue featured an advertisement for Moderne, “New York’s only antifascist German bookstore,” located at 2\textsuperscript{nd} Avenue and 84\textsuperscript{th} Street.\footnote{Das Neue Tagebuch, November 11, 1933, 462.}

What did the émigrés actually read? Unfortunately, no book catalogues from any of the German-speaking bookstores remain behind. And there is no easy way to reconstruct the entire library of any individual German in exile. But the advertisements and book reviews in the pages of Das Neue Tagebuch can provide some idea of German exiles’ reading habits. Some disclaimers apply, of course. There is no guarantee that readers of Das Neue Tagebuch actually purchased those books advertised and reviewed in the magazine. But it is not a stretch to assume that bookshop owners advertised books that they thought would appeal to the readership of Das Neue Tagebuch. And book reviews are a rich source of information, too, since they yield not only a picture of what the magazine’s writers were reading, but also what books Schwarzschild and editors thought the magazine’s readership might enjoy. By “reviewing the review,” we can get an idea both of what books were read, and how émigrés read them.

That said, the following books were either advertised or reviewed in Das Neue Tagebuch in 1933:

- Victor Adler, \textit{Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe}
- Ewald Banse, \textit{Nationale Wehrwissenschaft}
- Philippe Barrès, \textit{Sous La Vague Hitlérienne: La Révolution national-socialiste vue par un écrivan français}
- Ludwig Bauer, \textit{Und Österreich? Ein Staat sucht ein Volk}
- Otto Bauer, \textit{Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie}
- Ferdinand Bruckner, \textit{Die Rassen}
- Brunhilde Bührer, \textit{Galileo Galilei}
German Paris, 1933: Reading the World of the Émigrés

- Louis-Ferdinand Céline, *Reise ans Ende der Nacht*
- Alfred Döblin, *Jüdische Erneuerung*
- Ilya Ehrenburg, *Der zweite Tag*
- Lion Feuchtwanger, *Die Geschwister Oppenheim*
- Lion Feuchtwanger and Arnold Zweig, *Die Aufgabe des Judentums*
- Lothar Frey, *Deutschland wohin?*
- Augusto Giacometti, *Die Farbe und ich*
- Louis Golding, *Die Magnolienstrasse*
- Kristmann Gudmundsson, *Die blaue Küste*
- Gotthard Jedlicka, *Picasso*
- Konrad Heiden, *Geburt des dritten Reiches*
- Wilhelm Herzog, *Der Kampf einer Republik: Die Affaire Dreyfus, Dokumente und Tatsachen*
- Otto Leichter, *Die Sprengung des Kapitalismus*
- Heinrich Mann, *Der Hass*
- André Malraux, *La condition humaine*
- André Maurois, *Amerika: Neubau oder Chaos?*
- Hans Mühlstein, *Menschen ohne Gott*
- Walther Rode, *Deutschland ist Caliban*
- Michael Scholochow, *Neuland unterm Pilug*
- Ignazio Silone, *Der Fascismus*
- Charlot Strasser, *Geschmiss um die Blandlaterne*
- B. Travern, *Regierung*
- U.W. Zürcher, *Was soll werden?*

This “antifascist” library includes works from many authors, but it excludes a good deal of the standard fare in the literature of the time. Granted, the advertisements from which we have culled together this list have come from the pages of a political newspaper, but neither publishing houses nor booksellers aimed classics, any legal works, anything in the sciences, and hardly any non-political fiction at their targeted German-speaking customers. Theoretical works by the Austrian Social Democrats Otto Bauer and Victor Adler were popular, but some more surprising works are on the list. One could read the works of Nazi geographer Ewald Banse, a vocal advocate of German expansion to the East and anti-Orientalist who had supported the Armenian Genocide as a justified measure by Atatürk’s Westernized Turkish state. Émigré readers were, it would seem, eager to discover just what the nature of Hitler’s Germany was, and what they as (for the most part) good socialists could do to oppose it. The appearance of Céline’s *Journey to*
the End of the Night, a tale of a French misanthropic’s nihilistic adventure throughout the European world during and after World War I, is also surprising; the book was never reviewed in Das Neue Tagebuch, however, so the most likely explanation is that the book was already popular in Paris at the time, and publishers thought it wise to sell the novel to the readers of Das Neue Tagebuch.

Non-political fiction hardly existed in the world of the émigrés. Die Rassen by Ferdinand Bruckner, for example, is a play in three acts that derives its tension from the love affair of a German Jew, Helene, and her nationalist Gentile lover, Karlanner. Karlanner’s nationalist sympathies are won over after he attends a Nazi Party rally in his university town, but after Hitler becomes Chancellor, Karlanner begins to come to terms with the conflict between his heart and his emotional political sympathies. After he begins to see the anti-Semitic violence of his nationalist friends and Rosloh, a flunking student-cum-SA leader, Karlanner realizes that his actions determine “whose” Germany the country shall be. Helene is forced to emigrate with her family, but Karlanner achieves personal redemption by murdering Rosloh. The play ends ambiguously, however, for Karlanner himself is thereafter killed by the non-“coordinated” town police and turned into a martyr figure by the Nazis. Karlanner may have sacrificed his life for some abstract idea of a better Germany, but the audience is forced at the end of the play to confront the fact that even the act of individual courage may be manipulated to tell a different narrative about the homeland.

Ilya Ehrenburg’s Der zweite Tag, meanwhile, is a fictionalized account of the reconstruction of the southwestern city of Novokuznetsk (after 1932, Stalinsk), a sleepy provincial town transformed into a major coal mining and oil-processing center during
the First Five-Year Plan. The novel, whose title compares the Soviet project with the second day of Biblical creation, focuses on the existential destruction of Volodya Safonov, a young Russian intellectual who, unlike his classmates at Tomsk who study to be blast furnace engineers, geo-engineers, or agronomists, is not a committed Marxist at heart.

Safonov was due for exclusion from the rolls. Only by some oversight did he retain his hold on this life. For instance, he did not believe that a blast furnace was more necessary than the Venus de Milo: he wasn’t even confident that blast furnace was more necessary than that hunk of yellowed marble. He passed his *diamat* [dialectical materialism] like the rest of them. But had his thoughts been as accessible to checking as his coursework, it would have been necessary to underline any given day in red. His entire existence was an error.84

*Der zweite Tag*, moreover, with Novokuznetzk’s May Day celebration; the American delegation come to inspect the blast furnaces has just left, and the engineers sent to the region to bridge, divert, or reverse the flow of the region’s “burling rivers” are in town to listen to speakers assure them that “Lenin said that iron is the fundamental basis of our civilization,” and that “the giant of Kuznetsk must be assured its due supply of our Siberian ore!”85 The final speaker, the old Bolshevik Samushkin, recalls how the youth of Novokuznetsk helped him save a dam from destruction:

> Let me tell you that this indeed is our fundamental basis. With people of this sort we will get the iron we need too, for they are stronger than iron. As an old partisan, let me tell you that I can now die in peace, for the people we have here, comrades, are real people.86

Communist literature was part and parcel of the émigré library. Ehrenburg himself rented a flat at the *Rue de Cotentin* 34 in which he wrote *Der Zweite Tag* from December 1932 to February 1933, but the *Braunbuch* (itself published in July 1933) was the centerpiece of antifascist communist literature. The book itself was a joint work of some of the most talented writers and artists on the left of the day. A group of communist

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85 Ibid., 361, 365.
86 Ibid., 366.
writers in exile in Paris had composed the text for the book under the supervision of the communist impresario Willi Münzenberg, and the photomontage artist John Heartfield contributed the striking dust jacket for the book. Münzenberg himself had created dozens of organizations worldwide to publicize the book throughout the summer of 1933, and when the *Braunbuch* was published in August, it became an international best seller, translated into twenty-four languages and published in more than fifty-five editions.

The Münzenberg organization claimed that half a million copies of the *Braunbuch* had been sold, but this figure is likely inflated, and by comparison, *Das Neue Tagebuch* (while it was not translated) had a weekly circulation of 20,000 copies. Most importantly, however, the book assumed a presence itself in the Leipzig trials of the suspected Reichstag arsonists. Several witnesses were called in explicitly to refute the book, and Goebbels called it “a sixth defendant.”

The *Braunbuch*, which advertised itself as a “contribution to the struggle against Hitler-Fascism,” one led “for the true Germany,” analyzed recent German history through a communist and highly sexualized lens. On the 1918-1919 German Revolution, the *Braunbuch* had the following to say: “the revolution was crushed, the collapse of the capitalist system and the struggle of socialism hindered […] the rule of the old financial-capitalistic forces consolidated itself once more.” The early failures of the Nazi Party reflected its failure to ally with oppressive capitalists: “What, then, could Hitler offer [in 1918] to the leading groups of German capitalism? They did not yet need the NSDAP at

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88 Ibid., 107-111.
89 Ibid., 101.
90 Ibid., 102.
91 World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, *Der Kampf um ein Buch*, 5.
92 *Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitler-Terror* (Basel: Universum-Bücherei, 1933), Foreword.
93 Ibid., 10.
this time.” By the late 1920s, however, Hitler had made “an avowal to the capitalistic economic system and recommended himself once again to the ruling circles of German finance capital,” which led to his naming as Chancellor and, eventually, the Reichstag Fire, itself a ploy to consolidate power against the Socialists and Communists. The *Braunbuch* saw Nazism as an only more violent version of standard bourgeois capitalism: “through fascism, the ruling classes wish to violently and dictatorially assert the power that they could no longer maintain through the means of bourgeois democracy.” The book functioned like “a good detective story,” as the investigator (the *Braunbuch* itself) follows the promiscuous homosexual Martinus van der Lubbe (van der Lubbe’s homosexuality was a fabrication) as he is played by the evil morphine addict Göring as part of a spectacular conspiracy.

But the *Braunbuch* is less remarkable for its content than for the dialect of German in which it is written, a particular vocabulary that we can call the “dialect of antifascism.” If we compare the vocabulary and grammar of the *Braunbuch* to those of the articles in *Das Neue Tagebuch*, or in the other works in the hypothetical “antifascist library,” the former is easy to pick out. Hardly a paragraph goes by in the *Braunbuch* without the appearance of some grammatical variation of one of the following words:

- Capitalist (*Kapitalist*)
- Peasant (*Bauer*)
- Bourgeois (*Bürger*)
- Worker (*Arbeiter*)

Compared to articles in *Das Neue Tagebuch*, individuals are identified in the *Braunbuch* more through their membership to a class than anything they do, say, or think. Various

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94 Ibid., 30.
95 Ibid., 130.
adjectives can be applied to modify one’s identity – reactionary, financial-capitalistic, liberal, democratic, and so on – but one’s identity is fundamentally defined through their membership to the collective class. Compound nouns are more common in the dialect of antifascist than in other dialects of German, too: compound words like Arbeiterstrasse (workers’ street), Arbeiterblatt (workers’ newsletters), and Kapitalistenkrise (circle of capitalists) appear frequently. Sentences that group millions of people into “the workers” or “the capitalists” are also part and parcel of “speaking antifascist,” as in the following sentence about the 1933 German elections: “Hitler’s electoral chances were unfavorable given the growing antifascist fighting mood of the workers.”97 The Braunbuch was written in such a dialect that turned entire classes into singular nouns that a non-communist analysis of the situation in Germany was impossible.

Not all German émigrés took up this “dialect of antifascism” as they sought to assess the nature of Hitler’s Germany. The nouns and adjectives “fascist” and “antifascist” themselves, though they appear frequently throughout the Braunbuch, were used little by the contributors to Das Neue Tagebuch in 1933. Schwarzschild was not programmatic in his use of terms to describe Nazi Germany, but the nouns and adjectives he tended to use to refer to Nazis were (most often) “National Socialist” and “German.” The word “fascism” is just not common in the pages of Das Neue Tagebuch. But one rare instance of Schwarzschild using the term may be helpful. In a July 15 article, Schwarzschild wrote:

Fascism is only a method of government, while National Socialism is the spiritual, cultural, and moral barbarization of an entire nation in all of its fields of life, not only in the political.98

97 Ibid., 41.
While the word “fascism” some meaning for Schwarzschild, in other words, he saw National Socialism as a unique phenomenon that had to be identified as such. As for the term “antifascist,” it also rarely appears in Schwarzschild’s articles for Das Neue Tagebuch, and it is hard to say what Schwarzschild’s substitute for the word was. To speak of “antifascists” or “the antifascist opinion” elided differences between opponents of Hitler, just as “fascism” elided important differences between repressive regimes. Schwarzschild wrote using specific terms, not classes. In 1933, then, while many figures in the world of the émigrés used words like “fascist” and antifascist,” these terms were not hegemonic to the extent that Schwarzschild and almost no author for Das Neue Tagebuch used these terms in his or her writing. One could buy books like the Braunbuch and Ignazio Silone’s Der Faschismus at “New York’s only antifascist German bookstore” without using the terms or the dialect of antifascism oneself. To use the terms “fascist” and “antifascist” today to describe European interwar politics is to submit oneself to an anachronistic historical vocabulary.

How to pass from the what of reading to the how of reading? What did émigré readers do with a book in their hands, and what did lessons did they take from histories and fiction? Readers in German Paris could choose between cheap, mass-market paperbacks and more expensive linen-bound editions, but there is little comment in any of Das Neue Tagebuch’s book reviews or personal correspondence between the editors on the physicality of a book; books were the words on their pages more than any craftsmanship in the material work itself. In spite of the amount of literature in this world of the émigrés, this was a far cry from any age in which “books themselves were
individuals, each copy possessing its own character." At the same time, the collecting and book-owning tendencies of readers in German Paris were different from ours today. Lending bookstores [Leihbibliotheken] had made the trip to Paris. Customers at the Librairie “Au Pont de l’Europe” for example, could pay a small fee to take out books for a given time period, although this seems to have been a service offered only at the Librairie, and not Stock and Moderne. Even among the impoverished quarters of German émigrés, cheap paperbacks were destroying the market for the lending bookstore; books were something intellectuals owned, rather than borrowed. Along the same lines, this was also a world in which readers were expected to stick with the same periodical and even collect whole years of the same magazine; Das Neue Tagebuch routinely published multi-part articles that stretched out over the course of weeks and gave their reader little context to the content of the previous week's part, and at the end of 1933, Schwarzschild put out an advertisement to collectors of Das Neue Tagebuch, advertising a linen binder that binders could then use to bind together the year's run of issues; the binders were headed, like every issue's cover, with “Das Neue Tagebuch, Editor: Leopold Schwarzschild,” and contained a blank page where the week's listing of stories would go. Perhaps more tellingly, the page numbers for Das Neue Tagebuch reset only with the first issue of a new year; articles from the final issues of a year could be on page 600 of a 30-page magazine. Issues of Das Neue Tagebuch were, then, not stand-alone items, but rather parts of a year-long archive of analysis. News could not be distilled to a single issue, or to a single point in time. This was a world of letters in which holding on to books and magazines had become increasingly important, even if books were less appreciated as physical objects than in other times. It is difficult to imagine readers in Schwarzschild's

day “possessing themselves fully of a book in all its physicality” before they sat down to read it.\(^{100}\)

This gets us back to the original question of how intellectuals in this period read, itself part of the larger project of reconstructing the world of the émigrés and how German intellectuals in exile thought. Without the aid of marginalia, and with no way to recover the conversations Schwarzschild and others had about the books they read, the historian's task of reconstructing how intellectuals read seems downright impossible. But if we try to critically “review the review” that one intellectual submitted to *Das Neue Tagebuch*, and if we look closely at how writers at *Das Neue Tagebuch* did – or did not – learn to “speak antifascist,” we can get closer to seeing how these denizens of German Paris thought.

The book reviews of *Das Neue Tagebuch* are the first place to turn with this question in mind. Specifically, by reading Siegfried Kracauer's July 8, 1933 review of André Malraux's *Man's Fate (La condition humaine)* from our vantage point 70 years after the fact, we can gain some insight into how these men thought. Kracauer was almost as new to Paris as Schwarzschild. Kracauer had made a name for himself as a writer since 1921 and editor since 1924 for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, where his articles undertook a theoretical critique of the mass society he observed in Frankfurt and, after relocation in 1930, Berlin. A Marxist and a German Jew, Kracauer was quick to flee Berlin for Paris with his wife on February 28, 1933, and like Schwarzschild and many of the other émigrés who arrived in those spring months, he was continually short of funds. The chance to contribute an article to *Das Neue Tagebuch* was more than intellectual exercise. While the records of *Das Neue Tagebuch* indicate that Schwarzschild payed different

\(^{100}\) Ibid.
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authors wildly different amounts for their writings (Alfred Döblin commanded 692 Francs for one article, Richard Lewinson got 400 Francs per article, and Wilhelm Herzog 12.50 Francs for one), contributors to the magazine could expect some modest renumeration for their thoughts.\(^{101}\)

The plot and design of *Man's Fate*, moreover, make it a rich source for both the reviewer and historian as reviewer's reviewer. The novel is a fictional account of the failed Communist revolution in Shanghai in March and April 1927, and it focuses on the deeds of several Chinese Communist revolutionaries and their Western and Soviet acquaintances as their attempts to assasinate Chiang Kai-Shek and defend the city from Kuomintang soldiers fail. More substantively, however, Malreaux (at least in this reviewer's perspective) is most concerned in the novel with how his characters try to give meaning to their life and define who they are in the face of their impending deaths. The events surrounding Ch'en Ta Erh, a Chinese Communist terrorist assigned to assasinate Chiang Kai-Shek with a bomb as the general rides through Shanghai in his motorcade, are illustrative. As Ch'en discusses the logistics of the April 11 assassination attempt, one of his accomplices, Suan, speaks of her devotion to Communism. “I don’t want to create China,” she says. “I want to create my people, with or without her. The poor. It’s for them that I’m willing to die, to kill. For them only …”\(^{102}\) But Ch’en pushes Suan further. Throwing bombs at the motorcade is too likely to fail, he says: “we must not throw the bomb; we must throw ourselves under the car with it.”\(^{103}\) Whereas Suan is unwilling to risk death for the idea in which he believes, Ch’en sees in the idea for which he will die

\(^{101}\) Correspondence of Leopold Schwarzschild, Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde, File R8046, Documents 1, 2, 3, and 27.


\(^{103}\) Ibid., 194.
“the meaning of life. The complete possession of oneself. Total. Absolute. To know.”

Later that night, Ch’en’s accomplices have left him alone to take out the motorcade, and he has become the ideal terrorist. The sounds and sights of the city around him fade out as Ch’en runs towards Chiang Kai-Shek’s car “with an ecstatic joy;” he “knows how much weight an idea acquires through the blood that is shed in its name,” and is obsessed by his mission. Ch’en detonates the bomb while diving at the motorcade. The blast severs Chen’s torso from the lower half of his body, and as he lies dying, whether or not Chiang is dead is unimportant to him. He has given meaning to his life.

Hours before Ch’en’s death, the French businessman and imperialist Ferral and the opium addict Gisors discuss the existential issues that are at the core of Man’s Fate. Ch’en, in the words of Gisors, embodies how “very rare it is for a man to be able to endure – how should I say it?” – his condition, his fate as a man.” As Gisors continues, man is confronted by the apparent meaninglessness of his life and thus “there is always a need for intoxication,” be it in the form of opium, hashish, murder, or the Revolution. In Gisors’ opinion, however, white men have a particular need to go beyond the human condition through action, which “alone justifies life and satisfies. What would we think if we were told of a painter who makes no paintings? A man is the sum of his actions, of what he has done, or what he can do. Nothing else.” Gisors’ words are the outline of a code of behavior that governs the action of all of the Communist characters in the novel. As Kyo, the main character of Man’s Fate, for example, awaits his death by firing squad in a Shanghai prison, he reflects happily upon his life:

104 Ibid., 196.
105 Ibid., 247.
106 Ibid., 241.
107 Ibid., 241-242.
He had fought for what in his time was charged with the deepest meaning and the greatest hope; he was dying among those with whom he would have wanted to live; he was dying, like each of these men, because he had given a meaning to his life. What would have been the value of a life for which he would not have been willing to die?\textsuperscript{108}

Rather than choosing to die scared in front of the firing squad, Kyo takes his cyanide pill in order to die with dignity, to have “a death that resembles one’s own life.”\textsuperscript{109} Even as “death crushes his mind with its whole weight and finality,” Kyo has remained in control of his life and died for a reason.\textsuperscript{110}

Yet if \textit{Man’s Fate} strikes this 21\textsuperscript{st}-century reader as an early existentialist work, Kracauer read the work differently in his July 8, 1933 review of the book, “Seen With European Eyes.”\textsuperscript{111} Disagree though one may with Kracauer’s reading of the book, by “reviewing the review” and understanding the tension between how a reader in 2008 and a reader in 1933 read the same book can tell us much about the assumptions that governed antifascists’ reading habits and thoughts. \textit{Man’s Fate}, wrote Kracauer in the introduction to the article, “carried further a topic that has been long-discussed both in and outside of Germany. […] Crudely put, the debate between collectivism and individualism.”\textsuperscript{112} On the one hand, wrote Kracauer, \textit{Man’s Fate} “does justice to the materialistic worldview, which holds the behavior and thought of man to be determined by class.” On the other hand, however, the novel stood out because it did not belong to that class of “radical leftist novels and reportage produced in Germany in the last ten years, which actually act as if man were only the representative of his societal stratum and nothing beyond this.”\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, as regarded Marxism and Communism, Kracauer

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\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 323.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 321.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 323.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Siegfried Kracauer, “Mit europäischen Augen gesehen,” \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch}, July 8, 1933, 39-41.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 39.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 40.
\end{itemize}
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admired Gisors’ individualistic attitude: “Marxism is not a doctrine, it is a will. For the proletariat and those who belong with them – you – it is the will to know themselves, to feel themselves as proletarians, and to conquer as such; you must be Marxists not in order to be right, but in order to conquer without betraying yourselves.”\textsuperscript{114} For Kracauer, in other words, the existentialism of \textit{Man’s Fate} was important, but only insofar as it helped paint a more realistic Marxist portrait of society. This realism not only made \textit{Man’s Fate} an excellent work of art, but also set the novel apart from those contemporary Marxist works like \textit{Braunbuch} that encouraged an overly rigid and doctrinal interpretation of society. Malreaux, wrote Kracauer, “knows the existing economic and social factors far too well to sink into the mystic irrationalism that seems to have become the official doctrine in contemporary Germany.” While Kracauer was by no means writing as an anti-communist, his article clearly made a distinction between those leftist and Marxist writers at \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} and more rigid KPD members still in Germany, or those operating under the aegis of the Münzenberg empire.

The second half of “Seen With European Eyes” extended Kracauer’s critique of overly doctrinal European Marxists. The entire point of Gisors and Ferral’s discussion about the human condition, wrote Kracauer, was to show how “the individual does not receive his value from the collective; the worth of the collective is determined by the individual.”\textsuperscript{115} The Communist characters in \textit{Man’s Fate} derive meaning from their life not through abstract membership in the proletariat; even though both of Ch’en’s cowardly would-be suicide bombing companions are members of the Shanghai proletariat, they lack the individual resoluteness to die for their ideas and give their life meaning. Not that

\textsuperscript{114} Malreaux, \textit{Man’s Fate}, 71.
\textsuperscript{115} Kracauer, 41.
either Malraux or Kracauer was a committed individualist: as the latter put it, the depth of *Man’s Fate* was that it “characterizes our position between two worlds to which we belong to the same degree.” While Malraux sympathized with the revolutionary cause of the proletariat, he was careful to follow the fate of the genuinely individualistic antique dealer Clappique; while Malraux “preached revolutionary upheaval,” he featured the lonely opium addict Gisors as one of the main characters of the novel. That Malraux could depict non-Communist characters as more than members of their class represented for Kracauer “the prevailing meaning of this book.” Seen with Kracauer’s European eyes, Malraux’s *Man’s Fate* was less a work that could inspire its reader to contemplate the meaning of life, and more a book that could bring an important correction to that unsubstantial collectivist ideology that has spread itself throughout the German Left and that has hindered the Left from (among other things) duly recognizing the decisive role of the middle class [Mittelschicht]. If that can be relearned anywhere, let it be here. In the European countries, at least, no major societal change will be possible that does not take into account the existence of the individual.\(^{116}\)

While the world of the émigrés was one predominantly inhabited by leftists, then, Kracauer’s article gives us a sense of the linguistic and conceptual disagreements that divided the world of the émigrés. “Seen With European Eyes,” with its emphasis on understanding individuality in a critique of society, was a rejoinder to texts like the *Braunbuch* that spoke of “the” worker or “the” capitalist. It was also a refreshing linguistic break from the *Braunbuch*; there are almost no repeated classist words à la *Braunbuch*, and one gets the sense from the review that Kracauer is writing from his heart rather than trying to fit his reading of *Man’s Fate* within the bounds of a total explanatory system. Siegfried Kracauer’s European eyes and ears may have read and heard the dialect of antifascism as seen in the *Braunbuch*, but his article, in addition to

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\(^{116}\) Ibid.
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showing us today what émigrés thought about, shows how there were different dialects in which one could talk about National Socialist Germany in the world of the émigrés.

Yet if Kracauer’s review of *Man’s Fate* seems too abstract to get a really good idea of the differences in how émigrés thought, a contemporary dispute between Schwarzschild and magazine contributor Ludwig Bauer about the proper relation of *Das Neue Tagebuch* to authoritarian non-Nazi regimes may better answer this question. The affair began when Schwarzschild decided to include a short article by Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss for the first issue of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, entitled “Austria At This Moment,” a decision that inspired some discussion in the pages of German Paris.  

Engelbert Dollfuss was no stranger to the world of the émigrés. Following Hitler’s ascension to power without real opposition from either the Social Democratic Party and Communist Party in Germany, both Dollfuss (a member of the Christian Social Party) and the Austrian Social Democratic Party became anxious: the former because he feared an upswing in strength in Austrian Nazi parties and a more militant Germany; the latter because its leaders feared that Dollfuss would oppress socialist parties and strengthen ties with Mussolini in order to avoid falling into the penumbra of Nazi Germany.  

These fears became more visible in mid-February 1933, when the Dollfuss government enacted a new wage plan for Austrian railways that would decrease workers’ wages, which prompted a two-hour general strike among workers and sharpened trade-union leaders’ fears towards Dollfuss. The editor of one socialist paper could not have been clearer in how he saw Dollfuss: “We must stop international fascism from gaining

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new strength by a victory in our country. We must be capable of leading our battalions intact in the great decisive struggle.”

But the situation grew worse. Three weeks after the socialist editorial, on March 1, Dollfuss ordered Austrian troops to occupy railway stations and arrest railway officials, and several rail workers were shot without trial for having participated in the strikes. On March 7, Dollluss suspended the Austrian parliament, declaring that he would declare via the emergency powers decree in the Austrian constitution. From Dollfuss’ point of view, Austrian Nazis threatened to make further electoral gains after the success of the NSDAP in Germany. Dolffuss also viewed the Austrian socialists, or at least their gifted leader, Otto Bauer, as “Bolsheviks,” so cooperation was unlikely, and given that Dollfuss was governing largely through the support of the Heimwehr militia, he could not have expected his Christian Social Party to do well. Dollfuss also declared a ban on all mass meetings and demonstrations and imposed censorship on the Austrian press. To many on the left, the events in Austria disturbingly mirrored Germany only months earlier. As one leading Austrian socialist said: “This is the beginning of fascism and if we don’t resist the first move with all of our power, then there will be no turning back!” Austria represented a chance to atone for Germany.

And yet Engelbert Dollfuss was no Nazi. By June 1933, gangs of Austrian Nazi terrorists, ages fifteen and sixteen, had nearly destroyed several businesses in Vienna and killed at least two people; the Dollfuss government responded by arresting known Nazis on June 13 and purging government, the army, and the police of members of the

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119 Der Eisenbahner: Zentralorgan der österreichischen Eisenbahner (Vienna), February 10, 1933, 1.
120 Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism, 87.
121 Ibid., 82.
NSDAP.123 And when two Nazis killed one police auxiliary and wounded thirteen others about a week later in Vienna on June 19, the Dollfuss cabinet outlawed the Austrian Nazi Party that same day and began to expand detention camps that housed Nazis, Communists, and others opposed to the Dollfuss regime.124

Dollfuss’ article in Das Neue Tagebuch played down the political crisis in Austria with meaningless language and vague statements of political goodwill. This was clear from the first two sentences of the article:

Austria is currently living through one of the most difficult phases in its post-war history – a period that is most meaningful for all of Europe. But I am convinced that the healthy heart of the patriotic Austrian people [Volk] will lead our country through all difficulties.125

The rest of the article continued with similar vagaries that were unlikely to reassure those who thought of Dollfuss’ regime as just another form of fascism. “Austrians need not be ashamed of either the past or the present,” wrote Dollfuss when referring to the recent “political and economic difficulties.” Austrian Nazis were “rowdy young lads” against whom the Austrian state would “seize upon all necessary measures in order to suppress unrest and to guarantee order and security for the good of all peoples.” There were no mentions of censorship or the shootings of Socialists, and Dollfuss reminded readers that “we offer our hospitality to all without consideration for his race or religion, and my regime guarantees protection and well-being to all to enter our borders.” The article contained a number of statements of friendship towards Germany (with reservations), Hungary, France, and Italy: “we know that we possess in Mussolini a friend of

124 Ibid., 111.
extraordinary abilities, experiences, and sympathy."  

The article was a collection of vague statements of friendship that ignored the contemporary political situation in Austria, and Dollfuss secured his reputation for banality with his closing maxim: “Austria attaches importance to friendly relations with all of its neighbors, so long as those neighbors have the will themselves to be Austria’s friends. In these days, I hold that to be the only intelligent policy.”

By the time the next issue of Das Neue Tagebuch was out in Paris – July 8, 1933 – frequent contributor Ludwig Bauer had provided a more eloquent defense of Dollfuss, if also one that also downplayed the Chancellor’s more repressive side. The struggle against National Socialism was for Bauer nothing less than a world-historical event and a dramatic defense of Western civilization: “Here we have it: the Third Siege of Vienna. Only it began this time with the enemy not in Constantinople, but rather in Munich and Berlin, and these new janissaries wear brown shirts as their uniforms.”

Unimportant as Austrian internal affairs might seem, Bauer argued that history revealed the true significance of the situation. The Spanish Wars of Succession, the Thirty Years’ War, the Seventy Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian Wars: had not Austria and Vienna stood at the center of all of Europe’s recent great wars? Yet Bauer maintained a sense for the absurdity of the situation. “It just might be necessary,” he wrote,

> to celebrate Dollfuss and his paladins Vaugoin, Starhemburg, and Fey as heroes and saviors of freedom. The joke of world history, whose whimsies more than often come at our own expense, is that these men are not such figures and yet must act as if they were.

More concretely, Bauer conceded that “there were only negative solutions” to European power politics, but that the best solution would be an extension of the Little Entente

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126 Ibid., 14.
127 Ludwig Bauer, “Die dritte Belagerung Wiens,” Das Neue Tagebuch, July 8, 1933, 44.
German Paris, 1933: Reading the World of the Émigrés

(Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, supported by France) to include Austria, even if this would upset Germany and Italy. There was no easy way out of the situation, but one thing was certain: “Europe would fall together with Vienna” in the event of a National Socialist takeover, and alienating Dollfuss was no wise move.128 “Maybe it would help to romanticize Dollfuss,” wrote Bauer of the 5’2” Chancellor. “At least his small stature would help him much: here he is, the new David to resist the German goliath.”129

Between the article by Dollfuss himself and Bauer’s eloquent defense of “Austrofascism,” Das Neue Tagebuch was earning no shortage of Austrian leftist enemies. By the time the magazine next appeared on July 15, Schwarzschild had been receiving letter after letter condemning him. “Don’t you realize that Dollfuss, too, is a reactionary, an anti-democrat, a murderer of freedom, and a constitution-breaker?” “Don’t you know that the Austrian crisis is really about nothing more than the battle for domination between two varieties of fascism?”130 These were, as Schwarzschild summarized them, just some of the angry mail the paper had received during the first two weeks of June.

It was with this as a backdrop that he offered his first real defense of Dollfuss and an assessment of National Socialism in an article titled “The Degeneration of the Human Species.”131 Schwarzschild began the article with a reasoned defense of his position. “Reactionary thought, autocracy, dictatorship, and fascism,” according to Schwarzschild, were all semi-legitimate forms of oppressive government. They all presupposed a battle

128 Ibid., 45.
129 Ibid., 44.
131 Ibid., 61-64.
or some (more or less) bipolar relation with other political systems, and their differences had to do with “maxims of the regimes, or governmental or economic organization.” Schwarzschild was willing to defend Italian Fascism and Bolshevism on these grounds.

[Italian Fascists] have dumped castor oil on crowds of opposition parties, have banished several to Lipari [an island off the coast of Sicily], and even murdered a few. In Russia, political opponents have been shot, imprisoned, or shipped off to Siberia. But it always had to do with a political opponent, a political goal, and some kind of treatment directed towards the achievement of this goal.\(^\text{132}\)

This was Schwarzschild’s main criterion for distinguishing National Socialism from all other forms of government, at least in 1933. Unlike the Soviet Union or Fascist Italy, where violence and terror were means to some political end, in Germany cruelty and atrocities were employed and celebrated “with the aim of creating a common inequality.”\(^\text{133}\) National Socialism was “something to itself [\textit{etwas Eigenes}]. Without relation. Without parallel. It is a convulsive, rapid, and totalizing degeneration of the human species in the direction of cannibalism.”\(^\text{134}\) The question of Dollfuss soon dropped out of the article as Schwarzschild began to condemn National Socialism as an atavism emerged from the African bush:

Wherever a monument to the human spirit rises up, there sits a nobody, a screeching bushman [\textit{Buschmann}] who dumps his shit on it. Shit on a thousand years of Roman law. Shit on the philosophy of the rationalists; they were beasts. Shit on poetry; it has to be Nordic in origin. Shit on education; it never existed in the first place. Shit, stinking shit, shat on everything that ever separated a gorilla from a human being: shit on theater, historiography, music, political economy, logic, ethics – all of this defiled in the name of a new creation which we can’t even see, neither the thinnest buds nor a stem that could ever carry a bud.\(^\text{135}\)

Schwarzschild would not see anything modern or European in National Socialism, which was essentially a tribe of racial superiority. It was “Mohammed in the

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 62.  
\(^{133}\) Ibid.  
\(^{134}\) Ibid., 61.  
\(^{135}\) Ibid., 63.
20th century, the Crusades, the orgasm at one’s own stench.” In light of such barbarism, the defenders of civilization had to man up and defend the “territories directly threatened today” and “to demand the recognition (and guard against falling asleep to this fact) that that which comes at us today is not politics but rather something monstrous ungeheuer: the jungle.” In the face of “the jungle,” there could be only one piece of advice: lock and load. “When the jungle storms out, may he who has a gun fire and show that he was at least willing to need it.”

Between the vegetarian restaurants, the antifascist library, and Schwarzschild’s “jungle,” then, there existed in Paris by summer 1933 a highly complex and intellectual society of German émigrés whose thoughts, tastes in books, and even diet we can trace today by reading the world of the émigrés. This Parisian world was, above all, new, a world that required immigrants not only to learn a new language but also to find new professions and, in most cases, to grow accustomed to a much lower level of income than they had enjoyed in Germany. It was, as the one advertisement had it, a “new existence.” As we have seen, however, material discomfort did not make the intellectual world of the émigrés any less lively. There was apparently little time for apolitical reading in the world of the émigrés, as books emphasizing the moral dilemmas facing individuals who lived under National Socialism, novels glorifying the Soviet project, and communist narratives of German history were the staples of bookstores in German Paris; as we have seen, Siegfried Kracauer wrote book reviews in a milieu where an accurate weighing of the individual and the collective in society was more than just an aesthetic concern, for it was only through an accurate analysis of society that those Marxists in Germany and outside could hope at changing conditions in their home country.

136 Ibid., 64.
Most striking, however, are the different dialects of antifascism that the émigrés spoke and wrote in during this period. From the materialist and collectivist approach of the *Braunbuch* to Kracauer’s and Malraux’s emphasis on individual political choices to Schwarzschild’s totally different paradigm of National Socialism less as capitalist dictatorship and more as a barbaric atavism, the émigrés were by no means unified as to the historical significance of National Socialism. More than that, it is not as if these disagreements presupposed some common way to talk about Nazism. Was it, to use the dialect of antifascism from the *Braunbuch*, to be described in a rhetoric of workers, capitalists, and collective identity, or was it just barbarism? Schwarzschild and the editors of the *Braunbuch* could agree that Hitler was no good, but they used totally different arguments and rhetorics to come to the same conclusion.

It is, therefore, problematic to speak of antifascism as such in Paris in these early years, or even to tack Schwarzschild as an antifascist of a different stripe. There existed a spectrum of different and often mutually exclusive interpretations of the Nazi dictatorship in German Paris, to say nothing of the different rhetorics used to talk about the Third Reich, and the term “antifascist” belonged, at least in early 1933, to the materialist and Communist dialect of German spoken in the world of the émigrés. To put this another way: to call Schwarzschild or Kracauer an “antifascist” would be like calling Ruhollah Khomeini a communist because he, like the Iranian Communists of the late 1970s, opposed the Shah. Using the term “antifascist” to describe all anti-Hitler intellectuals is confusing because it glosses over the differences of opinion that existed between the émigrés. These differences may not have been fatal in 1933. Schwarzschild did not break with other intellectuals over the Dollfuss Affair, after all, and there was no contradiction
for him in knowing about Bolshevik prison camps and regarding Bolshevisim as a legitimate form of politics. But the differences between German intellectuals who are often uniformly painted as “antifascist” grew greater throughout the 1930s, and the difficulty one would have writing a coherent narrative of the disputes between all of these “antifascist” intellectuals suggests that the concept is not useful for explaining the period.

Antifascist or not, Schwarzschild had escaped from Germany and had recognized the enemy. But writing angry pieces against National Socialism and deriding the foolishness of other Westerners who could not see the distinction between it and “Austrofascism” was not going to get him, or his magazine, very far. Neither were the dozens of outrageous news clips that filled the back pages of Das Neue Tagebuch likely to convince skeptical readers. Reports of a pacifist forced to wear a neck placard saying “I am a traitor, and so is my family” from Hannover;\(^\text{137}\) of Jewish customers being beaten up in Landau’s Café Central;\(^\text{138}\) of the firing of longtime Jewish and “subversive” employees from the Dresdener Bank:\(^\text{139}\) all of these stories were likely to elicit from groans from readers, but were conditions in Nazi Germany in 1933 really that worse than in the Soviet Union or the American South? Das Neue Tagebuch was going to need more concrete stories if its reportage was to convince anyone of the unique threat posed by Nazism. Fortunately, however, Das Neue Tagebuch could count Rudolf Aron and Hans Hermes, two of the best economic journalists of the 20\(^{th}\) century, on its staff, and they, with Schwarzschild, were about to expose the Nazi rearmament to those, however few, who were willing to listen.

\(^{137}\) “Schandkarren für Pazifisten,” Das Neue Tagebuch, July 8, 1933, 47.
\(^{138}\) “Eine Lektion,” Das Neue Tagebuch, July 8, 1933, 48.
\(^{139}\) “Grossbanken entlassen jüdische Angestellte,” Das Neue Tagebuch, July 8, 1933, 48.
One summer day at the end of July 1935, twenty Berlin housewives entered an auditorium, climbed to the stage, and sat down at a dining table for one of Nazi Germany’s first-ever spam eating contests. The event, itself a repeat of several test runs in smaller German cities, was part of a campaign run by the National Socialist People’s Welfare Women’s Organization in order to boost consumer confidence in the canned beef that had been flooding butchers and markets for the past weeks following a poor summer slaughter and a lack of foreign meat imports. The canned beef had sat in stores for weeks, and even as local governments restricted the sale of fresh meat to inconvenient shopping times, butchers and shoppers conspired to buy fresh meat at prices that exceeded price controls. Some butchers had been arrested, not to mention the July raids on the vegetable stalls of Munich’s Viktualienmarkt. Canned beef it was for the Volksgemeinschaft, and as the housewives bit into their year-old meat with “the stern faces associated with fulfilling one’s duty and sturdy jaw muscles,” reporters from the conservative Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung snapped flash photos of the women as sweat ran down the women’s foreheads. The beef itself was not much to talk about – it reminded shoppers of beef from drought years and had a strange metallic taste – but the slogans for the contest were confident: “This fine canned meat is great-tasting and goes down easy!”

This Berlin beef-eating contest, reported in Das Neue Tagebuch in early August 1935, may seem like just a silly anecdote, but it reveals much about the low standard of living in Nazi Germany in the 1930s and is a good entry point into the serious economic reportage that Das Neue Tagebuch produced throughout its existence, most notably so

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during 1933-1935. While other anti-Nazi publications were content to describe the economy of the Third Reich in crude Marxist terms, writers for *Das Neue Tagebuch* pursued original and challenging research into the German economy and came away with a novel picture of how the Nazi economy functioned. In particular, *Das Neue Tagebuch* did not depict Germany as an imperialist capitalist dictatorship. While the paper noted that the standard of living for workers had dropped since Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, this was less the result of capitalist exploitation and more the result of a policy that can be best described as “guns and statistics.” On the one hand, *Das Neue Tagebuch* realized more quickly than any other anti-Nazi publication that the driving goal of Germany’s economic policy was rearmament, to the extent that German economic leaders were willing to promote rearmament even if this lowered the standard of living for German citizens. On the other hand, however, the most innovative way through which *Das Neue Tagebuch* made this discovery – namely, by analyzing official German statistics – also revealed the degree to which German policy-makers were concerned with manipulating the economy in order to give a false statistical impression of the state of the German economy.

This chapter, divided into five sections, focuses on the reports writers for *Das Neue Tagebuch*, most notably Rudolf Aron, produced for the paper during those years. First, this chapter examines financial policies within Nazi Germany in order to give some background of how work creation programs and rearmament were carried out in the Third Reich. Second, the chapter turns to the account one Marxist anti-Nazi who wrote at the same time as *Das Neue Tagebuch* depicted the German economy, in order to show how *Das Neue Tagebuch* was unique in breaking out of the usual Marxist tropes and
images of 19\textsuperscript{th} century factories in its analysis of the German economy. Third, this chapter focuses on Aron’s coverage of what would otherwise seem like a bizarre but not particularly telling event – the Berlin beef-eating contest – in order to show how writers for \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} understood the National Socialist economy as well as the degree to which citizens had room to resist the regime Fourth, this chapter focuses on Schwarzschild’s and Hans Hermes’ reportage of the “black budget” of the Third Reich in order both to give readers some idea of the excruciating research \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} employed in its articles as well as to show how German statisticians conspired with economic planners to hide German rearmament. Fifth and finally, this chapter covers Schwarzschild’s suggestions for what the Western democracies ought to do in response to German rearmament to show how much Schwarzschild’s argumentation presaged that of the later Cold Wars.

As we will see, the paper’s economic writings are important for several reasons. They give us today a finer picture of how émigrés perceived the threat of National Socialism. They make more striking the inability of Western governments to respond effectively to German re-armament. And most self-reflectively, they should make historians themselves ponder how it was that Nazi Germany came to acquire an image of a state friendly to German workers when both statistical and anecdotal evidence gives an overwhelming picture of what one historian has called a “\textit{Volksgemeinschaft} on a budget.”\textsuperscript{141} But before analyzing the way \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} analyzed the economic situation in Germany, however, we should review both German economic policy

following Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor as well as the interpretations of the German economy made by other anti-Nazis about the German economy.

The first place to look for signs of Germany’s new economic policy was, naturally, Hitler himself. Only two days after his appointment as Chancellor, on the night of February 1, Hitler was in Berlin, sweating with anticipation and dressed in a dark blue suit and black tie to deliver his first proclamation as head of the German government.\textsuperscript{142} The speech is most remarkable for its anti-Communism (“One year of Bolshevism would destroy Germany. The richest and most beautiful cultural areas of the world today would be transformed into chaos and a heap of ruins.”), but Hitler also made coherent economic policy suggestions, such as an agrarian settlement program, labor service, and “promoting employment” while “avoiding any experiments that would endanger our currency.”\textsuperscript{143}

Hitler’s pledge to implement his plan “with iron determination and unshakeable persistence” may sound like grandstanding, but Hitler’s government did make real policy efforts to reduce unemployment. Not that they came, or were needed, immediately: at the time of Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, there already existed a fully-fledged, fully funded – and more importantly, totally unspent – work creation program budgeted at 600 million Reichsmarks created by the Schleicher government.\textsuperscript{144} Almost a third of the total budget for work creation went to military spending, but the remaining 410 million Marks went to local work creation programs and agricultural land amelioration. By June 1, however, newly appointed President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht agreed with the

\textsuperscript{143} Domarus, 233, 234.
\textsuperscript{144} Tooze, \textit{The Wages of Destruction}, 39.
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Reich Finance Ministry on a one billion Mark work creation package, dubbed the “Reinhardt Program.”

Like the previous program approved by the Schleicher government, the Reinhardt Program was credit-financed. Economists both in favor of and against public expenditure as a means of economic stimulus agreed that no work creation spending financed by tax increases could improve the situation. Higher taxes would simply take purchasing power from private consumers and transfer it to the state. The state could borrow funds from the capital market, but this, too, threatened to squeeze out private industry from borrowing funds and expanding. The Reinhardt Program, however, took a third way through the creation of “new credit” (printing more money or issuing bonds). For conservative economists at the time, this made no sense: writing more checks would not produce more wealth, but would rather only lead to inflation. Prices would rise, real profits would sink, and the issuance of new money would act as a hidden tax and not encourage work creation. Yet this argument was only true under an economy at full stretch. “After all,” as one economic historian explains,

> with millions of workers desperate for work and with factories starved of orders, there was little reason to expect prices to rise. Under conditions of mass unemployment, government spending financed by new credit would result in greater real demand, greater production, and employment rather than inflation.  

It was true that if government spending remained at high levels as the economy recovered, catastrophic inflation might ensue, but given that Germany had 6 million unemployed (a 9% unemployment rate, based on the June 1933 census) and that most of Germany industry was running at less than half of full capacity, this was not a hard balance to strike.  

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More specifically, the Reinhardt Program worked in the following way: state agencies that paid contractors to carry out government projects paid not in cash but rather in interest-bearing IOUs in the name of the state agency, which were guaranteed by a cluster of state-affiliated banks. Contractors could (against a discount) cash the IOUs at any of the affiliated banks at any time. The banks, in turn, could be provided with the necessary cash by themselves cashing the IOUs with the Reichsbank, although here, too, a discount applied if the banks cashed the IOUs ahead of their maturation date. The Reichsbanks, therefore, would end up holding the work creation bills in exchange for hard cash. But the IOUs were worthless unless they could actually be exchanged for real money, and so the Reich Finance Ministry made the deal acceptable to the Reichsbank by promising to raise the necessary payback funds through the additional flow of tax revenue generated by new profits or through interest acquired on government loans once the financial markets had become more buoyant. The diagram below depicts this process:

![Diagram of the Reinhardt Program](attachment:diagram.png)

The money from the Reinhardt Program was used to fund a wide variety of public works projects. Many of the projects were modest: in Northeim, a town of slightly more
than 10,000 people in Lower Saxony, for example, the unemployed were paid to repair the town’s parks and roads.\(^{147}\) In a July 18, 1933 meeting of the Nazi-controlled Northeim city council, a Senator Ude suggested that some of the public works money be spent to build a sidewalk from the town center out to his farm located outside of town.\(^{148}\) (Ude’s request was voted down). Other projects, however, were more impressive. Prior to the Reinhardt Program, parts of the medieval wall surrounding Northeim’s inner city were crumbling, and the adjoining moat was filled with trash and rubble at points.\(^{149}\) The Reinhardt Program funded the eleven thousand workdays that repaired the wall where feasible and leveled it elsewhere, converted the moat into a series of swan ponds, and built grass lawns, flower beds, and playgrounds around the wall remnants to create a pleasant garden ring for the town. More impressively, however, 23,000 workdays went into the construction of an amphitheater set into a natural slope in the Northeim Forest. The site, first dubbed the *Thingplatz* (from the ancient Teutonic for a tribal meeting place) and latter the *Weihstätte* (“holy site”), was finished on June 7, 1936 and quickly became a valuable asset for Northeim. More than 60,000 tourists visited the theater in 1936 alone, and the city council chair arranged to turn the site over to the Nazi War Victims’ Society, which named Northeim its national headquarters and annual convention site, which brought more money to the town. And while Senator Ude remained without his personal sidewalk, the land upon which the *Thingstätte* had been built had been purchased at an inflated price from the Senator himself.\(^{150}\)

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\(^{148}\) Ibid., 174.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 271.

Re-armament, however, remained Hitler’s primary concern. 230 million of the Reinhardt Plan’s 1 billion Reichsmarks outlay were secretly siphoned off for “special measures” – a euphemism for strategic roads, airfields, barracks, and canals. But the military was about to get an outlay of its own. One week after the announcement of the Reinhardt Program, Hjalmar Schacht met with Defense Minister Blomberg, Commander of the Luftwaffe Herman Göring, and Erhard Milch, the Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, to agree to the financial package that funded the first stage of German armament. Schacht approved a figure of 35 billion Reichsmarks to be spent over eight years, amounting to a rate of about 4.4 billion Reichsmarks per year. The British economic historian Adam Tooze has put this figure into perspective:

Annual military spending by the Weimar Republic was counted not in billions but in hundreds of millions of Reichsmarks. Total national income in 1933 had slumped to as little as 43 billion Reichsmarks. Even allowing for a rapid recovery, Schacht’s program called for between 5 and 10 percent of German GDP to be devoted to defense for the next eight years.

This was indeed an astonishing military outlay for a country that was still in the League of Nations and nominally at peace with its neighbors, not to mention one that, at least by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, was banned from having an air force, submarines, artillery, and any manufacture of weapons, among other restrictive terms. By comparison, the United States in the present day devotes approximately 4% of its GDP to military spending on the back of per capita incomes approximately one-and-a-half times as

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151 Birgit Wulff, **Arbeitslosigkeit und Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen in Hamburg 1933-1939: eine Untersuchung zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik** (P. Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1987), 60.
great as those of Germany in 1933.\textsuperscript{155} Even during the so-called “Second Cold War” in the early 1980s, defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product never exceeded 6.1\% in the United States. Indeed, the only 20\textsuperscript{th} century great power to match or exceed the military spending rates of Nazi Germany in the 1930s was the Soviet Union, whose military spending as a percentage of GDP was between 20\% and 30\% – during the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{156}

How to actually finance re-armament? Given the depressing state of the Germany economy, taxation was out of the question. And any open announcement of a huge defense budget was likely to raise international ire or worse: when Germany withdrew from the League of Nations later that year in October, Göring and Blomberg expected France and Poland to launch a pincer attack against Germany.\textsuperscript{157} Schacht, therefore, transferred the logic of his off-budget work-creation program to military finance. A few weeks after the June 8 meeting, Schacht set up special account offices to channel the off-budget funds that were now to flow to military contractors. The scheme worked in the following way: a coalition of major Germans armaments producers and steel factories (some state-owned) formed a dummy company, Mefo GmbH, with a capital of 1 million Reichsmarks.\textsuperscript{158} Mefo’s sole purpose, however, was to issue IOUs (Mefo Bills) to the military. Branches of the military were then to pay arms contractors for arms orders in Mefo Bills, rather than in funds allocated by the public military budget. The arms contractors could then either wait for the IOUs to mature, or could cash them in as

\textsuperscript{155} A. Maddison, “Quantifying and Interpreting World Development: Macromeasurement Before and After Colin Clark,” \textit{Australian Economic History Review} 44 (2001), 1-34.
\textsuperscript{158} Tooze, \textit{The Wages of Destruction}, 54.
acceptable collateral at the Reichsbank (with a small discount, as was the case with the work-creation IOUs). Nonetheless, because the Mefo Bills, paid good interest and were effectively fully guaranteed government bonds, arms manufacturers rarely discounted the bills. As a result, Mefo Bills functioned as the main way to finance German rearmament without causing catastrophic inflation or attracting public attention to rearmament. The diagram below depicts the Mefo scheme:

With the Mefo scheme in place, all three branches of the German armed forces were ready to take their slices of the 35 billion Reichsmarks promised to them by Schacht; the secret air force of 200 aircraft planned for by the 1932 pre-Nazi governments blossomed under Göring and the funds from the Mefo scheme to a fleet of 2,000 front-line aircraft. ¹⁵⁹

While we have not touched on several other important areas of the German economy in 1933, by now we have a good enough grasp of the logic of work creation and

rerearmament under Schacht that we can evaluate how anti-Nazi intellectuals analyzed the German economy in 1933-1935, and how they developed their theories of National Socialism in power. While contemporary Social Democrat and Communist writers had more sophisticated assessments of Nazism than did Georgi Dimitrov’s and the Communist International’s definition of fascism as the “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital,” it was not by much. While exiled thinkers often offered perceptive analyses of contemporary geopolitics, their analyses of the National Socialist dictatorship were imprisoned by the language of Marxism and suffered for it. Das Neue Tagebuch was unique among anti-Nazis in offering an analysis of National Socialism that did not fall back on the Marxist worldview.

Let us turn, then, to an example of a voice of protest besides those in Das Neue Tagebuch, Fritz Sternberg. Sternberg (1895-1963) was a Jewish Marxist economist who devoted his career to opposing what he saw as imperialism and oppression of the working class. He spent much of the 1920s among German Marxist circles in Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, where he published his 1926 book Imperialism. Soon after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, however, Sternberg, fearing for his safety as a Jew and leftist, disguised himself as a skier and fled over the Sudeten Mountains into Czechoslovakia on March 12, 1933. From there, he made his way to Prague, where he remained for the next several years and where he published his work that most concerns us, Faschismus an der Macht (Fascism in Power).160

It does not take long to realize that Fascism in Power is a thoroughly Marxist work. The foreword to the book, written in Fall 1934 and purporting to provide both a

160 Fritz Sternberg, Faschismus an der Macht (Amsterdam: Verlag Contact, 1935).
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narrative of how Nazism took over Germany and how “the international working class” can take it back, features such lines as the following:

It took centuries before capitalism superceded feudalism and became the dominant, unchallenged means of production.

It will take generations from the beginning of the proletarian revolution until the victory of socialism in the decisive centers of global capitalism. […]

In the final analysis capitalism cannot maintain its ever more unsettled position, even in its fascist form.

In the final analysis, there exists only the choice between the descent into barbarism and the world conquest of socialism.¹⁶¹

Yet it would be unfair to dismiss Fascism in Power as just another example of 

Braunbuch-style Marxism, removed from reality and content to speak of “the” worker and financial capital as monolithic groups. Its Marxism is more sophisticated. The book features pages and pages of charts to document how the Nazi regime had in fact failed to reduce unemployment while claiming to have done so as well as how workers’ wages tended to sink during the first year of Nazi government. And yet every statistical argument in the book is shoehorned into a Marxist paradigm that refuses to see National Socialist economic policies as anything else but the newest and most oppressive form of capitalism.¹⁶² We read of the fact that

In the second year of the Nazi regime, such a dismantling of workers’ rights as occurred in 1933 – 1934 no longer satisfied monopoly capital. The new offensive of monopoly capital is introduced by the fascist state decreeing its “Work Law.” The sociopolitical victories that the German working class achieved in a generations-long struggle – the tariff law, a collective-bargaining agreement, a right to arbitration – are totally, absolutely destroyed. The Führer principle is carried out in the factory, too. The manager is the “Führer” to whom the labor force must pledge its fealty. The bourgeoisie becomes master again, just as was the case in the worst times of exploitation of early capitalism, before the emergence of the worker’s movement.¹⁶³

Add to this analysis of the factory floor in Nazi Germany Sternberg’s interpretation of geopolitics as a battle between the imperialist powers (England, Germany, France, America, and Japan) looking for more markets to exploit against the

¹⁶¹ Ibid., v.
¹⁶² Ibid., 134.
¹⁶³ Ibid., 143.
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Soviet Union, and Fascism in Power is a shrill analysis of political economy.\textsuperscript{164} Sternberg was right that workers’ wages did go down (in some cases, below what their previous unemployment benefits had paid them) under the Nazis. It is true, as recent economic historians have shown, that Germans’ standard of living during the 1930s was remarkably low. A kilogram of brown bread in the 1930s cost the equivalent of half an hour’s work for many low-paid Germans.\textsuperscript{165} A liter of beer cost more than an hour’s work. The annual rent for a basic four-and-a-half room apartment without a separate bathroom or kitchen, no indoor toilet, and no running water could cost as much as 1,380 Reichsmarks,\textsuperscript{166} or about five times as much as a low-paid blue-collar worker’s annual wage.\textsuperscript{167}

But Germany in 1934 was not England in 1844. The armaments industry certainly benefited from National Socialist spending policy. But many employers, both through programs like the Work Lottery and policies designed to artificially lower unemployment numbers (discovered by Das Neue Tagebuch and discussed later), had to take on fewer skilled workers, shut down the machines similar to those that had proletarianized British craftsmen a century earlier, and give workers reduced shifts in order to hire more workers. Moreover, Sternberg’s analysis overlooked how public spending, orders of magnitude greater in 1930s Germany than in 1840s Britain, helped blue-collar workers. Consumer goods were certainly sparse in Nazi Germany, but the regime was able to offer the accoutrements of a modern lifestyle, like the Volksempfänger (People’s Receiver),

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 202-228.
\textsuperscript{165} SRA, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich (1941/42) (Berlin, 1942), 377-380.
\textsuperscript{166} International Labor Office (Geneva), An International Enquiry into Costs of Living: A Comparative Study of Workers’ Living Costs in Detroit (USA) and Fourteen European Cities (Geneva, 1931), 33-45.
\textsuperscript{167} Bundesarchiv Hoppegarten, File R131, 594, Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Beirates der Industrieabteilung der Wirtschaftskammer Düsseldorf, October 14, 1940.
which in its cheapest form was priced as low as 35 Reichsmarks, or about a month and a half of near-minimum wage salary.\textsuperscript{168} (Today, by comparison, in 21\textsuperscript{st} century America, one can purchase a 13” television for slightly less than one month’s worth of pre-tax minimum wage). With their radios and monotonous diets composed largely of bread and jam, potatoes, cabbage, and pork, all washed down with water and the occasional beer or glass of milk, German workers did have a lower standard of living compared to the fellow members of the international proletariat, but it is a stretch to call what existed in Germany “the enslavement of the working class,” as did Sternberg.\textsuperscript{169}

If we look at public spending in Germany in a different light, then the picture becomes even murkier. It is conventional both in historical writing and in contemporary debates on government spending to pose the choice between “guns and butter:” between military and civilian spending. And military spending, which by 1938 had climbed to 20\% of GDP, certainly could have paid for the most extravagant subsidies for anything from public housing to free lunches to car ownership programs. To pose the question as “guns or butter,” however, presupposes a distinction between “productive” civilian spending and “unproductive” military spending that did not exist during the Third Reich. As Adam Tooze has pointed out, from a conventional point of view, the reintroduction of conscription in 1935 acted as an inefficient publicly subsidized vacation for millions of young men who were clothed and fed at state expense when they could have been gainfully employed.\textsuperscript{170}

Yet from another point of view, military spending was a public good. A well-supplied military could both defend Germany and aid the country’s economic expansion.

\textsuperscript{168} Tooze, \textit{The Wages of Destruction}, 149.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 142.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 163.
through conquest, for one. More subtly, however, how to draw the line between civilian and military spending in a society where the distinction between the two spheres was blurred? The “Day of the Wehrmacht” became a staple at Nuremberg Party Rallies from 1934 on, featuring tens of thousands of troops and thousands of vehicles and horses in an exercise whose military value was dubious, but whose value mass spectacle was obvious. On one occasion, Wehrmacht planes even dropped parachutists onto crowds of awestruck peasants. More than that, the expanding Wehrmacht served as a meaningful vehicle of industrial modernization. If few Germans could enjoy air conditioning, refrigerated food, or radio ownership, then the expansion of the Wehrmacht acted as a massive subsidy through which all German males could get their first hands-on experience of 20th century technology. It is true that the majority of Hitler’s army marched into battle on foot and relied on horses, a “poor army,” but every soldier in the army was familiar with how to work a radio, and a “poor air force” is a contradiction in terms. It was in this sense that Germany was indeed able to provide subsidized mass consumption of modern commodities to one sector of its population – conscripted men. As one 1943 tank manual had it:

For every shell you fire, your father has paid 100 Reichsmarks in taxes, your mother has worked a week in the factory. […] The Tiger costs all told 800,000 Reichsmarks and 300,000 hours of labor. Thirty thousand people had to give an entire week’s wages, 6,000 people worked for a week so that you can have a Tiger. Men of the Tiger, they all work for you. Think what you have in your hands!

Historians today have the benefit of hindsight, and certainly more complete and telling reams of evidence to draw on than did those living at the time, but how could Sternberg, who was no fool, come to conclusions that strike us today as so off the mark?

171 W. Landhoff, Die großen Militärparaden des dritten Reiches (Kiel, 2002).
172 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 164.
173 Ibid., 164-165.
The problem was not so much that Sternberg was giving the wrong answers as that he was asking the wrong questions. As we will see from the reportage of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, Sternberg’s language of industrialist exploitation and wage slavery missed the point in an analysis of a government devoted less to industrialists *per se* than to rearmament. His analysis of geopolitics as driven by imperialism and control of markets is not as far off as was originally thought by historians, but it certainly did not take Nazi anti-Semitism and Eastern expansion seriously as the basis for a foreign policy. The tension between Sternberg’s analysis and the actual situation in Germany will become clearer as we move to Aron’s and Schwarzschild’s findings. Sternberg’s explanation failed above all because it phrased almost every question in terms of “the worker” or “capitalists.” It failed both to distinguish commercial and military industry, and it failed to depict German industry as anything but a puppet of Nazi politicians.

If Sternberg’s analysis was misguided, how was the economic reportage of *Das Neue Tagebuch*? In order to answer this question, we need to turn to some of the articles of the paper to see how it depicted the German economy. Practically speaking, this means looking at the journalistic output of Rudolf “Rudi” Aron, specifically, three articles Aron produced from 1933-1935. Throughout its seven-year existence, Aron was the premier economics writer for *Das Neue Tagebuch*. While Aron produced 128 articles for the paper from September 1933 to March 1940 under the pseudonym “Joachim Haniel,” we know little about him besides the fact that he was Schwarzschild’s nephew, that he

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was born on January 23, 1906, that he rented a room at the Hotel Arago on the Rue de la Glacière, and that he wrote fluent French.

The goal in looking at Aron’s reportage is threefold. First, by looking at Aron’s depiction of the standard of living in Germany, we can see how he escaped Sternberg’s Marxist rhetoric to give both a more complete and less ideological account of how German wage-docking schemes worked and what the real motivations of industry leaders were. Second, by carefully reading Aron’s report of the summer 1935 beef-eating contests, we can get a better idea of the goals of German agricultural policy and exiles’ views of German agricultural political economy. And third, by covering what has been dubbed the paper’s greatest journalistic coup – uncovering the Mefo scheme and describing how it worked – we can learn how sophisticated Germany’s secret rearmament was and gain an appreciation of how these journalists in exile did their work.

Indeed, by September 1933, Aron had begun to paint a picture of the economy and standard of living in the Third Reich at odds with the usual picture of a highly organized and efficient modern industrial economy. In his article “The Standard of Living in the New Germany,” Aron exhaustively detailed the methods economic policymakers in the Third Reich had used to both give the statistical appearance of reduced unemployment while lowering the standard of living for the average factory worker. There were at least five ways in which Germany could recover on paper while actual conditions deteriorated.

177 Aron-Schwarzschild Correspondence, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, File R8046-1.
The first, Aron noted, was Hitler’s new policy of “Work Distribution” (Arbeitsverteilung), announced at the 1933 Nuremberg Party Rallies. Prior to Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, both Heinrich Brüning and Franz von Papen had opposed the replacement of the 48-hour workweek with a 40-hour workweek. Their opposition was based on the fact that employers would feel pressured to lower wages by less than the commensurate 17% drop in actual work time, and workers would dislike the reduced wages that a shorter workweek would bring about. Hitler had not openly declared a 40-hour workweek, but as Aron analyzed the official German economic statistics from June 1933, he saw that the average length of a workday for a German industrial worker was 7.26 hours, or a 43.5 hour workweek. At the same time, however, more than half of German factories still operated with the official 48-hour workweek. How to explain the discrepancy? The answer, Aron saw, lay in the “Work Distribution” program. Instead of officially changing the 48-hour workweek or cutting wages of workers, factories were now mandated to grant paid “Distributed Work” to unemployed persons in order to reduce unemployment figures. As a result of the addition of unskilled workers to the workplace, skilled workers necessarily had to work less and receive lower wages, too. As a result of “Work Distribution” alone, noted Aron, the average worker’s wage had dropped 10-15%. German workers were underpaid and underworked.

The second economic policy was machine shutdowns; put simply, German factories had begun to shut down their machine tools and reverted to handwork or more primitive technology in order to lower per capita productivity, require more workers, and reduce unemployment numbers. The Reich government had banned the installation of cigar-rolling machines and heavily taxed factories for any machines that were online in
order to encourage employers to re-hire unskilled workers to roll cigars manually. Glass-blowing machines were been banned in Thuringia, and in late August at a meeting of the Textile Industry Employer’s Association (\textit{Arbeitgeberverband der Textilindustrie}) and the Aachen Clothmakers’ Union (\textit{Tuchfabrikantenverein Aachen}), the two organizations passed a binding resolution mandating the replacement of double looms with single looms in order to reduce competition between skilled loom operators and to halve the maximum individual output of any given loom operator, thus encouraging factories to hire unskilled workers. As the \textit{Kölnische Zeitung} reported, the Aachen unions hoped that other local textile organizations would follow their example as soon as possible, but as Aron could see, the real result of the plan would be to drive skilled weavers out of industry, destroy any wage scale for quality work, and lower the average quality of textile production in Germany. In some senses, Germany in 1933 was less like England in 1840 than England in 1740, a nation relying increasingly on manual handicrafts as opposed to industrial manufacture.

The third economic policy was the so-called \textit{Krümper} System, through which companies employed several workers for the same job slot, with each man at work only a fraction of the week. Private companies had begun to use the system independently in the late 1920s in order to avoid bad publicity from laying off workers in times of already low unemployment. By October 1932, for example, Mansfeld AG, a copper-mining company, had employed the system. A few months later, Mitropa, a steel company, had given many of its workers “unpaid vacation” in order not to lay them off officially. According to Aron, however, following the ascension of the Nazis, industrial plants were encouraged both to maximize output and to help reduce unemployment numbers. The Mitropa plant
had been converted into an armaments factory and was encouraged both to expand its use of the *Krümper-System* and to lower workers’ hours; industry could thus implement both the *Krümper-System* and “Work Distribution” at the same time. This, reported the *Vossische Zeitung* in its September 1 issue, was a “pleasant sign of the spirit of sacrifice of our workforce in the interest of reducing unemployment.”\(^{180}\) Yet as Aron closed this section of his article, “neither the *Vossische Zeitung* nor any other German newspaper has shared with its reader whether or not the workers were asked about their ‘spirit of sacrifice.’”\(^{181}\)

Fourth, while workers’ hourly wages remained unchanged, companies employed “worker investment” schemes to recoup the losses from employing the previously mentioned policies. “For this invention,” wrote Aron, “we have the Sprottau AG Iron and Enamel Plant to thank.” Sprottau was forced to re-open workers’ lodging near the factory site in order to house the growing number of newly-employed unskilled laborers on site, but the company could not run the housing units at a profit. In response, Sprottau mandated its workers to form a “Workers’ Shareholders Association,” which was charged with raising 100,000 Marks over the course of two years to subsidize the plant’s overhead costs. The fees for the association reportedly cost workers 10-20% of their weekly salary on top of other wage and weekly time reductions.

Fifth and finally, while neither the Reich nor individual *Länder* nor Party organizations had imposed any new taxes *per se*, they had instituted so-called Voluntary Donation (*freiwillige Spende*) programs that existed in different forms and at different levels of society. At the federal level, the paycheck of every worker was docked 2-4%  


(depending on their location and income) to pay for the “Offering of National Work”; Voluntary Donation was, Aron noted, voluntary in the sense that “not paying was to be punished not with any legal penalty but rather a layoff.”\textsuperscript{182} Moreover, while “Voluntary Donation” was a progressive tax, it was not subject to the other restrictions placed on income taxes in Germany; the first 100 Marks of any worker’s monthly income were, for example, not subject to federal income tax, but they were subject to Voluntary Donation schemes.

The Offering of National Work was not the only form of Voluntary Donation, either. Workers had to pay 1\% of their monthly income to the “Adolf Hitler Offering” to subsidize costs of the NSDAP. By winter 1933, a scheme called “Winter Help” had been erected in order to subsidize winter charity funds. In Northeim, all clubs and social organizations were given target donation sums based on their membership rolls and made responsible for collecting those funds.\textsuperscript{183} Likewise, a list of all merchants in Northeim was drawn up and each told that he was expected to contribute, with the rejoinder that “contributions that are too small will be rejected.” Not only those with reported income, but also all women and children in the Pfalz region of Germany had to contribute one cent to collection funds every month under the “Pfalz Penny” program.\textsuperscript{184} Likewise, members of the Hitler Youth in Northeim roamed the streets to collect pennies from passerby, and collection cans were set up on every corner marked, “When the penny wins, the struggle will be victorious.”\textsuperscript{185} Some of the programs were even more eclectic: some regions of Germany employed a “work lottery” program, through which those

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 281.
\textsuperscript{183} Allen, \textit{The Nazi Seizure of Power}, 274.
\textsuperscript{184} Aron, “Der Lebensstandard in neuem Deutschland,” 282.
\textsuperscript{185} Allen, \textit{The Nazi Seizure of Power}, 275.
without work could win jobs at businesses that had been coerced into participating in the program.\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Eintopfgerichtsonntage}, or “Stew Sundays,” were also mandated after winter 1933. The idea was that on one Sunday every month from November to March, both German families and German restaurants were to prepare stew instead of their regular meal, at a cost not to exceed 50 Pfennigs per person,\textsuperscript{187} or the equivalent of about 45 minutes of work for a lowly-paid German worker.\textsuperscript{188} The difference in cost between the stew and the normal meal was to be donated to local Nazi welfare organizations, and profits were substantial; in Northeim, “Stew Sundays” regularly brought in more than 1,200 marks, or about the average annual income for a blue-collar German male worker in the mid-1930s.\textsuperscript{189} At the same time, members of the SA were routinely asked to donate canned goods, citizens were forced to buy tickets to party events, and citizens were forced to buy National Socialist badges and insignia. The “voluntary donation” was a constant part of life in Nazi Germany.

As Aron concluded, all of the measures combined lowered workers’ \textit{taxed} wages by at least 20% (3-6% from Voluntary Donation schemes, the rest from fewer work hours and the other four programs), but, he noted, “one should not talk themselves into believing that this is of concern only for workers.”\textsuperscript{190} Of course, reduced wages meant that workers had less purchasing power, but the real result of all of the wage-reducing measures was that they reduced revenues of German companies, too. For who was there to buy their products besides private consumers? “It is an imagination of financial

\textsuperscript{186} Aron, 282.
\textsuperscript{187} Joseph Goebbels, “Das deutsche Volk im Kampf gegen Hunger und Kalte” (Speech), September 13, 1933, in \textit{Signale der neuen Zeit} (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP Franz Eher Nachf., 1934), 225.
\textsuperscript{188} Tooze, \textit{The Wages of Destruction}, 142.
\textsuperscript{189} Allen, \textit{The Nazi Seizure of Power}, 275; Tooze, \textit{The Wages of Destruction}, 142.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 282.
illiterates,” wrote Aron, “to believe that the ‘economy’ could be run more efficiently if one ‘just minimized the expenses.’” While Aron had not yet developed his critique of the German economy in this, his first, column, he broke distinctively from writers like Sternberg in noting that workers’ reduced wages were not coming at the benefit of industry (or at least consumer industries). Regardless of where workers’ docked wages were going, companies that produced and businesses that sold consumer goods were hardly the first to benefit when workers’ wages fell and inflation struck.

Besides, German workers had to eat, too, and Eintopfsgerichtsonntage came only once a month. What to eat? While Marxist émigré intellectuals like Sternberg neglected to describe German agricultural policy in the 1930s, Aron produced a series of reports on food in Germany that both tell us much about the state of the German economy and Das Neue Tagebuch’s approach to economic reportage. While Sternberg had been content to leave agricultural policy out of his narrative of greedy capitalists in league with Nazi bureaucrats, Aron’s reports on German agriculture and food distribution showed that much of the plight of workers in Germany was the result of stupidity, not evil. In particular, Aron’s report of the Berlin beef-eating contest is a good entry point into how the paper treated the German agricultural economy. What was going on here? How to reconcile spam-eating contests and the arrests of butchers and grocers who illegally sold their goods above controlled prices with the picture of an exploitative, profit-driven capitalist state?

If we are to understand this bizarre spectacle and to retrace Aron’s thinking, we have to turn to the German farmlands. In fall 1933, German farmers enjoyed a bumper
crop.\textsuperscript{191} This had several effects: there was no need to import foreign grain, and because farmers had enough feed to adequately nourish their livestock and to maintain large herds, consumers had access to both quality meat and dairy products. Bread and other grain products were plentiful, too. Indeed, harvests were so bountiful that the regime could purchase grain reserves to hold for future, less productive years. The good harvest had political effects, too. By Aron’s account, economic planners became so confident that they had achieved agricultural autarky that they resolved to stop importing the (by 1933 standards) minimal amounts of feed Germany imported from abroad: rapeseed, grape seeds, peanuts, and other grains that humans rarely ate.

1934, however, brought a much less productive crop. This fact, noted Aron, would normally have prompted two measures: “release the piles of grain reserves for use, and bring in foreign feed.”\textsuperscript{192} Agricultural planners, however, did neither of these two things, preferring instead to maintain the bans on imported feed for publicity reasons, and insisting on enlarging the grain reserves even more, presumably as war reserves. Consumer breads were adulterated with grain substitutes in order to free up more grain for livestock, but even then, farmers lacked enough feed to maintain 1933-size herds, and so they had to slaughter much of their herds. As the title of one Aron article summed it up, the problem was simple: “too many pigs!”\textsuperscript{193} The average weight of a slaughtered cow dropped 10\% compared to the previous year, but with so many animals being slaughtered, it did not matter for gross meat consumption figures.\textsuperscript{194} By the official statistics, more meat was consumed in 1934 than any previous year in German history,

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
and with plenty of schmalz (rendered pig, chicken, or goose fat) left over from the slaughters, German consumers who could pay did not lack for fats, either.

But there was a catch. Much of the meat from the panic slaughter was of abysmal quality, and so the regime, fearing that the cheap, low-quality meat would flood the markets and go unconsumed, instead purchased the entire surplus of slaughtered meat from German farmers, or over 33 million pounds of low-quality beef and cattle parts. Indeed, the regime openly admitted that most of the purchased cattle was of such low quality as to be suitable only for glue, bonemeal, fertilizer, and dog food. And yet instead of using the reserves for any of these purposes, the meat was given to canning factories around Germany to be processed into canned beef reserves. But commentators noticed a burst of activity at canning plants, which forced the regime to backpedal: the canning factories were simply processing “fat and tasty cattle that had been imported” – at the same time that German central banks had so few foreign reserves as to make such imports impossible, not to mention the policies limiting imports of foreign food. By late summer 1934, then, Germans found themselves with a government that withheld their grain, adulterated their bread, and (while the quality of meat was high for consumers in 1934 itself) was prepared to let its citizens eat dog food.

When 1935 brought another poor harvest, Germans had to bear the wages of incompetence. Whereas many of the animals slaughtered in the 1934 season had actually been raised and fed by the 1933 bumper crop, there were no such herds this time in 1935, and so the production of meat, fats, dairy products, and eggs dropped precipitously. This caused a spike in food prices; in July 1935 alone, officially quoted meat prices rose 5%,

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195 Ibid.
196 Ibid., 733.
and Aron estimated that prices had actually risen 20% since the beginning of the year.\textsuperscript{197} The obvious solution was to import foreign meats, but because of Schacht’s refusal to devalue the Reichsmark, German exports remained uncompetitive on world markets. The Reichsbank’s foreign reserves were dropping to crisis levels, and prioritizing civilian imports over military imports was out of the question. Moreover, while work creation bills and Mefo Bills were not currency per se, they did cause inflation in the short term, which raised the prices of goods. Militaristic financial policies, a bad harvest, and liberal economics, not capitalist exploitation, caused the German meat crisis of 1935.

And as Aron well documented, the symptoms of this crisis were both comical and telling. Price controls were imposed on fresh meat throughout the Reich, but both butchers and consumers were happy to sell and pay at higher prices than officials deemed appropriate. In several German cities, the “butcher’s rebellion” showed the limits of popular support for the Nazis. After eight butcheries in Kaiserslauten were shut down on July 22, 1935 for exceeding price controls, including the butchery of the head of the local butchers’ guild. While in jail, the head of the guild refused to coerce the other butchers into agreeing to sell at the regime-dictated price, both for profit’s sake and because he was convinced that there existed no effective enforcement of the price controls elsewhere in the Reich, anyway: why should the butchers of Kaiserslauten be particularly punished? After two days in jail without apparent mistreatment, the butchers were free to go, and the price controls were lifted on all but the cheapest meats and sausages, so that the poor would have some access to fresh meat. “The example of the butchers’ revolt makes for a lesson,” he wrote.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 732.
Generally speaking, it has been established that one can successfully resist orders of the authoritarian regime. [...] The wave of rising expenses that cost the regime more sympathy in one week than all of its atrocities in two years, received a new push. The authority of the regime, which has already become so weak that a trade group can take up a fight with it, has suffered a new and hard blow through the damage caused by this struggle.\textsuperscript{198}

The butcher’s rebellion, in other words, showed the limits of the Nazi dictatorship; local government officials could not could on popular or industry support for their new food policies. But as Aron noted, it was telling that the regime faced more opposition for meat prices than for murder and boycotts of Jewish businesses; first came the food, then came the morality.

But the battle over the canned beef was not over. Because the metals most appropriate for canning were being used for arms orders, the metal used in the canned beef cans was of poor quality and leached a metallic flavor into the meat, and the cans did not keep well.\textsuperscript{199} It was, then, no surprise, that they sold very poorly. Every market in Germany was forced to sell the canned meat (relieving warehouses of some 100,000 cans), but the canned beef soon became a running joke as the cans adorned the shelves and window displays of German markets without anyone actually buying them. The next step, then, was for a number of cities in Western Germany to mandate that only the only meat product that could be sold in markets during the afternoon hours was the canned beef; housewives responded accordingly by purchasing their fresh meat in the morning, leaving most butcheries deserted in the afternoon. This drove the regime to sponsor the beef-eating contests described earlier in this chapter. Local leaders began to push the beef, too. One prominent local female Nazi leader in Mannheim declared, “it would, in all seriousness, be a deed devoted to National Socialism if every housewife would

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 732.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 733.
dispose of one can [of canned beef] a week.” The regime,” concluded Aron, “moves around in a circle of organization for organization’s sake. A tremendous amount happens. But this constant activity never gets hung up on what is necessary: what people want.”

Now that we have explained the difference in the way Das Neue Tagebuch and other anti-Nazi publications covered the German consumer economy, let us turn to how Das Neue Tagebuch exposed German rearmament and see how Schwarzschild and his reporters fit rearmament into their overall picture of National Socialism. Ever since July 21, 1934, Schwarzschild, Aron, and Hans Hermes, a writer who appears in no other accounts of the period, had been at work on a series of articles on the German economy that appeared at irregular intervals, detailing German imports of raw materials and

\[200\] Ibid.
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manipulation of unemployment statistics. The series ended on September 6, 1935 with an article entitled “The Final Figures of the Reich’s Expenditures,” written by Schwarzschild and Hermes.\textsuperscript{201} Their findings can be difficult to understand at first, but they show both the astounding degree to which German spending rose in the years following Hitler’s appointment and how the Reich’s economists attempted to disguise the rise in spending.

In order to understand Schwarzschild’s and Hermes’ methods, we have to remember that there existed in Germany stamp taxes on the transfer of certain legal documents – most importantly, stocks and bonds. When one wished to sell or exchange stock in a company, or a bond, one had to pay a small fee, either in the form of a purchased stamp that was to be affixed to the document, or through direct verified payment to a duty office. In particular, in Germany there existed a .01% stamp tax on the exchange of all bills (except for Reichsmarks and other treasury bills). For example, if a stock broker wished to purchase several shares in a company that were altogether worth 100 Marks, he would have to pay a stamp tax of 10 Pfennigs on the transaction. While the example of a modest stock purchase might make the stamp tax seem insignificant, the tax consistently produced 3 million Marks of income a year for the government.\textsuperscript{202} More relevantly, the stamp tax also applied to Mefo Bills and work-creation bills. Every time military contractors were payed in Mefo Bills, or any time a Mefo Bill was used as part of a transaction, the .01% stamp tax took effect. Therefore, while Mefo Bills were not “real” currency in the sense that they did not spike inflation, and a clever way to finance rearmament in that they would not cause official defense budgets to rise, their presence in


\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 851.
the Germany economy could be detected through the rise in stamp tax income they generated.

Before we continue to see where Schwarzschild and Hermes went with their article, we need to understand how and where income from the stamp tax was reported. In German reports about stamp tax income in the 1930s, there were three relevant statistics. The first was the income from the stamp tax itself, reported in millions of Reichsmarks; this figure was published in the magazine *Economics and Statistics*, the official publication of the Reich Statistical Office. The second figure was the total value of documents affected by the stamp tax, reported in billions of Marks; as Schwarzschild noted, the second figure was essentially superfluous, since it was only the first figure multiplied by 1,000. This relation always had to hold true, since the stamp tax was a tax of .01% on circulating documents. This second figure was published by two different sources, both separate from the Reich Statistical Office: an independent institution, The Institute for Economic Research, published an annual journal, *Economic-Statistical Handbook*, which featured the same statistics as those in *Economics and Statistics*. Another journal, the bi-yearly report of the Reich Credit Society (a large state-owned Berlin bank) also published the same statistics as *Economic-Statistical Handbook*, but because the Reich Credit Society’s journal appeared bi-yearly, it published the figures for the first half of any given year more quickly than did *Economic-Statistical Handbook*.

There existed, however, a third relevant statistical figure, the figure for the turnover of bills. As Schwarzschild explained, some transactions took place over a period of longer than a month, and the entire amount paid out by a given bill could be larger than what was paid in the course of a single month. In Germany, bills could be paid out
over the course of three months since their issuance, but at the beginning of a fourth month, the remainder to be paid out would be taxed anew and reported for that next month rather than belonging to the past three months of payout. The impact of this policy to the statisticians was that there existed a third figure, the turnover of bills for the past three months. This figure was just the sum of the bill turnovers (the second figure) from the past three months, and it was published exclusively by the Economic Activity Institute, a subsidiary of the Reich Statistical Office.

The relation between all of these figures may be confusing, but let us look at some figures from the Reich Statistical Office, and we can see what these abstract relations meant on paper. The following are the tax and bill turnover figures from the first quarter of 1932, as published by the Economic Activity Institute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Revenue from Stamp Tax (Millions of Marks)</th>
<th>Monthly Amount Associated with Stamp Tax Transactions (Billions of Marks)</th>
<th>Quarter’s Transaction Total Associated with Stamp Tax (Billions of Marks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1932</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1932</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1932</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the relations here make sense. Each of the figures in the second column is approximately 1,000 times larger than its counterpart in the column to the left, and both the revenue figures and the transaction totals are approximately equal (9.7 million
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Reichsmarks and 9.5 billion Reichsmarks). The quarterly transaction total, moreover, is approximately the same as the sum of the previous three month’s amounts. To make the point clear, we can look at another similar chart, this time from the final quarter of 1932:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Revenue from Stamp Tax (Millions of Marks)</th>
<th>Monthly Amount Associated with Stamp Tax Transactions (Billions of Marks)</th>
<th>Quarter’s Transaction Total Associated with Stamp Tax (Billions of Marks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1932</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1932</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1932</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that we have a grasp of how these statistics were reported, let us ask: how did these figures change during the Third Reich? By assembling the statistics reported by the three sources throughout that period, Schwarzschild and Hermes came up with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Revenue from Stamp Tax (Millions of Marks)</th>
<th>Monthly Amount Associated with Stamp Tax Transactions (Billions of Marks)</th>
<th>Quarterly Transaction Total Associated with Stamp Tax (Billions of Marks)</th>
<th>Increase in Quarterly Transaction Total Respective to February 1933 (Billions of Marks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1932</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1933</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1933</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1933</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1933</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1933</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1933</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1933</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1933</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1933</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1933</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
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The trend to gather from the above table is that the amount of bonds, checks, and other documents subject to the stamp tax increased dramatically under Nazi rule, from 8.5 billion Reichsmarks to 26.8 billion Reichsmarks. This, claimed Schwarzschild and Hermes, represented the “black budget” of the Third Reich, a financial trick used to dramatically increase domestic spending without “really” raising the budget. Indeed, as of May 31, 1935, the official budget of the Third Reich was only 4.3 billion Reichsmarks; if the increases in issued documents uncovered through the stamp tax statistics was correct, this would mean that the Third Reich had spent a secret, off-the-books, budget of 18.3 billion Reichsmarks since Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor. In reality, this corresponded mostly to the circulation of Mefo Bills with high face values which corresponded to payments for rearmament.
A number of objections could be made to Hermes’ and Schwarzschild’s claim, but they all crumbled under scrutiny. The first was that the “secret budget” just represented loans to an expanding private industry hungry for capital and expansion. Schwarzschild quickly shot down this objection, however, noting that during its period of peak performance, the German economy in December 1928 produced 12.8 billion Reichsmarks of stamp tax income, and that “nobody will claim that the current status of the German economy is even remotely comparable with that of 1928.”203 The second objection was that the stratospheric figures might reflect the payment calendar of work-creation bills (or the Mefo Bills, for that matter, even though Schwarzschild was unaware of their existence): could the fact that work-creation bills paid out over several months have inflated the statistics? The answer was no: the work creation bills were subject to the three-month rule, a fact that was reflected in the statistics. The third possible objection was also the most sophisticated, and indeed, the authors and editors at the Reich Statistical Office and the Reich Credit Society seem to have realized the implication of the figures they were publishing and tried to come up with an explanation. Their idea was that all of the foreseeable taxes on the work creation bills were being paid up front; if, for example, a bill would run for four months, the bill’s issuers were being forced to pay the new tax for the fourth month up front. But as Schwarzschild and Hermes noted, this objection failed for two reasons. For one, this was not how taxes on bills were assessed; taxes were newly applied to the work creation bills on the fourth month, the eighth month, and so on. Moreover, even if the work creation bills were being taxed for their projected lifetime upfront, this would not make any real difference in the total amount of credit issued, and hence stamp tax revenue, in the long run. Whether taxes were assessed

203 Ibid., 852.
all at once up front, or every three months, they were going to be reflected in the statistics. It seemed justified, in Schwarzschild’s and Hermes’ opinion, to conclude that the Reich had devoted approximately 18.3 billion Reichsmarks of off-the-budget funds, four-and-one-quarter times the official budget, to secret projects, rearmament among them.

This wasn’t the only scandal. Even as the corpus of statistics published in *Economics and Statistics, Economic-Statistical Handbook*, and those published by the Economic Activity Institute gave a picture of the Reich’s “black budget,” it turned out that the official figures for quarterly transactions produced in *Economics and Statistics* denied the existence of the “black budget.” Schwarzschild and Hermes provided, for example, the figures produced by the magazine for the final quarter of 1933:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Revenue from Stamp Tax (Millions of Marks)</th>
<th>Official Monthly Amount Associated with Stamp Tax Transactions, According to <em>Economics and Statistics</em> (Billions of Marks)</th>
<th>Official Quarterly Transaction Total Associated with Stamp Tax, According to <em>Economics and Statistics</em> (Billions of Marks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1933</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1933</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1933</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Economics and Statistics*, in other words, underestimated the total amount of bills circulating in Germany by almost 5 billion Reichsmarks. And the discrepancy became more shocking every month, as the following chart showing figures from 1935 depicts:
The quarterly figures published in *Economics and Statistics* did not even match up with the journal’s own figures. For example, even though *Economics and Statistics* indicated that the past quarter’s transaction total as of April 1935 (in other words, the sum of transactions from January, February, and March) to be 11.9 billion Reichsmarks, the journal also reported that the transaction totals from those months were 5.6 billion Marks, 6.8 billion Marks, and 9.9 billion Marks. Something was, quite literally, not adding up in the German economy.

It was in this way that Schwarzschild and Hermes were able to uncover the secret rearmament of Germany and unmask the statistical existence of the Mefo scheme, along with the other off-the-books rearmaments programs. “It is clear, and even admitted by the officials, that the majority of the off-the-budget expenditures went to armaments,” wrote the pair at the end of their article. Both absolutely and relatively speaking, the sums were enormous. When added up, German state spending from 1933-1935 was two and a half times as great as French state spending during the same period. Moreover, 20 billion of the total 39.6 billion Marks spent had been financed through short-term debt within the
course of 28 months – no small feat compared to the British Empire’s 11 billion Marks (900 million Pounds) of short-term debts accumulated in the course of centuries.\textsuperscript{204}

This, then, was the state of the German economy and the way the writers for \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} perceived it in 1933-1935. If we look at the Third Reich from an economic point of view, Nazi Germany in the early 1930s with an economy far removed from that of England in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century. Its government funded work creation programs that genuinely improved the appearance of German cities and gave previously-unemployed Germans work, but it did so at the same time that its policies dramatically lowered workers’ wages, hurt consumer industries, and pursued agricultural policies that limited consumers’ purchasing choices and threatened to create a malnourished \textit{Volksgemeinschaft}. It was a society in which access to the technologies that British or American workers could enjoy – radio, automobiles, even indoor running water – was limited. But it was also one in which males could, through military mobilization, effectively receive what was at least in the 1930s paid vacation and gain exposure to technologies (radios, tanks, and airplanes) to a degree unheard of by young men in any other Western peacetime country at the time. And it was a society in which there existed a strange tension between non-Jewish Germans and the regime. While “Aryan” Germans were apathetic to the murder of their Jewish neighbors, we have seen through the case of the “butcher’s rebellion” and subsequent response by the regime both the amount of room there was for ordinary people to negotiate with Nazi officials as well as the degree to which local Party officials would turn anything into an opportunity for more mass mobilization.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 854.
That said, what did Schwarzschild think the Western liberal democracies should actually do to counter German rearmament? In general, Schwarzschild argued for a more and more aggressive French and British foreign policy as the 1930s progressed. Already by September 7, 1933, the Nazi-affiliated *Leipziger Neuesten Nachrichten* ran an article that decried Das Neue Tagebuch as a newspaper that “goes so far in its madness [Tollwut] and hostility towards the new Germany as to advise the French to undertake the ‘preventive war as crusade.’”\(^{205}\) While Schwarzschild took the hatred from a Nazi newspaper as a sign that Das Neue Tagebuch was doing its job, he noted that “there is in our view only one means to hinder the coming and certain war without war.” More precisely:

> Enforcing the extradition of German aircraft and an end to the construction of new aircraft. There still remains time to achieve this without any coming to arms; it is, moreover, the only method to avoid the war that will otherwise inescapable war, and it is, I would add, an undertaking that would benefit only the gravely threatened world, and that would be of no direct use to the opposition to Hitler. The German rulers would not be disturbed, and the German Diaspora would not regain its homeland; only the world as a whole would be sure of peace.\(^{206}\)

At first, in other words, calls for an arms race were off of the table. The Western powers had to enforce German disarmament before the funds devoted to rearmament had their real effect, and German disarmament had to be – as far as was possible – non-partisan. Nazi leaders had to be assured that disarmament was not part of some larger scheme to install a more pro-Western government, or to aid German exiles to overthrow the National Socialist government. In this sense, Schwarzschild was far more moderate than the Communists who would later demand a Soviet Germany.


As the years progressed and the “black budget” began to fund scores of new German airplanes, tanks, and other military technologies, the opportunity for coercive German disarmament passed. In a March 2, 1935 article, “Invitation For Risk,” Schwarzschild criticized Great Britain and France for not having a clear policy with regards to the Versailles Order and for fearing to take any foreign policy move that might have risks.\(^{207}\) Even if one disagreed, as did Schwarzschild, with the content of Nazi Germany’s foreign policy, it had to be applauded for its boldness and for its aggressive pursuit of national interests. “That is the genesis,” he wrote, “that one cannot lose from one’s memory: aimlessness and anxiety before every risk on the one hand, and purposefulness and readiness to take risks on the other hand. The history books of the year 2000 will have a hard time providing any other explanation besides this one for the ghastly development that took place in Europe from 1919 until today.”\(^{208}\) If the Western powers wanted to project power against Germany, they had to form explicit military alliances with other countries, they had to realize that the only valid alliances were military alliances (i.e. not neutrality pacts) with other countries opposed to Germany, and they had to form international alliances; if wars were localized between nations like Germany and Czechoslovakia, powers outside of the zone of conflict would never intervene, and Germany could expand its influence.\(^{209}\)

Most controversially, Schwarzschild argued that an arms race between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other was the only way to maintain the Versailles world order. Western politicians had to get rid of the “pseudo-pacifistic histrionics, the idea that one can disable the weapons of those who want war through soul

\(^{208}\) Ibid., 202.
\(^{209}\) Ibid., 203.
massages [Seelen-Massage], through an ‘abracadabra’ or ‘presto-chango.’” Pacifists had to accept the “brutal thesis that there is no defense [against weapons] besides more weapons, more numerous weapons, allied weapons.”²¹⁰ Western democracies lived in a world where other powers with different national interests – the Soviet Union and Germany – had accepted these realities of geopolitics, that diplomats would only be listened to when “a few million soldiers and a few thousand airplanes stood behind them.”²¹¹ Schwarzschild was, in other words, arguing for a realist foreign policy and an intentional arms race as the only reasonable policy for the Western democracies to take against the Third Reich. By expanding their militaries and raising the destructive stakes of any war or action that upset French or British national interests, Nazi Germany could be contained. (Incidentally, the idea that Nazi Germany would not be able to afford such a continued arms buildup over time did not enter into Schwarzschild’s argument). By September 1938, Schwarzschild accepted that Hitler could represent the one factor – an irrational state actor – that could upset this early argument for Mutually Assured Destruction as a defense policy. But one had to admit:

The world peace today cannot be maintained through anything else besides the anxiety of those in power in Berlin before losing a world war. This anxiety is necessary – but this anxiety is also sufficient [to avoid war], assumed that there even exists anything sufficient. [...] A fear of losing the world war in Berlin is necessary to the maintenance of world peace, one has to say. If that doesn’t do it, then nothing will.²¹²

It is in remarks like these that one can see how much Schwarzschild’s arguments presaged those made by American policymakers during the Cold War. Schwarzschild wrote in an era when the physics behind nuclear fission reactions was just being discovered, and his idea that the threat of a massive conventional, non-nuclear war would

²¹⁰ Ibid., 204.
²¹¹ Ibid., 205.
be sufficient to deter aggressive state actors probably seems quaint to those who grew up during the Cold War, attuned to the threat of nuclear mutually assured destruction. But Schwarzschild lived in an age in which the Battle of the Somme, not Hiroshima, was the defining image of war of the day; it was as intuitive to his contemporaries that a large conventional war would be catastrophic as it is to us today that a global nuclear war would be terrible. The point is that Schwarzschild was one of the first liberals to advocate not for pacifism and disarmament but for increased defense spending by the state and the possibility of mutually assured destruction as the basis for a stable global peace. If we look at Schwarzschild this way, it becomes apparent that while the 1930s marked a low point for pacifist liberalism, it was also a period in which the ideas that would be later advanced by Cold War liberals were first developed. Schwarzschild wanted a Cold War against the Nazis, but his ideas on foreign policy were only first incorporated against the Soviets after World War II.

Schwarzschild’s argument for a European Cold War was not popular, at least among the streets of German Paris. As the German Communist Maximilian Scheer, a writer for *Die Neue Welthühne* during the 1930s in Paris, later recounted, many of the Marxist German exiles were nervous of supporting any policy that would increase the fortunes of French or British industrialists. Specifically, Scheer recalled having a conversation about *Das Neue Tagebuch*’s position with a French factory owner that reflected the position of many German exiles.

“In other words,” said the Frenchman, “you are for revealing the restoration of German militarism.”

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“Of course. In order to warn the public of a new war. In order to help the opposition inside of Germany, for the German opposition is fighting for peace. In short, in order to aid the cause of peace.”

“Of course, of course,” he said with an ingratiating patience. “But those are all theoretical long-term goals. The immediate goal is the disclosure of the danger of a new, strong army beyond the Rhine. France has to arm itself more vigorously. That’s all there is to it.”

That how he thought. Not the disarmament of all, but the arms buildup of all. Not the combating of increased German military spending, but an increase in French military spending. Not a diminishment of the danger, but an escalation of danger. Not ‘away with arms profiteering!’ but rather ‘More arms profiteering!’

We had already made our decision before he finished his sentence.214

This disagreement between Schwarzschild and the other German émigrés in Paris is a further example of the kinds of disagreement that plagued the antifascist movement. Former anti-Nazis could speak wistfully – and vaguely – of general feelings of camaraderie among all opponents of Hitler in the 1930s, but the question of whether or not France and Britain ought participate in an anti-Hitler arms race was a concrete question that divided the ranks of anti-Nazis. It showed how differently Marxist and non-Marxist anti-Nazis pictured society. For Schwarzschild, arms manufacturers could be the effective guarantors of an anti-Nazi foreign policy; for Scheer and other Communists, industrialists and arms manufacturers were but a less terroristic form of the capitalist enemy. Arms manufacturers may not have merited the scorn of the Nazis themselves, but these kinds of doctrinal differences were very real and divided the Parisian antifascists.

But if there was only a tension between the way Das Neue Tagebuch and contemporary Marxist anti-Nazis analyzed the German economy, a near-fatal rift between the two camps was about to emerge on the banks of German Paris. The pages of Das Neue Tagebuch and other contemporary exile publications had long been a forum for writers to discuss the merits of what seemed like a great step in the liberation of Man in the Soviet Union. Schwarzschild, we may recall, knew of the Gulag by summer 1933, but

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214 Maximilian Scheer, So war es in Paris (Berlin, 1964), 49.
he could nonetheless content himself to view the Soviet project as one that, while it used violence and terror, did so in the name of a higher good. But by the autumn of 1936, the Moscow Trials were the event that began to draw a rift between former friends in German Paris. By the spring of the following year, the news from the Soviet Union had grown even more erratic. The Trials would open, to use Schwarzschild’s favorite term, a Pandora’s Box among the world of the émigrés that would further divide the anti-Nazi world.
It was August 19, 1936 in the Soviet Union, and as the sun first rose on towns like Stalinogorsk and Stalino that Wednesday morning, memories of Aviation Day were still fresh in citizens’ minds. In Moscow, workers like E. V. Koldybaev of the Kuybyshev Electrical Works, V. M. Artemyeva of the May 1st Local Soviet of OSOAVIACHEM (a paramilitary organization devoted to recruiting fighter pilots), and P. T. Bartholomewyev of the “Liberated Labor” factory were invited to an airfield in Moscow to be trained to fly biplanes by the members of the Stalin Section of the Moscow Aviation Club. Engineering clubs had given children like Lyala Demeyanova and Yuri Bogomolov of Stalinogorsk model airplanes to play with. Even as less fortunate workers and children made their way to workplaces like the Mikoyan Moscow Meat Factory (which sold 130 varieties of sausage in addition to “glands of internal secretion for pharmaceutical and industrial purposes”), the Kaganovich Ball Bearing Plant, or the Stalin Automobile Plant, neither had their Aviation Days been without spectacle, for a squadron of 39 airplanes had flown in formation over the skies of Moscow that day, spelling out “STALIN” to the observers below.

But all was not well in Moscow that week. Already on Monday night, workers on the evening shift at the Ordzhonikdze Glass Factory in Moscow had gathered to listen to a message from the head procurator of the Soviet Union, Andrei Vyshinsky,
concerning the “terrorist activity of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and their gang of bandits.” The next day, August 19, the banner heading to Pravda had it more precisely:

Today the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. begins its hearing of the affair of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite band of murderers.

The entire nation is filled with hatred and scorn towards the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bandits who murdered comrade Kirov and had planned the murder of the Leader (vozhd') of Communism. The entire nation brands these despicable murderers, held in contempt, as agents of the fascist secret police – Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and all of their band.

Get on with the judgment! A terrible judgment on the Trotskyite-Zinovievite rabble!

In other words, not only the Bolsheviks Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev (imprisoned in Soviet jails since immediately after the murder of Sergei Kirov in December 1934) but also the exiled Leon Trotsky and thirteen other supposed conspirators were to be tried for a lengthy list of charges:

1) That in the period of 1932-1936 a united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre was organized in the city of Moscow with the object of committing a number of terrorist acts against the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government for the purpose of seizing power.


3) That during this period, the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre organized a number of terrorist groups and prepared a number of practical measures to assassinate Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Kossior, Orjonikidze and Postyshev.

4) That one of these terrorist groups, operating on the direct instructions of Zinoviev and L. Trotsky and of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre, and under the immediate direction of the accused Bakayev, carried out the foul murder of Comrade S. M. Kirov on December 1, 1934.

By 1:30 PM that afternoon, Vyshinsky had finished his introduction of the case against the conspiracy, and almost all of the defendants had pleaded guilty to all of the charges.

221 Caption to Photograph, Pravda, August 18, 1936, 2.
222 Pravda, August 19, 1936, 1.
Following a fifteen-minute break, the trial got even stranger. Over the next several days, Vyshinsky examined the defendants, who admitted to taking part in a conspiracy organized against the leaders of the Soviet state in conjunction with the Gestapo. By mid-afternoon on the 19th, Sergei Mrachkovsky, a former commissar in Siberia during the Russian Civil War, had confessed to meeting with several other defendants in Moscow in late 1932 to discuss the assassination of Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich, and Kliment Voroshilov.  

Valentin Olberg, a Russian émigré who had carried out a correspondence with Trotsky in the early 1930s, said that in 1933 Trotsky had facilitated his contact with Gestapo agents and that “in 1933 there began organized systematic connection between the German Trotskyites and the German fascist police.”

Given the chance to plea his case, another defendant, Richard Pickel, had only the following to say:

Only one conclusion can be drawn. We represent a most brutal gang of criminals who are nothing more nor less than a detachment of international fascism. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were our banner. To this banner were drawn not only we, the dregs of the land of Soviet, but also spies, and agents of foreign states and those sent here for diverstive activities. The last eight years of my life have been years of baseness, years of terrible, nightmarish deeds. I must bear my deserved punishment.

At 2:30 PM in the afternoon on August 22, V.V. Ulrich and two other Soviet judges pronounced all sixteen defendants guilty of either organizing or assisting the “united
The trial of the “Moscow Sixteen” was just the first of several major show trials to be held over the course of 1936-1938. The reaction of Western intellectuals to the trials ran the gamut: for some, the experience of the show trials began to sew doubts in any faith they had in the Soviet Union as an important actor in the liberation of mankind; for others, the trials only embodied the type of justice required to build socialism in a world dominated by fascist and non-fascist bourgeois imperialist countries. *Das Neue Tagebuch*, however, was unique in recognizing the sham nature of the trials at an early stage, and Schwarzschild had to wage an often lonely struggle to convince his readers and friends of the poverty of Bolshevism. Indeed, Schwarzschild’s reflections on the Moscow Trials made him one of the first anti-Nazi thinkers to condemn Stalinist Communism and to draw an explicit comparison between Stalinism and National Socialism, even blaming Soviet Communism for the appeal and rise of Nazism in Germany.

This chapter, divided into four sections, focuses on the reception of the 1936 and 1937 Moscow Trials among German anti-Nazi émigrés. First, this chapter examines Schwarzschild’s critical stance towards the first Moscow Trials in August 1936; it is clear that by 1936, *Das Neue Tagebuch* and Schwarzschild had ceased to be “antifascist” or even an anti-Nazi *per se*. From 1936-1937, both magazine and editor were on the way towards becoming one of the most outspoken centers of anti-totalitarianism in the West.

Second, this chapter covers the propaganda campaign conducted against Schwarzschild and 
*Das Neue Tagebuch* by the Communist paper *Deutsche Volkszeitung* in early 1937, 
demonstrating the intellectual poverty of some antifascist groups while showing how 
large the ideological gap was between Schwarzschild and some of his contemporaries. 
Third, this chapter turns to the reactions that anti-Nazi émigrés in the West (besides 
Schwarzschild) had towards the Soviet Union during 1937, and how the selective 
publication of these articles by *Das Neue Tagebuch* and other “antifascist” publications 
made the divide between Schwarzschild and other “antifascists” much greater. Fourth and 
finally, this chapter closes with a discussion of Schwarzschild’s assessment of 
Bolshevism on the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution in which he directly 
compared Bolshevism to National Socialism, indeed, even blamed the former for the 
latter, and clearly showed his distance from the Sovietophile anti-Nazi wing of the 
“antifascist” movement.

In general, the point is not that *Das Neue Tagebuch* was alone in taking an anti-
Soviet pitch. The American journal *Partisan Review* went so far as to issue an editorial 
disavowing itself from the Communist Party in 1937, stating that “the totalitarian trend is 
inherent in that movement and it can no longer be combated from within.”

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229 Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 43-44.
chapter will show, that was not the case at all. Schwarzschild, who was not a fringe figure in Paris – he edited the largest exile newspaper there – went on the warpath against Soviet Communism during this period. To put it another way: scholars like Hobsbawn, Diner, Furet, and Grunenberg are wrong. Communist antifascism was cynical and no high point for German intellectuals, but these intellectuals in exile did have a positive legacy, the legacy of anti-totalitarianism.

Let us then turn to examine this legacy. The world of the émigrés had changed much since even the summer of 1933. The Communist world consisted of a confusing array of national parties and Comintern-coordinated international organizations. For all of 1933 and half of 1934, national Communist Parties, including the French Communist Party (PCF), were prevented from participating in alliances with non-Communist organizations. At the same time, there existed two European Communist antifascist “empires”: one, the International Committee to Aid the Victims of Hitler Fascism run by Willi Münzenberg (of Braunbuch fame); the other, the World Committee for the Fight Against War and Fascism, run by the French writer Henri Barbusse, a major figure in the Comintern apparatus.230 So long as national parties were not to negotiate with socialist parties, these were the only catholic forces in the world Communist movement. After the immediate goals of the Braunbuch had been achieved – Dimitrov and the other Reichstag Fire defendants were repatriated to Moscow on February 28, 1934 – the goal of these organizations became the release from Germany of German Communist leader Ernst Thälmann.231 Donations, bouquets, and resolutions for Thälmann became common in the Communist world, and on April 16, 1935, Thälmann’s birthday, German embassies were

231 Ibid., 10.
flooded with calls from around the world to release Thälmann. 50,000 birthday greetings came from the United States alone.\textsuperscript{232} While the displays were impressive, Thälmann was never freed (he was shot at Buchenwald in August 1944), and the Prague leadership of the German Social Democratic Party did not express solidarity with Thälmann (their former arch-enemy) until January 1937. The international Communist media empires were good at producing spectacles – \textit{Braunbuch} and the Thälmann campaign – but antifascist catholicism seemed a long way off.

But events in early 1934 in France caused a dramatic sea shift in the Communist world. On the night of February 6, 1934, several French paramilitary rightist parties marched in the streets of Paris, killing dozens and injuring hundreds of people. The French Left, both Communist and Socialist, feared – like their Austrian counterparts months earlier – that France was about to suffer the fate of Germany and Italy. The French Communist Party, led by Maurice Thorez, who continued to denounce Nazism as “just one form of monopoly capitalism among others” and refused to consider an alliance with socialists, organized a counter-march on the 9\textsuperscript{th}, which remained isolated among Communists. At the same time, the Communist mayor of St. Denis, Jacques Doriot urged communists to make common cause with the socialists, and even convinced residents of St. Denis to march with socialists on the 12\textsuperscript{th}, at the time an anathema. Confusion reigned among the French Communists, and Doriot was eventually expelled from the Party for lack of discipline, but on June 11, the Comintern sent a secret memo to the French Communist Party recommending a willingness “at all costs” to strike an alliance with socialists and form a common front against fascism.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 13.
Antifascist ecumenicalism was not restricted just to the world of political parties, either. In June 1934, Henri Barbusse wrote to Comintern Propaganda Chief Bela Kun: “It appears to me that it is extremely important to win over the bulk of the intellectual masses to our cause. I don’t just mean the eminent personalities, the masters of the pen and the sciences; we must also win over the institutions, the doctors, the engineers, the white collar employees, in short, the masses of intellectual workers.” Barbusse’s letter also referred to the upcoming 1934 First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, a two-week (August 17-September 1) congress consisting of some 200 speeches “aimed at gathering an elite of European writers by no means positively disposed to European Communism – but at the minimum willing to admire the achievements of Soviet society.”

There were speeches from both Soviet Communist leader Andrei Zhdanov on socialist realism and André Malraux, who challenged Stalin’s dictum that “writers are the engineers of the soul.” “If writers,” said Malraux, writers are engineers of the soul do not forget that the highest function of an engineer is to invent. Art is not a submission but a conquest.” But the real point of the Congress, as several 1934 letters from Ilya Ehrenburg to Stalin indicate, was to aid in the construction of “a broad anti-fascist front of writers. […] The political program of such an organization should be broad yet precise:

1. The struggle against Fascism.

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234 Henri Barbusse, Letter to Bela Kun, June 25, 1934, Rossiskoi gosudarstvennyi archiv sozialnoi i politicheskoi literatury (Moscow), File 495.60.246.
2. The active defense of the U.S.S.R."^{238}

The Soviet Union, Ehrenburg suggested, ought to woo Western writers and intellectuals to view Stalinism as a humanism. Romain Rolland, André Gide, Malraux, Ernst Bloch, Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Sherwood Anderson, John dos Passos and others were all on the list of writers to be folded into the front of literary antifascism. Gide and other Western authors were granted interviews with Stalin and fêted by Soviet dignitaries in trips to the Soviet Union that later fed controversies in the world of the émigrés. For a time, it seemed as if antifascist cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western states in the realm of both politics and literature was a real possibility.

Schwarzschild and *Das Neue Tagebuch* were among those calling for unity between Communists and other anti-Nazi groups, within certain limits. In his August 3, 1935 article “A Task Becomes Visible,” Schwarzschild called for the unity of all anti-Nazi groups to oppose the regime.^{239} According to Schwarzschild, the Nazi regime had reached a point where it lacked popular support, but given its dictatorial methods and suppression of opposition parties, it was impossible for opponents of the regime – be they inside or outside of Germany – to resist Nazism effectively. More importantly, though, opposition groups were paralyzed in two other ways. First, because of the lack of any anti-Nazi front, individual groups’ opposition seemed bound to fail: resisters could not count on any support from other groups who wanted to overthrow the Nazi regime. Second, though, the question of “What comes afterwards?” plagued all discussions of an anti-Nazi front. Schwarzschild, however, argued that 1935 was a unique moment for these groups to forget their different visions of post-Hitler Germany, and come together

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^{238} Ilya Ehrenburg, Letter to Joseph Stalin, September 13, 1934, Rossiskoi gosudarstvennyi archiv sozialnoi i politicheskoi literatury (Moscow), Fond 58, Opis 1, Ed. Khr 4591, Listy 4-7.

to form a “Center” of anti-Nazi activity. “It might turn out,” wrote Schwarzschild, “that the areas of agreement are greater than they dogmatically seem.” There would be some difficulties, Schwarzschild recognized, but just as Athena had been formed in Zeus’ head before springing to life, so could the “Center” plan the post-Nazi German state to be implemented after the downfall of the Third Reich. Moreover, such a movement could give hope to those inside of Germany who opposed the Nazis. “The knowledge that there exists some sense outside, a brain that thinks and foresees for everyone, the knowledge, that not a vacuum exists but rather something than can step in and function would have immeasurable effects on every individual, even if he didn’t know anything besides the fact that it existed.”

This was Schwarzschild at his most ecumenical, and it reflected a moment in the history of the German emigration where the term “antifascism” might be accurate. From late 1934 to August 1936, there existed an atmosphere of limited cooperation between anti-Nazis, when opposition to National Socialism per se (not Schwarzschild’s anti-despotism, not the Communists’ desire for proletarian revolution) seemed like the most important issue for intellectuals in exile. On June 21, 1935, a sell-out crowd of 3,000 writers attended the Congress for the Defense of Culture, at the Salle Mutalité on the rue Saint-Victor. As Furet put it, “the cream of the French and European anti-Fascist intelligentsia was mobilized to celebrate – against Hitler but along with the Communists – the cultural values embodied in Soviet humanism.” As Anson Rabinbach had it, “put more strongly, the Congress advanced what might be called the antifascist aesthetic–

240 Ibid., 731.
241 Rabinbach, “Paris, Capital of Antifascism,” 30. Given the scope of this chapter, I have not written much on the Congress, but I am thankful to Professor Rabinbach for a manuscript of his paper “When Stalinism was a Humanism: German Writers respond to Nazism 1934-1936.”
neither revolutionary materialism nor unpolitical liberalism – but rather a cultural
synthesis based on the premise that the Russian revolution represented a moment in what
Jean Guehenno called the ‘great, long, and patient humanistic revolution which has been
taking place since the history of mankind began.’”

But the ecumenicalism of antifascism cannot be overstated. Schwarzschild, the editor-in-chief of the biggest
German exile publication, did not attend. Bruno Frei, a member of the Willi Münzenberg
apparatus, about whom we will hear more of later, noted of the Congress that “a
respectable group of steadfast people, gathered around Leopold Schwarzschild’s Neues
Tagebuch, dreaded to think about Committees and Congresses. The anti-Communist
taboo proved resistant, even in the emigration.”

Indeed, antifascism never really became catholic, partly because of
Schwarzschild’s skepticism of the Russians, partly because of the Communists’
insincerity. At the 7th Comintern Congress in August 1935 in Moscow, Dimitrov
officially announced the policy of forming Popular Fronts between Communists and
socialists, but he still said that “Social Democracy had prepared fascism’s path to power”
and that “a unity of workers” was tied to the “condition of recognizing the necessity of
the revolutionary downfall of the rule of the bourgeois and the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Later, in November 1935, leaders of the German Social
Democratic Party in Exile rebuked KPD leaders at talks on the grounds that the Communists
were too bent on a Communist post-Nazi German government.

But on February 1-2, 1936, representatives of the German “Marxist” parties
(KPD, SPD, and others) gathered at the Hotel Lutetia in Paris to hold talks, which was

243 Rabinbach, “When Stalinism was a Humanism: German Writers respond to Nazism 1934-1936,” 4.
244 Bruno Frei, Der Papiersäbel (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972), 193.
followed by a conference attended by many of the leading German anti-Nazis figures. Both Communists like Willi Münzenberg and Lion Feuchtwanger and more conservative figures like Schwarzschild were among the 118 figures who attended the conference. The most important product of the conference was the manifesto “Declaration to the German Nation,” which was passed on February 2nd and published in *Das Neue Tagebuch* on the 15th. The manifesto still bore the language of class; it described those present as “representatives of the German bourgeois and proletariat,” and the new regime to be established in Germany was “a democracy of the workers secured against the misuse of overpowered economy power.” But this was no *Braunbuch*, and on the whole, the manifesto called for a liberal, non-Communist, state oriented towards protecting workers from abuse. It called for freedom of speech, equality before the law, freedom of belief, and any group was welcome to sign on to the principles of the manifesto, regardless of class or party affiliation.

This was antifascism at its best, but it bore no fruit. Communists, Social Democrats, and conservatives like Schwarzschild had given up their partisan differences to come together against the common enemy in support of humanistic ideals. But antifascism did not produce anything and was marked more by disagreement than accomplishment. Throughout the spring and summer of 1936 there were debates between Communists and other members of this *Volksfront* on just exactly what the post-Hitler government was to look like. Wilhelm Pieck, the General Secretary of the Comintern, for example, assured in an August 1936 article that “the establishment of a democratic

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247 “Ein Manifest,” *Das Neue Tagebuch*, February 15, 1936, 151-152.

248 Ibid., 151.

249 Ibid., 152.
“republic” was the immediate goal of the struggle for the collapse of the Third Reich. There was, however, apparently no contradiction for Pieck to claim only pages later in the same article that the KPD would remain committed to helping the people “draw the correct conclusions,” since a “democratic republic cannot bring them socialism and liberation from capitalist exploitation.” German Communists, in other words, had not given up on their ultimate goal of a Soviet Germany, but for now it at least seemed that the road to Soviet rule went through a democratic German republic, one that would be supported by socialists and Schwarzschild. This, then, was the Volksfront in summer 1936. Leftists of different stripes had agreed to withhold their more fundamental disagreements and long-term hopes for Germany in order to form an ecumenical anti-Hitler front, and yet these very disagreements about the German endgame always remained in the background. “Antifascism” was short-lived, plagued by suspicions, and bore no fruit.

The reason the antifascist movement was so short-lived were the Moscow Trials and the wildly varying responses to them on the part of the Volksfront’s former members. The August 29, 1936 issue of Das Neue Tagebuch contained a vituperative article by Schwarzschild, “The Gestapo Man Trotsky,” that criticized the trials and helped to spark a nearly year-long debate among the émigrés that would discredit both Soviet Communism and Sovietophile antifascists in Paris as well as mark the demise of the Volksfront. In Schwarzschild’s view, the trial was the final step in Stalin’s construction of a personal dictatorship within the Soviet Union. After Lenin’s death in 1924, three of the four remaining members of the Politburo – Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin – formed a

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251 Ibid., 6-8.
“troika” to exclude Trotsky from power, stripping him of army command by 1925, removing him from most offices by 1927, and finally exiling him in 1929. Throughout this period, however, Stalin had been busy building up the party apparatus and removing Zinoviev and Kamenev from positions of power and banning them from Moscow. Kirov’s murder in December 1934 provided the opportunity to imprison the two, and now they, along with fourteen other Old Bolsheviks, were to be liquidated. “Seen more precisely,” wrote Schwarzschild, “all of those incriminated by this trial are precisely those surviving Soviet pioneers. All of them – besides Stalin himself.”  

The trials had nothing to do with a higher form of justice or any alliance between Trotsky and the Nazis; they were a way for Stalin to eliminate all potential opposition figures and to cement his personal dictatorship. As Schwarzschild closed the opening to his article:

> Whoever perishes in trials after this one, whoever is to be “liquidated” by an executioner’s bullets after Zinoviev and Kamenev, whoever has been allowed to slip away with his life, with freedom, perhaps even with his office, is comparatively unimportant. In the coming Palace of the Soviets, in the upper gallery devoted to the founders of the state, there will stand only one statue of a living person before the eyes of the Soviet people: Stalin. All the other statues are destroyed or shoved into the corner.

There was, Schwarzschild noted, a tragedy to the whole spectacle. Pathetic as those being tried were, “the tragedy of this trial is not its victims.”

To really grasp what was going on here, one had to look back to 1930, when the first such trial (Schwarzschild did not use the word “show trial”) was conducted against the physicist Ramsin and seven other scholars and engineers. Just then as in 1936, Schwarzschild noted, Ramsin and the other defendants were accused of having participated in an anti-Soviet conspiracy with foreign powers and of having been provided with explosives by French capitalists to sabotage Soviet industry. But just then, as in 1936, too, there was scanty evidence to

253 Ibid., 826.
prove that Ramsin and the others had actually done any of this. Nonetheless, the defendants consistently gave the same “endless, categorical, pathetic self-accusations” of “Yes!” and “Even worse!” and all Party organizations encouraged the harshest treatment possible for the defendants.

Yet there was a hitch. Neither Ramsin nor the other seven defendants had been convicted, and soon press organs had made an about-face, praising the acquittal and the reentry of Ramsin and his colleagues to their former scholarly positions. The mistake the world had made then was to assume that such a trial had no victims, to declare the trial “an attempt to boost support for the first Five-Year Plan at an especially difficult point.”254 And yet there was much to answer for: “the guessing game as to the methods with which the defendants were brought to their unnatural behavior, how they could act against all known human behavior, was immense, and could not be assuaged by ‘the Russian soul’ or the characters from a Dostoevsky novel.” More simply, however, the 1930 trials gave the average person an impression of the Soviet Union as a country without legal guarantees, “a foreign, oppressive, alarming system,” Schwarzschild was not yet ready to say that the practices in the Soviet Union could have moved ordinary Europeans to support National Socialism or other anti-Bolshevik regimes in the West; the point was that the Soviet Union was delegitimized, indeed, should have been delegitimized more than it was, by the 1930 trials. Moreover, the point was that show trials were not the exception but rather the norm for the Stalinist Soviet Union.

As Schwarzschild returned to the present day, the real victim of the Moscow Trials were Western observers and those anti-Nazis who sought to influence them, sought to convince them that alliance with the Soviet Union was the preferable course for

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254 Ibid., 827
Western democracies. “Calamity has befallen those who have always confessed to a high opinion of camaraderie with Russia at this moment, who have touted its pioneering role in economic and social history.” Just as writers were trying to play up the Soviet Union as a semi-democratic ally to the West against Nazi Germany, the Soviets had furnished their opponents with the best propaganda possible:

[Those sympathetic to the Soviet Union] have been befallen with the calamity that in the very same critical moment as their opponents attempted to subvert the undecided nations with the formula ‘Western civilization on the one hand, Bolshevism on the other,’ that in this very moment a spectacle was offered whose bleak alien nature can only be an effective contribution to this propaganda.

The Moscow Trials had, in Schwarzschild’s view, exposed the true nature of the Soviet Union to the West. How, after all, were observers to react to a state that had arranged a show trial of its former top leaders only months after this same state had earlier deemed it necessary to earn the respect of the West by promulgating a new, liberal constitution? Defenders of the Soviet Union were, Schwarzschild wrote, kidding themselves if they thought that observers would overlook the “dictatorial side of the Russian coin” and instead dwell only on the Union’s impressive economic gains. The only result of the Moscow Trials, besides enhancing the power of a dictator who had made Zinoviev and Kamenev into his own Röhm and van der Lubbe, was to negatively affect the feelings of those who swung between the choice “between Moscow and Berlin, and that is a misfortunate more now than ever.” Schwarzschild had begun to make not-so-implicit comparisons between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, and as he concluded, “no one can say how much [the Moscow Trials] will weight the scale in the choice between the two.”

255 Ibid., 826.
256 Ibid., 828.
257 Ibid. 826.
As if the opponents of Hitler in exile had not been divided enough by the debates surrounding the first Moscow Trials, an even more sensational episode was about to divide the camps of German Paris. From January 23-30, 1937, another trial was held against the “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Center,” this time focusing on the Old Bolsheviks Georgy Pyatakov and Karl Radek. Because Schwarzschild was occupied at the time with a series of articles on German U-Boat warfare during World War I, the responsibility for writing about the second set of Moscow Trials fell on Joseph Bornstein, a socialist journalist from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire who had befriended Schwarzschild in Munich in the early 1920s, made a name for himself with articles on the murders of Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht and the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, and fled Germany for Paris in 1933 via Switzerland. Having arrived in Paris, Bornstein settled in at the Rue Jasmin 11 and was active as a journalist, writing not only for the Tagebuch under the pseudonym Erich Andermann, but also for the Pariser Tageszeitung. And after the fallout from the 1936 Moscow Trials, Bornstein had given up his illusions about the Soviet project, as the title to his article indicated: “Witch Trial in Moscow.”

The title of Bornstein’s article was not meant to be ironic. Simply replace “Trotskyism-Fascism” for the Devil, wrote Bornstein, and there was virtually no difference between the witch trials of early modern Europe and the trials of Radek and

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259 Address Book Confiscated From Das Neue Tagebuch Offices, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, File R8046-16, Blue Address Book.
Pyatakov. Yet Bornstein could mix sarcasm with serious journalism; “Witch Trial in Moscow” was devoted to exploding Vyshinsky’s case against the Old Bolsheviks. Unlike medieval witch trials in which witches’ broomstick flights from location to location were untraceable and difficulty to dispute, the charges and confessions made against and by the defendants in Moscow were not only falsifiable, but also falsified. For example, Pyatakov had confessed during the trials to taking a special flight from Berlin to Oslo in December 1935 to meet Trotsky in Norway, but airport controllers had confirmed only days after Pyatakov’s confession that there had been literally no flights from Germany, let alone Berlin, to Oslo in December 1935. Likewise, another defendant, Golzmann, had confessed to having met with Trotsky and his son at a Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen to discuss how best to murder Stalin. And yet there was no Hotel Bristol anywhere in Copenhagen; the only existing Hotel Bristol had burnt down in 1917 and was never rebuilt. Moreover, the defendants’ confessions were suspiciously precise for events that could never have happened; Pyatakov recalled the exact time of his supposed departure from Tempelhof as well as his arrival in Oslo, and exhaustively described his actions over the course of the days prior to the “trip.”

What was going on? Given the preposterous nature of the confessions and the lack of evidence of an actual Hitler-Trotsky connection, Bornstein weighed several explanations for the bizarre behavior of the defendants at the Moscow Trials. Bornstein himself suspected that G.P.U. functionaries had tortured the defendants in the trial until they were prepared to admit anything, at which point the defendants were dictated and forced to memorize confessions that he suspected were written not by secret police elites.

262 Ibid., 133.
263 Ibid., 133-134.
but by flunkies, hence the contradictions and bizarre narratives of European politics offered by the defendants.  

Bornstein was, however, open to other possibilities. He mentioned speculations by the British press that the defendants might have been drugged, but he noted that specialists had rejected this explanation.  

Another possibility was hypnosis, and so Bornstein quoted the opinion of an unnamed expert in hypnosis, who argued that G.P.U. functionaries might have tortured the defendants before hypnotizing them as they went on the stand.  

Bornstein closed his articles with more questions than answers, unsure of the both the motivation and means of the recent Moscow Trials, but he echoed Schwarzschild in suspecting that Stalin’s desire to cement his dictatorship played a role. For in Stalin’s words, as Bornstein closed, “there [was] nothing sweeter in the world than to choose one's victim, prepare one's plans minutely, slake an implacable vengeance, and then go to bed.”  

Bornstein’s article prompted debates among the world of the émigrés as to just how Radek and Pyatakov gave such incriminating self-denunciations. Writing in the February 13 issue, S. Aberdam agreed with everything in Bornstein’s article, besides the theory that the confessions had been extracted using hypnosis.  

A week later, on February 20, Schwarzschild published a letter from a “preeminent chemist” who wrote that the defendants had definitely not been hypnotized; instead, the chemist argued that the chemical mescaline, a drug that supposedly made one extremely apathetic while enhancing one’s memory, had been mixed into the defendants’ food. Once under the

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264 Ibid., 136-138.
265 Ibid., 138.
266 Ibid., 138-139.
267 Joseph Stalin, quoted in Bornstein, “Der Hexenprozess in Moskau,” Das Neue Tagebuch, February 6, 1937, 139.
influence of mescaline or another drug, the defendants were read the confessions by their torturers, the chemist concluded.

All of these explanations were possible, of course, but the debate about the techniques used by the interrogators at the Moscow Trials was going nowhere. Schwarzschild noted that Radek’s bizarre behavior on the stand – happily waving to his fellow defendants, all condemned to death – was consistent with the chemists’ description of mescaline, but there was no hard evidence.\footnote{Leopold Schwarzschild, “Das Rätsel des Moskauer Prozesses,” \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch}, February 20, 1937, 175.} Just as the papers run by Communist German “antifascist” exiles in Moscow were coming out with articles with titles like “Pitiful Creature,” “Extermination of the Pernicious Foreign Substance,” and “There Was Never a More Just Verdict,” Schwarzschild and other skeptics of the Soviet Union were trying to get to the bottom of the Moscow Trials. But how?

An apparent explanation arrived in the mailbox of \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} early that next week in late February. A certain Dr. Marcel Strauss, the “former head of the Strasbourg University Clinic,” had written to the paper with what seemed to be a conclusive explanation to the mystery in Moscow. In his letter, Strauss noted his agreement with Bornstein’s speculation about the use of hypnosis in the Moscow Trials. Further, Strauss cited the work of a Professor Wilson at Harvard University, who had conducted experiments in hypnosis in the early 1930s.\footnote{“Dr. Marcel Strauss,” “Hypnose in Moskau?,” \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch}, February 27, 1937, 205.} In Wilson’s experiments, subjects had been taken into a large room lit only by a dim green light, where two experimenters would take turns repeating the same message over and over to the subject. One experimenter would repeat the message for several hours and as soon as his turn speaking was up, the second experimenter would begin repeating the message over and
Subjects were spoken to for dozens of hours, and Wilson soon used gramophone players to repeat messages to experiment on subjects for even longer periods. After hours or days of being repeated the same message, subjects could eventually be hypnotized, chemical-free, into repeating any arbitrary message. The success of Wilson’s experiments, added Strauss, suggested that perhaps the NKVD had taken similar steps to hypnotize the defendants in the Moscow Trials. Moreover, Strauss noted that Soviet newspapers had in 1934 reported that “many well-known psychiatrists were called ‘for scholarly work’ in the Commissariat of International Affairs.” 271 This, in Strauss’ mind, showed convincingly that the bizarre confessions of the Moscow Trials were no proof of Trotskyite conspiracy, but rather just modern psychology and torture techniques applied to political opponents. Schwarzschild and the staff of Das Neue Tagebuch decided to publish Strauss’ letter, but the printed version included only the date – and not the return address – of Strauss’ letter. On February 27, 1937, the issue of Das Neue Tagebuch containing Strauss’ letter hit the newsstands of Paris.

It did not take long for a scandal to erupt over Strauss’ letter. When that next weekend (March 6-7, 1937) anti-Nazi papers again filled the newsstands of German Paris, the Communist Deutsche Volkszeitung had a sensational story outing Das Neue Tagebuch as a tool of the supposed Nazi-Trotskyite anti-Soviet conspiracy. Bruno Frei, a German Communist in exile in Paris, had written an article whose title said it all: “Goebbels in the ‘Neues Tagebuch’: A Crass Case of Trotskyite-Fascist Conformism – Hypnotized by Trotsky, Employed by Hitler.” 272 The article explained that “Marcel

271 “Dr. Marcel Strauss,” “Hypnose in Moskau?,” Das Neue Tagebuch, 206.
"Strauss" had used five sentences in his letter identical to those in the Nazi newspaper *The Laboring Man*, which was also skeptical of the validity of the Moscow Trials. There was, in other words, not only “complete conformity between the editorial board of the ‘Neues Tagebuch’ and Goebbels’ press in slandering the Soviet judiciary, but both also avail themselves of the same sources and articles.” More importantly, however, “Marcel Strauss” did not exist. The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* explained that it had discovered that no Marcel Strauss existed “either at the given address” (Rue Gelyer 23) or at all.” Someone – members of *Das Neue Tagebuch* or agents of the Nazi-Trotskyite conspiracy – must have printed and signed the letter themselves and had it sent from Strasbourg to the paper’s offices as part of a larger plan to discredit the Moscow Trials and supporters of the Soviet Union. The broader point of Frei’s article, indeed, was that the narrative offered by the Moscow Trials of a Nazi-Trotskyite conspiracy against the Soviet Union was correct. At stake was the “purity of the emigration, vigilance vis-à-vis the machinations of the Gestapo, and the purging of antifascist ranks of Trotskyist elements.”

Was *Das Neue Tagebuch* really just a tool of the anti-Soviet “Trotskyite conspiracy?”

Frei’s accusations soon fell apart. The next week, on March 13, 1937, Schwarzschild published in *Das Neue Tagebuch* the devastating article “Their Milieu,” which showed that the real story behind “Marcel Strauss” was not a *Das Neue Tagebuch*-Trotskyite-Nazi conspiracy, but rather the bad faith and corruption of the German communist “antifascist” movement. The real question, Schwarzschild asked, was how the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* had obtained Strauss’ address. As mentioned, *Das Neue Tagebuch*

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did not publish Strauss’ (fake) address when it published his letter. Therefore, since Strauss’ address did not actually exist, the only parties who could have known the address of the letter were Schwarzschild and the staff of Das Neue Tagebuch on the one hand (the recipients of the letter, in other words), and the fabricators of the letter on the other. The only way for the Deutsche Volkszeitung to have known Strauss’ non-existent address was for the paper itself to have been the origin of the fake letter. Indeed, the Communist paper had gone ought of its way to slander Das Neue Tagebuch because of its critical reportage of the Moscow trials. As further proof, Schwarzschild showed how even the supposed corresponding sentences between the Strauss letter and the Nazi paper The Laboring Man were faked by the Deutsche Volkszeitung. The opposite of what the Deutsche Volkszeitung had suggested was true: it was the Communists, not the anti-Communists, who were resorting to conspiratorial methods to destroy the anti-Hitler alliance.

The episode involving Marcel Strauss and the Deutsche Volkszeitung reflected the intellectual poverty of German Communists in exile in the 1930s. Neither the Deutsche Volkszeitung nor Bruno Frei had been obscure extremist figures. The Volkszeitung, the successor to the Gegen-Angriff, was the major German “antifascist” newspaper in Prague during the 1930s. Bruno Frei, meanwhile, was a German Communist who had fled Germany in early 1933, had also written on the scale of the Nazi concentration camp system by 1936, and was a self-acknowledged member of the Willi Münzenberg Communist propaganda empire. “Willi managed to make followers out of coworkers,”

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276 Ibid., 325.
write Frei in his autobiography. Elsewhere Frei was more disingenuous. He described himself as a supporter of the Communist “center of action and literary society” that existed in Paris in the 1930s. “Both Germans and Frenchmen together gathered at the great events at the Salle d’Encouragement in St. Germain de Près to protect the humanistic cultural heritage from the poisonous fumes emanating from Germany that threatened to spread even further.” And yet both Frei and Münzenberg were part of a large scheme to discredit Schwarzschild as a Nazi-aligned paper. The German philosopher and Marxist Ernst Bloch wrote to a Moscow contact about how he would “fire a torpedo at Schwarzschild,” but do so in language that would make him seem independent of the Moscow line:

It ought to be clear why I avoided the total use of standard party language – in this case and for this purpose – in coming out in support of the party cause. My attack and my commitment would otherwise have lost its impact in the eyes of many readers. […] What needed to be said was still said, and the attack should have consequences.

In his article for Die Neue Weltbühne, Bloch criticized Schwarzschild as an “exegete” who was undermining the cause of antifascism. “The trials have not been harmful,” wrote Bloch, “but this mysterious type of publicity has.” Bloch suggested that antifascists follow Socrates’ approach when it came to the mysterious trials in the Soviet Union: “What I have understood is excellent. From which I conclude that the rest, which I do not understand, is also excellent.” For Frei, Bloch, and other members of the Communist antifascist universe, there was no contradiction between on the one hand labeling themselves “humanists” and defenders of culture while at the same time defending the

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277 Bruno Frei, Der Papiersäbel (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972), 174.
278 Ibid., 192-193.
281 Ibid.
Stalinist show trials and accusing critics of those show trials of being agents of Nazism.

As Schwarzschild himself wrote in “Their Milieu:”

The fact of the matter is that the system of despotism and the principle: “justice is what is useful to me” leads to the very same results in every coloration, and that inside the so-called anti-fascist world the very same methods and ideas are being used that they accuse the fascists of and against which they themselves fight. To speak out about this fact and to treat is as such is happily passed off by this milieu as “division” and “treachery.” Red-Nazidom (Rot-Nazitum), since it currently stands in opposition against Brown-Nazidom, demands on the basis of this fact alone not to be criticized or disturbed.282

Schwarzschild’s denunciation of the Communist exiles was justified. To dismiss Schwarzschild’s response to the fake letter from the Deutsche Volkszeitung as an example “insensate, almost paranoiac hatred of communism, the Soviet Union, and all communists,” as one historian has done, is condescending, and it shows both a lack of understanding of the credibility of Stalinism among German intellectuals and low expectations for intellectuals’ role in society.283 Schwarzschild wrote at a time when, in his words, other anti-Nazis hid behind the “current political antagonism of fascism-antifascism” and ignored the “deeper and more ancient distinction of despotism-democracy […] indeed, the most ancient, most fundamental, metaphysical antagonisms of all between violence and justice, truth and falsehood, morality and crime, and constitutionality and cynicism.”284 To claim that Schwarzschild failed to treat the whole matter – the efforts of German exiles to him as a Nazi and to supporting the Stalinist Great Terror – “with the contempt it deserved” begs the question of what any honest intellectual could have done faced with the hypocrisy of the German “antifascists” during the 1930s.285 Likewise, it is not plausible in light of the Marcel Strauss episode that the

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German “antifascist” Communists, who, as Schwarzschild pointed out, supported show trials and were given to conspiratorial press techniques, were on the side of “progress.” Rather than overreaction or criticism of “progress,” Schwarzschild’s polemics were just and marked the beginning of an anti-despotic or anti-totalitarian tradition on the German exile left.

The Strauss affair also reflected the fractured nature of the “antifascist” movement. It is obviously problematic to speak of a united “antifascist” movement given that Schwarzschild was calling the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* “red Nazidom.” Indeed, Schwarzschild closed “Their Milieu” with what sounded like a call for anti-Nazis to resist the Communists just as much as the Nazis:

> And if the milieu of those who dare to exist on the basis of these polarities [i.e. violence, falsehood, crime, and cynicism] should then consider using the corresponding tricks from its *Okhrana* recipe book, then it will only become clearer how necessary it is to render the same resistance here as elsewhere.

How to rethink the nature of anti-Nazi movements? Eric Hobsbawm was correct when he wrote that the 1930s “can be best understood not through the contest of states but as an international ideological civil war,” but he was incorrect when he diagnosed this civil war as having just two sides (supporters of the ideals of the French and Russian Revolutions versus their opponents). Instead, by the point of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union, there were (generally speaking) not two but three sides in the European-wide conflict. The frontier ran not between “progress” and “reaction,” as Hobsbawm put it, but rather between Nazism, Stalinist Bolshevism, and anti-Despotism. Communists and Nazis were existential enemies. Nazis and opponents of despotism like Schwarzschild or

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288 Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 144.
289 Ibid.
Winston Churchill could agree that the Moscow Trials were a farce and that the Soviet Union had become Stalin’s personal despotism; both Das Neue Tagebuch and Nazi papers like The Laboring Man could see the Moscow Trials not as evidence of a Trotskyite – Nazi conspiracy but rather an engineered face to cement Stalin’s power. Of course, any alliance between these two groups was out of the questions. Nazis had too much contempt and racism for liberals or Jews like Schwarzschild, and barbarism, not anti-Bolshevism, was the most important feature of Nazism in Schwarzschild’s view. And while Communists and opponents of despotism could agree that Nazism was a form of barbarism and threatened Europe, German Communists in exile had developed a conspiratorial outlook that made alliance with any group that criticized the Great Terror infeasible. For how could good Communists make alliance with Trotskyites or agents of Nazism? The anti-Nazi and anti-Communist, indeed, anti-despot Schwarzschild was in an impossible position, for he lived in a world in which the major anti-Communist force, Nazism, endorsed a conspiratorial anti-Semitic ideology, and the major anti-Nazi force, Stalinism, endorsed a conspiratorial view of the non-Soviet world. “Antifascism” was less any single movement than the constellation of figures like Schwarzschild, caught at various positions in the constellation of anti-tyrannical thought between two ideologies.

Besides the Strauss Affair, no other event better captured the divide between the anti-Nazis in Paris than the debate surrounding Lion Feuchtwanger’s Moscow 1937, published in the summer of 1937. Feuchtwanger’s book came on the heels of what had been one of the major literary events of the 1930s. During the summer of 1936, the French writer André Gide, then a Communist and a correspondent of Schwarzschild’s, visited the Soviet Union on an invitation to observe the country and (presumably) write a
favorable novel about the country that would bolster Communism’s reputation in the West. But Gide’s Retour de l’U.R.S.S., published in November 1936, criticized the Soviet project for the xenophobic nationalism it had inspired in its citizens, the appalling poverty of most normal Soviet citizens, and the groupthink common among Soviet officials. Gide, who had been expected to write a favorable account of the Soviet Union, renounced his ties to Communism, and for the next several months, Retours was an international event.

Perhaps in response to this, Lion Feuchtwanger was received as a guest of the Soviet government in January and February 1937 and quickly composed the short book Moscow 1937: A Travel Report for My Friends about the experience.\(^\text{290}\) The reception of the book would make clear the differences that had crystallized among the “antifascist” movement in the last nine months. Moscow 1937 itself was an anti-Retours de l’U.R.S.S. that sought to justify the show trials and discredit Gide’s criticism of the Soviet Union. Feuchtwanger’s book was sprinkled with some modest criticism of conditions in the Soviet Union: people were too quick to denounce irresponsible or shoddy work as “sabotage,”\(^\text{291}\) theaters were afraid to put on anything but “optimistic” contemporary plays or the classics,\(^\text{292}\) and neither Stalin’s rhetoric nor his Marxist argumentation was particularly impressive.\(^\text{293}\) But Feuchtwanger more often wrote of how “one has to speak loud and clear when one wants to be understood from Moscow to Vladivostok” and was not slow to dispense praise on the Soviet Union or criticize Gide’s observations.\(^\text{294}\) On

\(^{290}\) Lion Feuchtwanger, Moskau 1937. Ein Reisebericht für meine Freunde (Amsterdam: Querido Verlag, 1937).
\(^{291}\) Ibid., 47-48.
\(^{292}\) Ibid., 61-62.
\(^{293}\) Ibid., 81.
\(^{294}\) Ibid.
the key issue of the Moscow Trials (the second set of which Feuchtwanger himself attended), Feuchtwanger categorically rejected the accusation that the defendants had been drugged or hypnotized,\textsuperscript{295} and explained that the defendant and judge in the Soviet justice system worked together towards a common goal of a functioning socialist state, similar to a Leader of Opposition in a parliament.\textsuperscript{296} Trotsky had good reason to ally with the Nazis, wrote Feuchtwanger; this for him was proof enough of his guilt.\textsuperscript{297} The essence of Radek and Piatakov’s guilt was still not totally clear to Feuchtwanger, but the task of making the “Trotskyites”’ guilt understandable had to await “a great Soviet poet.”\textsuperscript{298} Until then, Feuchtwanger echoed the comments of Ernst Bloch and Socrates: “What I have understood is excellent. From which I conclude that the rest, which I do not understand, is also excellent.”\textsuperscript{299}

The publications in the major anti-Nazi papers quickly reflected the allegiances that had crystallized after the Moscow Trials. \textit{Die Neue Weltbühne}, one of the major anti-Nazi Communist newspapers operating in Prague at this time and part of the Münzenberg press empire, began to serialize Feuchtwanger’s account. An overview of the book appeared on April 8, 1937,\textsuperscript{300} and serializations of the chapters “Conformism and Individualism,” “Literature and Theater in the Soviet Union,” and “Soviet Jews” followed one after the other on June 24,\textsuperscript{301} July 1,\textsuperscript{302} and July 8, 1937.\textsuperscript{303} \textit{Das Neue Wien}
Tagebuch, meanwhile, made little mention of Feuchtwanger’s novel in the meantime. It was only two days after the final installment of Feuchwanger’s book appeared in Die Neue Weltbühne and around the time that copies of Moscow 1937 were arriving in Parisian bookstores that the Das Neue Tagebuch published “Raining Gold,” a selection of excerpts from André Gide’s Retouches à mon Retour de l’U.R.S.S., a rewritten version of Retours de l’U.R.S.S. that would not coincidentally later be used as the basis for Gide’s piece in the 1949 anti-Communist classic The God That Failed.304 “Had I written a praise of Stalin and the U.S.S.R. – it would be raining gold on me!” wrote Gide. But he was too disgusted with the multi-course meals offered to him by his host Union of Soviet Writers, by the fact that he could not go anywhere without being accompanied by five chaperones, and most all by the fact that a new non-revolutionary class had taken power in the Soviet Union. “There is nothing Communist that burns in their hearts,” concluded Gide’s article of his times in the Soviet Union. Just as Die Neue Weltbühne featured one of the most celebrated Communist intellectuals of the exile scene to have come out in support of the Soviet Union, so did Das Neue Tagebuch feature the most notable former Communist of the age as a counterpoint to the promotion of Feuchtwanger’s book.

More than that, Schwarzschild went out of his way in two articles at the end of July and the beginning of August 1937 to totally discredit Feuchtwanger and the pro-Stalinist exile cause. Schwarzschild’s article, “Feuchtwanger’s Dispatch” was one of the longest articles in Das Neue Tagebuch, about thirteen pages long in a magazine that was typically contained only twenty pages.305 Schwarzschild challenged Feuchtwanger on

practically every point in *Moscow 1937* with pages of statistics and devastating arguments, but in general, Schwarzschild argued that Feuchtwanger’s book was so astonishingly poorly researched and written that “it was not even a book about Russia.”

The book was, rather, the novel of the know-it-all intellectual *par excellence*, of the first-time visitor to a foreign dictatorship who stays in his luxury hotel and in the capital for a few weeks, and then moves to write a book about the entire country, while at the same time knowing nothing of the country’s recent history. Schwarzschild humiliated Feuchtwanger by showing how *Moscow 1937* attempted to use Lenin’s Testament to discredit Trotsky and praise Stalin as the best possible successor to Lenin, when Lenin himself had warned he was “not sure whether [Stalin] will always be capable of using that power [of Secretary General] with sufficient caution.” Schwarzschild showed how Feuchtwanger had vastly overrated Stalin’s leadership during the Russian Civil War.

And he again embarrassed Feuchtwanger by pointing out how the Communist writer had praised the clarity of Stalin’s speeches while at the same time admitting of his near-total lack of proficiency in Russian. On and on it went. Most broadly through, Schwarzschild excoriated Feuchtwanger as an example of the kind of intellectual willing to sacrifice “values – summarized briefly, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the Rights of Man” – for material progress, even though material conditions in the Soviet Union were shameful; in particular, Schwarzschild mentioned reports of a city where workers had had average of two square meters of living space.

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307 Ibid., 731.
308 Ibid., 732-733.
309 Ibid., 733-734.
311 Ibid., 756.
closed, “this is where the question of knowledge of lack thereof ends. Here something else begins, something more serious, namely as evidence for the tendency of some towards psychosis, a psychosis that has taken grip of all too many shocked dispositions.” Feuchtwanger apparently had no response to the article.

The lines taken by Feuchtwanger, Gide, Schwarzschild, and the newspapers that published them shows that the camps that had crystallized in Paris in mid-1937 were less members of any “antifascist” movement and more groups that prefigured the divisions of the late 1940s and the beginning of the Cold War. The defeat of Nazism was of paramount importance to both writers like Feuchtwanger and Schwarzschild, but for different reasons. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Nazism was for those “antifascists” on the left a dictatorship of finance capital and above all an unjust social system foisted on to German workers, while Schwarzschild and writers for Das Neue Tagebuch had a more mature analysis of the German economy and instead hated National Socialism as a 20th century barbarism. As Soviet Communism itself began to seem more and more barbaric itself, however, Schwarzschild could not tolerate it any longer and developed an intense but justified hatred of the Soviet Union; Feuchtwanger’s book was actually full of misrepresentations and represented German intellectuals’ tendency to overlook the human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The point is that as early as mid-1937, Schwarzschild no longer hesitated at all to equate Communism with National Socialism, and he saved no scorn for fellow intellectuals who had been flitted by its utopian message. “Antifascism” as an alliance between Communists and personalities like Schwarzschild existed for less than two years, and tenuously at that. It was a myth, not only in the sense that it exalted Stalinism and mass terror as a form of humanism, but

312 Ibid., 759.
also historiographically, because it existed so dimly for so short a time. There were Communist anti-Nazis, and non-Communist anti-Nazis, like Schwarzschild, but the more remarkable part of the history of German anti-Nazis in exile is less the period of limited catholicism from 1934-1936 than Cold War Zero, which broke out among the supposed union of “antifascists” in 1936-1937.

With his affair with the Deutsche Volkszeitung and Feuchtwanger over, Schwarzschild had seen the lengths to which hypocritical “antifascist” émigré groups and individuals would go to in order to defend the Soviet Union, and he had had enough. The impetus for one of Schwarzschild’s most devastating articles, “The Pandora’s Box,” came with the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union, November 7, 1937. The celebrations were greatest in the Soviet Union itself. Around midday, Stalin, Molotov, Dimitrov, and several other Soviet leaders waved from the top of the Lenin Mausoleum as rows and rows of tanks, artillery, and motorcycles with machine guns rode across Red Square in front of them. After the vehicles followed many marchers who carried posters that depicting the NKVD as a spiny fist crushing a spider-like creature labeled “Trotskyites.” Newspapers, headed by lines like “The Year of Birth – 1917” featured cutaway drawings of the upcoming Palace of the Soviets alongside airbrushed portraits of Lenin and Stalin and poems like “Piece About Voroshilov,” “To The Twenty-Year Old,” and “Kazakhstan,” which closed with the following lines:

Stalin-sun! Mountains and colors!

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313 Photograph by Kislova, Pravda, November 8, 1937, 1.
314 Photograph by M. Kazashinikov and N. Buleshok, Pravda, November 8, 1937, 6.
316 Pravda, November 7, 1937, 5.
317 Pravda, November 7, 1937, 8.
318 Ibid., 1.
To the Herculean health of the light!  
Bring – all-powerful and strong –  
Happiness to the peoples of all races!  

Even a recent spectacle from Aviation Day was back as a squadron of 55 biplanes flew over the skies of Moscow in formation, spelling out “20 [Years] U.S.S.R.”

The celebrations were worldwide. In Madrid, Spanish Republicans celebrated the Soviet anniversary with the continued defense of Madrid; a float of a bear (Madrid’s mascot) sitting on Franco’s head drove through the city accompanied by a sign proclaiming, “On November 7 we crushed Franco. Now Madrid will crush international fascism. Long live Madrid, the capital of the world.” Earlier in the day, local politicians had renamed part of the Gran Via, a central boulevard in the city, the “Avenue of the Soviet Union,” while volunteer solders in the city were treated to a hearty lunch, games of baseball, potato-sack races, and wheelbarrow races, and a movie on the Soviet Union later that night. If the pages bereft of reports of such celebrations from the Paris newspapers are any indication, the mood was somewhat more muted in France that Sunday, November 7, but the 20th anniversary of the world’s first socialist society was clearly some cause for celebration.

The celebrations must have moved Schwarzschild to pen “The Pandora’s Box,” an article that has been panned as “shameful and at the same time ludicrously at variance with his normal standards of excellence,” but that in fact stands out for its clear-headedness and accuracy. Schwarzschild began “The Pandora’s Box” by pointing out

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322 Photograph by M. Kalashnikov, Pravda, November 8, 1937, 3.  
the real event of significance that had taken place the past weekend: the signing on
November 6 of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Italy. The Pact was
vague; as Schwarzschild caricatured it,

should one of us wish to take some sort of action, diplomatic or military, against some
sort of non-partner to the agreement, and should we agree that this action is grounded in
the need to protect the world from Bolshevism, then we will in some way, to some as yet
unknown degree, support one another.327

The vagaries of the pact were grounds for mockery, but its real significance lay in the fact
that both regimes were more than willing to disguise their real national interests in the
name of “anti-Bolshevism.” Just as regimes past and future would use phrases
“protecting national sovereignty” or “spreading democratic values” as euphemisms for
protecting their own national interests, so could Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy pursue
their own foreign policy interests while hiding behind a policy of anti-Bolshevism.
Schwarzschild’s point was that even if “anti-Bolshevism” as national policy was
mendacious, it was credible enough to other state actors to not incite charges of
hypocrisy. “In the present world,” Schwarzschild wrote, “anti-Bolshevism is by their own
estimation a strong trump card. […] The fact that this trump card exists at all and the fact
that it has such strength is a result of the existence of Soviet Russia.”328

This fact, then, combined with the recent 20th anniversary of the Soviet Union,
gave Schwarzschild occasion to ask a touchy question: “what influence did the creation
of Soviet Russia exert on international relations in the world outside of Russia?” And
Schwarzschild had a direct answer to this question. “Whoever candidly turns to this
question with neither passion nor prejudice will find it difficult to come to any other
result that that there has only been disadvantages – perhaps even worse – to the rest of the

328 Ibid.
Moscow/Paris, 1934-1937: Communism Turns Ugly

world as a result of the existence of the Soviet Union.” Schwarzschild had to qualify this view: the question was not whether Soviet socialism in theory was a good example for the rest of the world, nor was he trying to question whether the Soviet Union could be a “useful element” to the free peoples of the world. There was, he wrote, a difference between an alliance based on common opposition to a third party (Nazism) and an alliance based on common principles. In Schwarzschild’s view, the only defensible policy for Western leftists was one of “negative alliance and positive opposition” with the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{329} France and England, in other words, should form an alliance of necessity with the Soviet Union, while at the same time opposing Communism in principle. Schwarzschild knew that Western Communists would demand that he and other anti-Bolsheviks “value their state and they themselves, or that one would at least bury one’s own thoughts and give the Communists a monopoly of influence.” It was the Communists most of all, remarked Schwarzschild, who ought to understand his stance. Just as Lenin had made temporary alliance with Alexander Kerensky in 1917 in order to defeat the “counter-revolutionary General Kornilov,” while still agitating against Kerensky, so, too, ought Western leftists to ally themselves with the Soviets while still pursuing anti-Soviet propaganda.

Yet Schwarzschild was not content to end there. In the next section of “The Pandora’s Box,” Schwarzschild offered a revisionist account of Soviet and European history. Lenin, he wrote, had been highly inconsistent during 1917 as to whether it was possible for revolution to take place in the Russian Empire before the proletarian in other, more industrialized countries had taken power. So, too, had Lenin changed his position on whether unconditional surrender to the Germans would be acceptable. The point of all

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 1090.
of these changes in positions was that the “young, gigantic foreign body” that had been erected in Soviet Russian was a bundle of contradictions, “maneuvered by its own necessities into a unparalleled whirlpool of enmity and fear with the rest of the world.” Schwarzschild was downplaying the contradictions and tensions in Russian society that centuries of Imperial rule had built up, not to mention the fact that Russian peasants had their own revolution prior to the October Revolution. Nonetheless, he was largely right when he wrote the following:

The betrayal in war (probably the event that had the bitterest and most far-reaching effects of all for much time), the confiscation of all levels of society of property, even the lowest (which was cause for alarm in a world with an incomprehensibly wide distribution of wealth and inconceivably deep desires for property; even the lower classes were alarmed), the eventual establishment of a dictatorship that mercilessly abolished every trace of the traditional political rights and the traditional guarantees to the individual (just as the world was in the midst of a crusading thrones for these very rights): all of this was piled up in the idea of Soviet Russia, and in a world that found itself confronted for the long term with the threat of such a foreign body, evil defensive reactions were inevitable.330

In Schwarzchild’s view, the existence of the Soviet Union was responsible for many of the problems in Europe ever since 1917. The threat of Bolshevism had made the Allies reluctant, he wrote, to further disarm Germany after World War I or to remove the “militaristic nationalist class” from its position in society. Later, politicians in Weimar Germany were forced to rearm as the Soviet Union developed its own military forces. In Italy, Schwarzchild wrote, “it is outside of the realm of possibility that Mussolini would have been tolerated, created, and invited into government had there not existed the panic of world revolution and the center of Soviet Russia from which this threat emanated.”331 Only the new threat of Bolshevism justified the changes to society that Mussolini demanded, and if people complained, there always existed the defense that Italian Fascism was nothing compared to Communism. Moreover, from whom else had

330 Ibid., 1091.
331 Ibid., 1096.
Mussolini, “the rat king of counter-gangsterism,” learned how to stage a seizure of power if not the Bolsheviks?

Schwarzschild went even further. More than teaching the Italian Fascists how to operate, Bolshevism was, he wrote, the template for National Socialism. “There is,” wrote Schwarzschild, “nothing fundamental to the methods of enterprise and the maxims of our non-Russian oppressor that was not shown to them by the Soviet Union – indeed, was only shown in the Soviet Union.” In Schwarzschild’s view, there had been, to use the phrase of a controversial historian, a “causal nexus” between the atrocities of War Communism and those of the Nazis. Only in Russia “did the Nazis have the chance to see the first ‘total state,’” wrote an increasingly incensed Schwarzschild. “They have been able to study how in Russia the first total usurpation of power on the part of a single group that not only dissolved all other parties, not only denied justice to every marginal group that did not meet the regime’s standards, but [also] controlled people’s minds.” A secret police, the total mobilization of all citizens from the cradle to the grave, the unlimited extension of government power: all of this the Nazis could learn from the Bolshevik case. Simply put, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were the authors of a new style of politics foreign to Europe until they themselves indirectly taught it to their sworn opponents.

The conclusion of Schwarzschild’s article was simple and marked him as a clear anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist in marked contrast to the other “antifascists” of the world of the émigrés. Even if Bolshevism had brought improvement to Russia (itself a doubtful proposition), “Soviet Russia was for the world outside of Russia for all twenty years of its

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existence nothing but a wide-open Pandora’s Box,” one that had produced both Italian Fascism as well as Nazism. Nonetheless, Schwarzschild did not reserve particular scorn for Lenin, for, he noted, “no man is guilty of this monstrous result; it is the wages of an utterly wrong judgment of the world, of a totally false taxation of the world’s possibilities.” The tragedy of Bolshevism had not to do with the failings of Lenin, but rather the intellectual’s miscalculation of how he or she could change the world. In other words, while Schwarzschild wrote as an anti-Marxist, his fault with Bolshevism seemed not to lay with the class character of it per se, but rather with its dreams of remaking the world while failing to appreciate how immutable some traits of humanity remained. Schwarzschild had, of course, been an anti-Nazi to this point, and as we have seen, his anti-Bolshevism became more and more pronounced throughout the late 1930s. But on the basis of the tone of his condemnation of Bolshevism here, it is most accurate to see him as an anti-totalitarian, opposed both to the Bolshevik project and Nazi counter-project to remake the world in man’s own image. While Schwarzschild wrote before the Holocaust – the one part of National Socialist rule that seems to have been “invented” without the inspiration of events in the Soviet Union – his portrayal of Bolshevism as a Pandora’s Box remains largely accurate, and it was sorely needed at a time when few other critics were willing to denounce the Soviet Union. Most broadly, however, Schwarzschild discussion of the “Pandora’s Box” shows just how little “antifascism” was the word for Schwarzschild. Campaigns about “antifascism” were the stuff of parades in Moscow and Spain, but in Paris, Schwarzschild had taken up a rhetoric of anti-totalitarianism that directly compared National Socialist and Communist rule, was

333 Ibid., 1094.
opposed to totalitarianism more than Nazism or Communism per se, and was far removed from the days of “antifascist” alliance with the Communists in 1934-1936.

This was the world of Communism and intellectuals in Europe in the late 1930s, a world of hopes for democracy to replace the Third Reich, of the fantastic spectacle of the Moscow Trials, of faked letters, accusations of affiliations with Nazism, and the collapse of the “antifascist” front. By looking at the history of opponents to Nazism in Paris in 1934-1937 through the pages of Das Neue Tagebuch, we have read not only of the hopes and disappointments of this era, but also hopefully shown how inaccurate the usual concept of “antifascism” is to describe this period. As we saw, the only period that could be dubbed a time of resistance “against the common enemy” was from early 1934 to August 1936, and even that was a period during which Comintern officials were open about their ultimate desires for a Soviet Germany, and that a democratic Germany was only a transition to a Communist German state. What jumped out as we looked through this period was not the period of “antifascism” from late 1935 to August 1936, but rather the year and a half of open animosity between Schwarzschild and the German Communists sparked by the Moscow Trials and Communists’ apologetic reactions to them; not the unified statements of humanism between the Communists and socialists in February 1936, but the debates about whether Stalinism was a humanism as conducted between Gide, Feuchtwanger, and Schwarzschild in 1936-1937; not unity among Germans, but the crystallization of pro- and anti-Soviet intellectuals around Die neue Weltbühne and Das neue Tagebuch in 1937; not “antifascism,” but Schwarzschild’s anti-totalitarianism. As Schwarzschild put it himself in a 1947 curriculum vitae,

I was, in particular, one of the rare Anti-Nazis who did not fall victim to the “popular front” litany of Soviet Russia. For long years before the Hitler-Stalin-Pact I refused to recognize the existence of any antagonism of principle between Moscow and Berlin, and
did not put any trust in the Kremlin words and assurances, and consistently warned to expect more exasperating surprises from this quarter than any other.\textsuperscript{334}

With this in mind, the question now becomes how it was that the story of Schwarzschild was largely not treated by Western historians until now, what implications the story of \textit{Das Neue Tagebuch} may have for historians of inter-war Europe, and the usefulness of the concept of “antifascism.” Let us turn, then, from the controversial articles of German Paris in 1935-1937 and the courtrooms and squares of Moscow to the streets of New York in the summer of 1940.

\textsuperscript{334} Leopold Schwarzschild, Curriculum Vitae, 1947, Leo Baeck Institute (New York), File AR 7043, Box 1, File 1.
New York, 1940-1941: *Gog and Magog* and the Historiography of Antifascism

It was September 12, 1940, and as Schwarzschild stepped off the *S.S. Nea Hellas* onto the docks of New York, he must have felt relieved after the events of the past year.\(^{335}\) *Das Neue Tagebuch* had continued to publish until the German invasion of France; its last issue appeared on May 5, 1940. Schwarzschild, along with many other opponents of Hitler, was transferred to a French internment camp by the middle of that month, and after a few days there, transferred into the Foreign Labor Company of the 143\(^{rd}\) Reserve Regiment of the French Army. It is unclear to what degree Schwarzschild actually participated in the Battle of France himself, but a day after French surrender, Schwarzschild was demobilized and left waiting in Vichy France. This, however, was no consolation, as Nazi officials demanded his handover. But on August 9, 1940, Schwarzschild was able to obtain an emergency visa from the American consulate in Marseilles, and six days later, he had boarded the *S.S. Nea Hellas*. After a stopover in Lisbon for a few days until September 3, Schwarzschild was on his way to America.\(^{336}\)

The global news of the last few months was even more tumultuous. Only a few months after Schwarzschild’s debates with the German Communist antifascists in Paris, the Third Reich continued its expansionist foreign policy. Austria was annexed in March 1938, and the *Sudetenland* of Czechoslovakia came in September 1938, to be followed by the remainder of the country in March 1939. In a March 25, 1939 article, Schwarzschild wrote that the only positive effect of the occupation of Czechoslovakia was that it would finally awake Westerners to the true nature of National Socialism:


\(^{336}\) Leopold Schwarzschild, Letter to Director of Central Post Office (Lisbon, Portugal), October 19, 1940, Leo Baeck Institute (New York), File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.
New York, 1940-1941: *Gog and Magog* and the Historiography of Antifascism

This did it. After six years, this finally did it. The sinister documentary of violence, robbery, and murder during the ides of this March rammed the lesson home. A country which, because it was a credit to civilization, had already been assaulted and crippled, was finally to perish in the process. An honest, hard-working, trusting nation has now to pay the price and to endure the long night of bondage. But this has opened their eyes! They now know what they are up against. They now know what to expect. At long last it is understood, acknowledged, and accepted. No more attempts to prevaricate, construe, twist, contradict, and indulge in fantasies. It has at long last been recognized: these men are out to subjugate everything and everybody. To exercise power, to rule, is their one and only objective.\(^{337}\)

Later that year, on August 24, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a secret non-aggression pact, and a month later, both states had invaded and divided Poland among themselves. News of the pact between the Nazis and the Bolsheviks shocked many Western observers, especially those Communists antifascists of Paris who had gone to extreme lengths to defend what had been the world’s major anti-Nazi state. Schwarzschild, on the other hand, was hardly surprised. “Here they stand, united,” wrote Schwarzschild on September 2, “the Moscower and the Berliner, the NSDAP Member and the Comrade. They have, along with all that which they represent, become one, Naschevism, Commfascism.”\(^{338}\) By the next year, Nazi Germany had invaded France, too, and here Schwarzschild was in New York.

This chapter, divided into two parts, focuses on Schwarzschild’s arrival in America, his final assessment of the nature of National Socialism and Communism, and several reflections on the meaning of the history of *Das Neue Tagebuch* for the intellectual history of late modern Europe. The first part of this chapter is devoted to Schwarzschild’s arrival in New York in late 1940 and his unpublished book *Gog and Magog*, a work that marked Schwarzschild’s transformation into an anti-totalitarian thinker. The second part of this chapter summarizes the novel findings of this thesis and

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what directions the scholarship of antifascism ought to proceed based on the discoveries this thesis has made about Das Neue Tagebuch throughout.

Schwarzschild quickly began to settle down in New York City and make contacts with other anti-Nazi intellectuals in the city. By September 20, eight days after his arrival, Schwarzschild and his wife had begun to rent an apartment for ninety dollars per month at the Hotel Colonial on 51 West 81st Street,\footnote{Bill from Hotel Colonial, September 22, 1940, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.} where the Schwarzschilds lived until March 31, 1941.\footnote{Lease of Apartment from Hotel Colonial, October 1, 1940, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.} On October 4, Frida Kirchwey, the editor of The Nation, wrote letters of introduction for Schwarzschild to Maxim Lieber, a literary agent, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, requesting that they meet with him and help him find a forum to publish articles.\footnote{Frida Kirchwey, Letter to Maxim Lieber, October 4, 1940, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2, and Frida Kirchwey, Letter to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, October 4, 1940, , Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.} A few weeks later, on October 29, Quincy Howe, the editor of Simon and Schuster, wrote a letter of recommendation for Schwarzschild to Bruce Bliven, the editor of The New Republic.\footnote{Quincy Howe, Letter to Bruce Bliven, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.} Schwarzschild apparently tried to submit an article to The Nation on the expulsion of the French Rothschilds, but by mid-November, Managing Editor Robert Bendiner rejected the piece as too long.\footnote{Robert Bendiner, Letter to Leopold Schwarzschild, November 13, 1940, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 2.}

Even if Schwarzschild had difficulty getting his pieces published in magazines in America during these first few months, it was not as if his views were totally alien in America, or elsewhere, for that matter. By the fall of 1940, comparisons between Nazism and Communism had become common. The Christian Science Monitor wrote that...
“Communism and Fascism are essentially alike, for each means the exaltation of force, the suppression of liberties, a regimentation and discipline by one will which brooks no opposition and which subordinates the individual to the demands of the state.”

Closer to New York, the August-September 1938 issue of *Partisan Review* featured essays by Leon Trotsky, Victor Serge (an émigré from the Soviet Union highly critical of Stalin), and Dwight Macdonald, all criticizing artistic production in Russia. Following the announcement of the Pact, the board of the American Civil Liberties Union voted 10-9 to expel Gurley Flynn, a longtime labor activist and Communist Party member, on the grounds that she was an “apologizer” for totalitarianism and hence could not defend civil liberties. What all of these different groups meant by totalitarianism varied. Trotsky focused mostly on artistic production, noting that “even the art of the court of absolute monarchies was based on idealization but not on falsification.”

Religious groups focused on state persecution of religion, or state-endorsed atheism. By November 1939, the American Philosophical Association was organizing symposia on just what the totalitarian state was. The point, however, was that others besides Schwarzschild had begun to see Russia and Germany as manifestations of the same phenomenon.

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349 Trotsky, Ibid.
Schwarzschild he used his time in New York to join this debate and to compose his most ambitious – and unpublished – work, *Gog and Magog: The Nazi-Bolshevik Twins*. The book, which was to be published by Oxford University Press, shows how much Schwarzschild had become an anti-totalitarian rather than an antifascist. Indeed, the message that emerges from the 190 page unpublished manuscript is closer to Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* than anything written by the German Marxists in Paris in exile in 1940. Much of *Gog and Magog* is a history of interwar Europe, describing Lenin’s changes in position prior to the October Revolution, the ways that Comintern strategy may have helped the Nazis come to power, and how not only the Bolsheviks but also the Nazis had achieved the total state control of their national economies. At a time when Nazi Germany enjoyed the sympathies of some American capitalists, too, Schwarzschild reminded readers that “it is beginning to dawn upon the most hard-bitten millionaires that Nazism is just as hard on capitalism as Communism.” The 144 pages that constitute the first two parts of the manuscript – “The Creation” and “German Bolshevism” – are no exception to Schwarzschild’s writings in that they offer a thoughtful reading of inter-war European history, but the most significant part of *Gog and Magog* is Part III, “The Product.” “After a career that has gone far to enrich the history of terror and crime,” wrote Schwarzschild, “both systems stand clearly defined,” wrote Schwarzschild at the beginning of this chapter. “What kind of conditions have they created in the area they govern? What kind of life do they want to introduce into the rest of the world?”

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351 Leopold Schwarzschild, “Auto-Biographical Notes,”, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
353 Ibid., 1
Schwarzschild thought that there were two fundamental qualities of totalitarian rule. The first was that “the system can and actually must do away with the division of human life into dependent and independent, public and private halves.” The average person in a liberal democracy, Schwarzschild continued, could not grasp what totalitarianism meant, because “they picture dictatorship as reducing the area of the private sphere, but not as suppressing it entirely.” As Schwarzschild put it eloquently:

If the events in the political sphere [of a democracy] are unpleasant, they imagine, there is always the possibility of submitting to compulsion as far as it extends, and for the rest, “not worrying about politics.” Precisely this is neither permitted nor possible in Germany and in Russia. It is impossible “not to worry about politics”; politics worries about you every minute.

This was Schwarzschild as an anti-totalitarian theorist. There was no mincing words about how the Soviet Union was morally superior to Nazi Germany, as he had done in 1933, nor was there even a comparison between the U.S.S.R and Germany, as Schwarzschild did in 1937 when he called the Soviet Union “Red Nazidom.” Bolshevism and National Socialism were existentially the same; the differences between the two forms of totalitarianism were only superficial.

The second feature of totalitarianism, noted Schwarzschild, was the “invention of a new technique of domination: the ‘party.’” Neither the NSDAP nor the Bolshevik Party had anything in common with the political parties of the 19th century. Once the Nazis and Bolsheviks had taken control of the state in Germany and Russia, respectively, one might have expected the Party organizations to disintegrate, wrote Schwarzschild. After all, “what use have the leaders for the rank and file of the special party group, once they have enslaved the whole people?” The answer, it turned out, was a lot. For “both in Russia and in Germany, the party is today a monstrous, millionfold multiplication of the

354 Ibid., 2.
355 Ibid., 4.
phenomenon elsewhere called a police informer or stool pigeon.” The expansion and mass membership of the National Socialist and Communist Parties represented, wrote Schwarzschild, a fulfillment of the dream of every “autocratic police body: a state of affairs in which every single man is watched by an informer every minute of the time.” In Schwarzschild’s mind, only Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union could be dubbed totalitarian. It was only in those two states, he wrote, that “the reality of existence is entirely determined by one all-embracing purpose and one all-embracing means. The purpose is the appropriation of individual life. The means is the mammoth-informer, the ‘party.’”356 Again, Schwarzschild’s criticism of the despotic European states had nothing to do with the specifics of either the Nazi or Bolshevik case, nor with the exploitation of proletarians, nor with the defense of “European culture.” What most concerned Schwarzschild, instead, was the total liquidation of the private sphere in both countries, the total inability of the individual to determine his or her own meaning in life. Far from both his anti-barbarism stance of 1933 and the Marxism of Communist antifascists, the Schwarzschild of 1940-1941 was an anti-totalitarian, opposed to states that sought to own human beings and dictate the meaning of their life for them.

While Schwarzschild regarded the destruction of the private sphere and the establishment of “the Party” as the two most important features of totalitarian rule, he continued on the same bent as he analyzed other common features of Germany and Russia. There was the normalization and standardization of “the totality of factual and general knowledge, opinion, convictions and emotions according to the need of the state.”357 Whether it was done intently or not, both states created a new “human product”

356 Ibid., 6.
357 Ibid., 8.
that had grown satisfied with its poor material conditions in the two countries and began to believe in the lies the regimes would feed them. Schwarzschild wrote, for example, of an anti-Nazi friend of his who had visited him during the 1937 Paris Exhibition.

We went to a restaurant and a large bowl of butter was set on the table. My German acquaintance remarked ironically on the “cheap French propaganda trick.” Even he had been unable to escape the impact of the stories in German newspapers about catastrophic butter shortages in every possible country, particularly in France. I had to take him out to the country in a car to convince him that there was plenty of butter in every village. Such is the force with which the monopolistic propaganda product is drilled into every brain.358

Almost all of the tropes that would be applied to the Soviet Union years later by writers like Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, and Zbigniew Brzezinski were here, in other words. Schwarzschild was and had been writing as if there existed an ideological war between liberal democracies and totalitarian states since at least 1936-1937. Indeed, the conclusion to Gog and Magog was an affirmation of liberal values and the precedence of man’s dignity over economic needs: “in the hierarchy of necessary things, the animal minimum of bread is by no means followed by butter to spread on it. Far above it in importance are immaterial essential needs. If these are not satisfied,” wrote Schwarzschild, “the individual’s life becomes a jungle, and the garden of his creative achievement a desert.”359 The tragedy of totalitarianism, beyond the fact that it represented a gross overextension of state power, was its “effort to create perfections that have never existed: the perfections of equality and order.”360 Both European totalitarianisms sought, concluded Schwarzschild, to make mankind conform to a “mysterious ‘Reason in History.’” Intellectually speaking, Communism and National Socialism represented a violent form of historical determinism that denied human contingency. The last lines to Gog and Magog bear a deep similarity to those of Hannah

358 Ibid., 17-18.
359 Ibid., 43.
360 Ibid., 44.
New York, 1940-1941: *Gog and Magog* and the Historiography of Antifascism

Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Besides those totalitarian perfections of “equality and order,” anything was possible on Earth, and man, not laws of class or race, made history:

> All conceivable paths are always open to history. Everything can be made of it, and the opposite of everything. No higher compulsion and no secret impel or help those who make it. The fate of mankind has only one source: the actions of mankind itself.

*Gog and Magog* was insightful, but it was never published. As noted, *Gog and Magog* was written in the fall, winter, and spring of 1940-1941, and it was to be published by Oxford University Press. According to Schwarzschild’s notes, *Gog and Magog* was to be printed on June 23, 1941 – the day, as it turned out, after “Hitler chose to jump at Stalin’s throat.”

What happened next has to rank among the strangest coincidences in intellectual history. “[*Gog and Magog]*,” wrote Schwarzschild, “was stopped in the process of printing because Hitler attacked the Soviets, and opinions that were inimical to the latter were no longer considered opportune.” Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union on June 22, combined with the prevailing Western preference for the Soviets over the Nazis prevented the publication of one of the earliest analyses of totalitarianism. At the time, moreover, Schwarzschild and his wife were in the process of applying to become American citizens, and so Schwarzschild made no further effort to have this unpublished work of anti-totalitarianism published. Thus, *Gog and Magog* sits today as a finished manuscript in the archives of Center for Jewish History in New York.

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361 Leopold Schwarzschild, “Auto-Biographical Notes,” Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
362 Leopold Schwarzschild, quoted in Unknown, Letter, 1971, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 3, File 5.
363 H.R. Knickerbocker, Letter to “To Whom It May Concern,” July 28, 1941, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 1.
The rest of Schwarzschild’s career was devoted to anti-Marxism and finding a stable post-war resolution in Europe. Following the non-publication of *Gog and Magog* in 1941, Schwarzschild became an American citizen along with his wife, Valerie, and lived in New York City, vacationing at least once in Florida.\(^\text{364}\) In the mid-1940s, he wrote several books addressing the resolution to the Second World War, *World in Trance* and *Primer of the Coming World*, as well as the anti-Marxist biography of Marx, *The Red Prussian*. Schwarzschild was working on a larger history of Western Marxism, *The Red Prussian’s Heritage* at the time of his death in Santa Margherita, Italy, on October 2, 1950.

Let us end the narrative about Schwarzschild and *Das Neue Tagebuch* here and turn to the novel findings of this thesis. By looking at the history of antifascism through the lens of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, this thesis has reached three conclusions that concern the historiography of antifascism.

The first is that past historians have overrated both the unity of the “antifascist” movement as well as the supposed bipolar worldview that went along with being an opponent of Nazism during the 1930s. One example of this kind of reading could be found in Anson Rabinbach’s 2006 article “Moments of Totalitarianism.”\(^\text{365}\)

Popular Front organizations embraced anti-fascists, from intellectual luminaries like Roman Rolland, André Gide, and Heinrich Mann, to the countless footsoldiers who attended Soviet dance recitals, lectures by the Archbishop of Canterbury, or tea parties for Spain. The rhetoric of anti-fascism became a political lingua franca that obliterated all differences among “progressives.” Christians, Socialists, Jews, Communists, Liberals, even vegetarians (Scott Nearing) could link arms against the “common enemy.” The everyday culture of anti-fascism sustained the mood of polarized perception.\(^\text{365}\)

Rabinbach’s assessment of the “antifascist” movement glosses over the major rifts between different members of the anti-Nazi constellation in the 1930s. As we saw in

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\(^\text{364}\) Photos of Valerie Schwarzschild, Leo Baeck Institute, File #AR7043, Box 1, File 14.
“The World of the Emigres,” writers for *Das Neue Tagebuch* like Schwarzschild and Siegfried Kracauer took idiosyncratic and polarizing positions on issues from whether or not to support Engelbert Dollfuss to how to read or write a book. A “rhetoric of antifascism” existed, but it was not ecumenical. Schwarzschild and the writers for *Das Neue Tagebuch* used a completely different vocabulary from the *Braunbuch* or more moderate Communist writers like Fritz Sternberg to describe their world; the usual Marxist terms like “worker,” “capitalist,” and “peasant” were nowhere to be found in the pages of *Das Neue Tagebuch*. Schwarzschild’s articles never read of “antifascism” or an “antifascist” movement; if the seven years’ worth of titles of the 3,511 full articles in *Das Neue Tagebuch* are any judge, the word “fascism” is featured in an article’s title only twice, and the word “antifascism” never appeared in the title of an article in the paper. There was a “common enemy,” but historians have overrated the unity this fact engendered between the anti-Nazis. There seemed to have been a moment of genuine ecumenical antifascism in the first half of 1936, before the Moscow Trials, but as we saw, Communist anti-Nazis were never really open in their hopes for a post-Hitler Germany, and following the Moscow Trials, the gap between the Communists and non-Communists grew even wider. We saw, for example, how Bruno Frei sought to discredit *Das Neue Tagebuch* as a member of a Nazi-Trotskyite alliance, and how Schwarzschild did not hesitate to write of “Red Nazidom” or make direct comparisons between Nazism and Stalinism in 1936-1937. As has been emphasized throughout, this is why not only Rabinbach but also Eric Hobsbawm has misjudged the period. There was an international ideological civil war of sorts, but it did not have two sides. More research needs to be done into the reception of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, but it seems that there were at least three
sides to the intellectual terrain of the 1930s: Nazis, anti-Nazi Communists, and anti-Nazi liberals like Schwarzschild who prefigured the Cold War liberals of the 1950s.

This gets to the second major conclusion of this thesis: not all antifascists were Communists. It is personally difficult for the present author to understand why the previous generation of historians of antifascism devoted so much attention to Communist antifascists. I can only suspect that the existence and visibility of the Eastern European Communist states, especially the GDR, that proclaimed antifascism as their *raison d’etre* encouraged many contemporary observers to assume that the antifascism of the 1930s was primarily a Communist phenomenon. This is not a defensible position. As should be clear from Schwarzschild and Rudolf Aron’s analysis of the German economy, Schwarzschild’s dubbing of Soviet Communism as “Red Nazidom,” and Schwarzschild’s totally non-Marxist account of National Socialism in *Gog and Magog*, Schwarzschild was never a Communist in the first place, and only became more passionately anti-Communist throughout the 1930s. This is even more striking given that *Das Neue Tagebuch* was not a minor publication. It had the widest readership of the major German exile publications, not only in terms of raw numbers, but also in the sense that *Das Neue Tagebuch* was read by not only leftist exiles (the case with *Die Neue Weltbühne*, the *Pariser Tageblatt*, and the *Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung*), but also liberal and bourgeois readers in Europe and America.\(^{366}\) Schwarzschild and *Das Neue Tagebuch* represented “the conservative middle, liberal-conservative bourgeois” that was a part of the anti-Nazi movement in the 1930s.\(^ {367}\) This poses a major problem for the thesis of Antonia


\(^{367}\) Ibid., 83.
Grunenberg’s *Antifascism – A German Myth*. Grunenberg was certainly right that the early years of the German Democratic Republic did not represent a golden age of German liberalism, but in focusing so much on the Communist version of antifascism, Grunenberg, along with others, failed to appreciate the non-Communist, anti-totalitarian German liberalism that existed under the aegis of *Das Neue Tagebuch*. It is another question whether discovered or invented historical traditions are any complement or replacement for civil society reforms in a democracy like the current German state. Nonetheless, Schwarzschild’s anti-barbarism, anti-totalitarian liberalism is certainly a more “usable legacy” than the discredited Communist antifascisms of the 1930s that sought to make Stalinism into a humanism.

This failure of previous historians to recognize the liberal, anti-Communist antifascism of *Das Neue Tagebuch* gets to the third and final novel finding. By focusing so much on the Communist side of antifascism during the 1930s, historians like Hobsbawm, Furet, Grunenberg, and others unwittingly advanced a narrative of the 1930s and the 20th century that overly focused on the clash between Communism and National Socialism and the discrediting of liberal democracy in Europe. Given what this thesis has shown of *Das Neue Tagebuch*’s positions, and given what is known about the breadth of the readership of the paper, it may be time to revise the typical narrative of the 1930s. Rather than seeing the period as one of crisis for liberalism, it is more accurate to separate the appeasement policies of the British and French governments throughout the period from the nascent aggressive anti-totalitarian liberalism of *Das Neue Tagebuch* and its readers like Churchill. Western democracies like Britain and France may have been in

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retreat throughout the 1930s, and there is something to be said for the appeal both Communism and (in some cases) National Socialism held for intellectuals. But it is important to remember that opposition to Nazism encompassed not only Communist antifascists but also anti-totalitarian liberals like Schwarzschild. As we have seen through the case of *Gog and Magog*, the visibility of these liberal anti-totalitarians was severely reduced by the publicity needs of World War II, but many of the ideas that Schwarzschild and contemporary anti-totalitarian liberals first developed in the 1930s were instrumental for the Cold War liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s, especially in America. In other words, based on this study of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, it seems that while the 1930s may have marked the end of one version of liberalism, it marked the beginning of an ascendant anti-totalitarian liberalism. Schwarzschild’s contemptuous attitude towards the Communist antifascists of Paris in 1936-1937 and the way his anti-totalitarianism had to be censored in the event of World War II, foreshadowed the course of anti-totalitarianism in the West for the second half of the 20th century. Anti-Nazism was the only thing that kept Schwarzschild from the throats of the Parisian Communist antifascists, and the same was true of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union until the defeat of “the common enemy,” Nazi Germany. Historians may continue to write about “antifascism” in the streets of Paris in the 1930s, but more remarkable than the two-year attempt at an antifascist front was what I have called Cold War Zero, the estrangement of liberals from Communists that presaged the totalitarian/”free world” divide of the later Cold Wars of the 20th century.

From the streets of Paris on July 1, 1933, to the literary annals of German Paris; from the spam-eating contests and statistical sheets of Berlin to the squares and skies of
Moscow on Aviation Day; from the antifascist quarrels of Europe to the beginning of anti-totalitarian liberalism in America, we have covered a lot in this thesis. As the present author finishes writing about the ideas of Leopold Schwarzschild and *Das Neue Tagebuch* some seventy-five years after the paper first appeared on the streets of German Paris, the debates about totalitarian politics and the struggle against National Socialism that dominated the conversations of Schwarzschild’s day are thankfully the stuff only of history theses. And indeed, any total history of European history of the 1930s must include those unbelievable German and Russian attempts to subject reality to that “mysterious ‘Reason in History’” and to deny men their own fate – as Schwarzschild put it, “the actions of mankind itself.”

It was these incredible and tragic events in Nazi Germany and, later, the Soviet Union, indeed, that moved Schwarzschild to begin *Das Neue Tagebuch* and turn his analytic skill to the events in those two states. Yet the history of this disparate and often contradictory constellation of opponents to National Socialism and Bolshevism vindicated Schwarzschild’s optimistic theory of history. “Love for Germany,” wrote Schwarzschild in the introduction to the first issue of *Das Neue Tagebuch*, “can today often only manifest itself as enmity towards its occupants.” But there was another way. “[It] is, if one can dub it so, a hope. […] Emigration, like any kind of distance from things and events, can bestow greater prescience, more thoughtful objectivity, and a penetrating insight.” By reading the world of the émigrés, the statistical sheets of Berlin, and the courtrooms of Moscow, this thesis has shown how Leopold Schwarzschild and the other writers for *Das Neue Tagebuch* – if not other antifascist intellectuals – fulfilled this hope. Whether contemporary historiography seventy years

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later will bear witness to Schwarzschild’s intellectual honesty and crusade against the European totalitarianisms remains an open question.
Photographs

A 1949 photograph of Leopold Schwarzschild.
The cover of the first issue (July 1, 1933) of Das Neue Tagebuch.
The world of the émigrés: advertisements in a 1933 issue of *Das Neue Tagebuch*. 
The world of the émigrés: advertisements for Parisian bookstores.
Undated photograph of Joseph Bornstein, a major writer for *Das Neue Tagebuch* on the Moscow Trials. (Courtesy Leo Baeck Institute).
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